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Abstract
In the 1970s the Canadian government took a strong stand against apartheid sport 
policies. Despite Canada!s limited sporting links with South Africa, Prime Minister 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his Liberal government took on a leading Commonwealth 
position in promoting the isolation of South African sport. The catalyst for this 
leadership  was Canada as host of two "mega! sporting events during the 1970s - the 
1976 Montréal Olympics and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. This thesis 
focuses on the progression and adoption of new policies and initiatives which looked to 
strengthen Canada!s foreign policies dealing with apartheid sport while promoting 
these initiatives within the Commonwealth. Canada, a senior member of the 
association, had proved itself to be a key  ally  of newly  independent Commonwealth 
nations throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These nations looked to Canada for 
guidance. Along with taking on a stronger Commonwealth position during the Trudeau 
era, Canada also looked to increase its international presence by  focusing less on its 
traditional ties with the United States and more on forging relationships with a variety of 
newer nations. As Canada looked outside its borders to assert itself, within the country 
regionalism was on the rise with the advent of Québec separatism. All these factors 
played a major role in the development of Canadian foreign policy  during the 1970s. 
This thesis focuses on the balance between internal and external pressures for change 
and how changes unfolded in light of Canada holding two mega sporting events in 
quick progression. From 1968 to 1980, Trudeau dominated Canadian politics. An 
engaging figure, he came to power promoting his notion of a "Just Society!  and looking 
to expand Canada!s international prestige. Newly  opened archives of the External 
Affairs Department at the Library and Archives Canada show that Trudeau played a key 
role in the development of Canada!s new policies, especially  during the period of 1975 
to 1978. The wide range of primary  sources consulted, many  recently  opened through 
Access to Information and Privacy requests, alongside a variety  of sources from 
voluntary  associations, analysed in this thesis provide a fulsome, chronological 
narrative of how Canada moved to the forefront of the Commonwealth and the 
association!s movement to isolate South African apartheid sport.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Scope and argument 
This thesis is a critical analysis of the Canadian government!s anti-apartheid sport 
policies in the 1970s. It focuses on the progression of these policies through the first 
incarnation of the Liberal Party  government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau from 1968 to 1979 
- a decade which witnessed a marked international strengthening of anti-apartheid 
sentiment, especially  amongst newly independent African states. Unlike in Britain, 
Australia or New Zealand, South Africa!s two main white sports - rugby  union and 
cricket - were not popular in Canada. Consequently, Canada!s direct sporting contact 
with South Africa was relatively  limited and primarily  in the field of athletics and other 
more marginal sports. Canada, however, was a leading member of the Commonwealth 
and necessarily  implicated in the wider post-colonial politics of the former British 
empire. Moreover, under Trudeau, Canada increasingly  aspired to play  a distinctive 
and progressive role in world affairs. It was against this background that Canada acted 
as host to two of the world!s largest sporting events: the Montréal Olympic Games of 
1976 and the Edmonton Commonwealth Games of 1978. This tension is central to the 
thesis, the argument of which is reciprocal: that Canada!s international interests 
impacted upon its holding of "mega! sporting events and that these events also directly 
influenced the conduct of foreign policy. Hence, in its broadest sense this is a case 
study of the role of politics in sport and of sport in politics.   
In addressing the evolution of Canada!s anti-apartheid sports policies in the 1970s, this 
thesis examines the balance between internal and external pressures for change. What 
was the role of moral pressure exerted by  Churches, trade unions and other 
progressive bodies and individuals in the formulation of an anti-apartheid sports policy? 
Did Canadian economic and trading interests effect this? What role did Canadian 
regionalism, notably  the growing "problem! of Québec separatism, play? Or was it 
rather external factors - Canada!s desire to increase its "middle-power! status or the 
relations with emergent African nations, for example - which were the crucial catalysts 
for changes to Canada!s sports policy in relation to South Africa? 
The hosting of major international sporting events is often seen as an honour. But the 
Canadian government soon discovered it could be a burden. The staging of these 
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events, especially  the modern Olympic Games, of course, had frequently  been subject 
to political intrigue and international diplomacy. In the year Trudeau came to power, this 
kind of politicisation of sport was apparent to all. The 1968 Mexico City  Olympics was 
preceded by a massacre of protesters 10 days before the start of the Games whilst the 
Black Power salute by American 200-meter medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos 
during the playing of the Star Spangled Banner was a hugely  controversial political 
gesture. As Montréal began to prepare for the 1976 Olympics, the Trudeau government 
had to come to terms with the new phenomenon of political terrorism. During the 
Munich Olympics of 1972, 11 members of the Israeli Olympic contingent were killed by 
members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September. Despite the aspirations 
and efforts of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to keep international political 
conflict out of the Games, clashes of Cold War ideology and new forms of extremism 
were never far away. Heading off or containing such conflicts could not be managed at 
the level of the host city, which did not hold political power. Reluctantly  or otherwise, 
the host state was drawn in. 
In the Canadian case the key  factor was the coincidence of a leading Commonwealth 
nation hosting the Olympics at the same time as an international movement for cutting 
all sporting links with South Africa gathered momentum. The African Commonwealth 
nations had, on several previous occasions, including 1970 and 1974, threatened to 
boycott the Commonwealth Games because of continuing sporting ties between white 
Commonwealth nations and South Africa. This campaign was backed by  powerful 
protest movements, especially  in Britain and in New Zealand, designed to stop tours of 
white South African rugby or cricket teams selected on a racial basis. This in turn 
raised the political stakes and temperature across the Commonwealth. The 
coincidence of the 1976 Olympic Games and the 1978 Commonwealth Games, being 
held in a leading Commonwealth country, which proclaimed itself as progressive and 
multicultural, provided African Commonwealth nations with the opportunity  to isolate 
South Africa even further. Central to the thesis is the period 1975 - 1978, during which 
the threat of boycott, first of the Olympics and then the Commonwealth Games, 
became a reality. How did this come about and how was it dealt with? This leads 
directly  to consideration of the key  role of Canada in the framing of the 1977 
Gleneagles Agreement, which governed Commonwealth sporting policy  with South 
Africa until the collapse of the white supremacist regime. Thus this thesis, whilst 
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primarily  concerned with specifically  Canadian internal policy  issues, throws new light 
on wider questions of international and Commonwealth relations with South Africa. 
Method and Structure 
Why  did Canada!s anti-apartheid sport policy  become much stricter when Canada had 
such limited direct sporting contact with South Africa? In order to answer this question 
and to evaluate carefully  the changes, nuances and development of Canada!s foreign 
policy  dealing with South African sport, this thesis is set out as a chronological analytic 
narrative. Why was this approach taken? There were, of course, other potential ways to 
approach the question and structure of the thesis. For example, a thematic approach 
could have been taken based upon the different "actors!  involved: the sporting 
federations, the host cities, the IOC, the Commonwealth, the activists and pressure 
groups and, most importantly, the Canadian state itself. Such an approach would have 
made it difficult to determine patterns of influence over time. As the activity  of the state 
in response to external pressure turned out to be of prime importance and the role of 
internal "actors! much less significant, a structure which gave each equal importance 
would not have served the wider explanatory purpose. 
The intensification of Canada!s anti-apartheid policies can best be explained 
historically, that is as part of an evolving narrative of change where one event or action 
led to an initiative, which in turn produced a further reaction. Such an approach also 
allows full scope for the key  role of certain individuals, the most important of whom was 
Trudeau. Hence the chapter structure of the thesis is based upon an unfolding 
sequence of events in which the Canadian government was drawn into responding to 
the changing demands of the international situation, notably the increasing stridency  of 
the African nations of the Commonwealth and their boycott threats. Hence the bulk of 
the thesis is devoted to the immediate build-up to the Montréal Games, the 
consequences of the boycott and the formation of the Gleneagles Agreement. 
By examining the evolution of policy  over time rather than taking a snapshot of it at a 
particular moment, it is possible to see the variety  and interplay  of forces influencing 
the Canadian government at any one time. Foreign and diplomatic policies are formed 
through complex interactions of interests, events and personalities. Only  a nuanced 
diplomatic history  can provide a satisfactory account of the rapid succession of events 
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from the boycott of the Montréal Olympics to the politics of avoiding another boycott in 
1978 at the Commonwealth Games. This involved a series of intense exchanges and 
high political maneuvering on the part of Canada and other senior members of the 
Commonwealth. 
A chronological narrative tracks the progression and development of the process of 
change whilst recognising the importance of contingent factors such as the force of 
personality. Here the recent availability  of new primary  archive sources, the nature and 
extent of which are set out in full in the following section, turned out to be of critical 
importance. A key  element of this thesis, and an important aspect of its originality, lies 
in the presentation of previously  unavailable or restricted material which casts new light 
on the nature and level of Canadian government activity  behind the scenes. For 
example, we can now see how concerned Canada and Britain were at the prospect of 
an African boycott of Edmonton, which threatened the unity and legitimacy of the 
Commonwealth itself. How  could a multicultural Commonwealth of nations continue if 
the majority  of its members felt alienated and marginalised due to race? Canada, as a 
senior member of the Commonwealth and as the nation often seen as the confidant of 
non-white Commonwealth nations, wanted to avoid, at all costs, any division of the 
association along racial lines.
There are many  ways a thesis such as this could have been written. History  is a 
discipline with a wide variety  of approaches ranging from Marxist based class analysis 
to viewing the past through the lens of gender, which has been especially  important in 
social and cultural history in recent years. This in turn has been the object of a post-
modernist critique which rejects "grand narratives! or theory-led accounts and focuses 
on the assumptions that the historian brings to the task derived from personal 
experience or inclination. This post-modern approach stresses the "linguistic turn!, 
paying greater attention to the way  language itself constructs the past and how the 
language of the historian also impacts on what is written.
My own approach has been determined by  my  education, reading and the nature of the 
subject I have chosen. My  training has been in political science and diplomatic history 
with a special emphasis on decision making by  elites. The focus of my  earlier Master!s 
research on Commonwealth politics reevaluated the role of Canadian Prime Minister 
John Diefenbaker at the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. My  choice 
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of doctoral subject and my approach to it followed from this; I look at how key  decisions 
were made at the highest level of government rather than trying to conduct a 
grassroots analysis of public opinion through the press or pressure groups. Whilst I 
acknowledge the significance of these influences on policy-making, my object was 
primarily  to interrogate the way national politicians and administrators respond to 
international political pressure at the very highest level of government. This forms the 
intellectual framework for my  study  of the changing nature of Canada!s anti-apartheid 
policy in sport.
My stress on a close reading of diplomatic texts means that my broad position is one of 
critical empiricism. By this I mean that I have not treated my primary  sources as "sacred 
texts! or from what Douglas Booth has labeled a simple "reconstructionist! position. In 
other words, I do not believe the historian can simply  take a text or "fact! at face value 
and assume that by accumulating a number of such documents or data in 
chronological sequence the "truth! will emerge in a simple fashion. Whilst this thesis is a 
primarily  a study in policy-making based mainly  on government sources, at each stage 
I have considered the specific historical context in which the text was produced and the 
purposes of the author in writing it. According to E.H. Carr, the modern historian "...has 
the dual task of discovering the few significant facts and turning them into facts of 
history, and of discarding the many  insignificant facts as unhistorical.!1  To further 
illustrate this point, Carr explains:
No document can tell us more than what the author of the document 
thought - what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen 
or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he 
thought, or even only  what he himself thought he thought. None of this 
means anything until the historian has got to work on it and deciphered it. 
The facts, whether found in documents or not, have still to be processed by 
the historian before he can make any  use of them: the use he makes of 
them is, if I may put it that way, the processing process.2 
Many of the primary  archival sources in this thesis are from newly  opened files; this 
allows for new interpretations on how the government of Canada consciously  advanced 
the anti-apartheid sport movement in the 1970s. Granted, the documents could have 
been analyzed via other, important historical theories. Marxist analysis could have been 
applied, highlighting the role capitalist nations like Canada and Britain played in 
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1 E.H. Carr. What is History? Reprint Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p.14-5.
2 Ibid, p. 16.
progressing South Africa!s international sport isolation at the behest of developing 
nations - thereby  imposing a solution, the Gleneagles Agreement, that best met their 
needs while toning down the anti-apartheid rhetoric. Or, a postcolonial analysis would 
have revealed that former African colonies successfully  progressed the anti-apartheid 
sport movement through consistent calls for sports boycotts of South Africa and 
actually  following through on its boycott threat at the 1976 Olympic Games. But, an 
empirical analysis of the facts, extracted from the specific sources noted below, was 
deemed the best way of portraying this particular historical topic because the 
progressive and intricate series of events that unravelled from 1968 through to 1980 
required a methodical, clear analysis of the steps involved in the development of 
Canada!s anti-apartheid sport policies.
This thesis begins by  examining the period which preceded the Trudeau years 
beginning in 1961, the year in which South Africa was declared a republic and ceased 
to be a member of the Commonwealth. The increasing isolation of South Africa, 
including its expulsion from the Olympic movement, forms the backdrop to Canada!s 
relationship with South Africa up to 1968 under the Conservative government of John 
Diefenbaker and the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson. Chapter Two also 
examines the development of a grassroots anti-apartheid sports movement in Canada. 
Chapter Three focuses, primarily, on the political climate in Canada in the late 1960s. In 
1968, young Liberal Pierre Elliott Trudeau was voted into the Prime Minister!s office on 
a wave of hope for change. This chapter assesses the significance of the rise of the 
separatist movement in Québec and Trudeau!s key role in foreign policy, especially  his 
interaction with other Commonwealth countries and his desire to increase Canada!s 
international influence.
In Chapter Four, Canada!s foreign policy  towards South African sport begins to change. 
It is in the early  1970s that Trudeau and his government, mainly  the Department of 
External Affairs, start to evaluate Canada!s policies and diplomacy towards South 
Africa. By  1975 Canada had further distanced itself from South Africa. But, how 
effective were the new policies that were approved? Would Canada legitimately  be able 
to claim they  were doing all they  could do to oppose apartheid through sport? This 
chapter examines how the changes progressed, how they  were approved and how 
they were received by other nations and by the Canadian public.
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Chapter Five sets the stage for the Montréal Olympics, explaining exactly  where South 
Africa stood in international sport in 1975 and 1976. During these years, the 
international movement to isolate South African sport really  gained momentum and 
groups such as the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) were 
actively  working to isolate all aspects of South Africa!s international sport contacts. This 
chapter also tracks the anti-apartheid sport movement in Canada, small as it may be, 
and the Canadian government!s moves to enforce its new anti-apartheid policies in the 
run-up to the Olympics. It was critical that Canada did not appear to be in sporting 
contact with South Africa, even indirectly, through New Zealand!s continuing rugby 
contact with South Africa. Even the invitation of a non-racially  selected team of disabled 
South African athletes to the Toronto Paralympiad, taking place in August 1976, proved 
highly contentious.
Chapter Six covers the period immediately  preceding and up to the Montréal Olympics 
along with the actual boycott of the Games. During this time, the preparation of the 
Olympics in Montréal were plagued with problems - over-spending, strikes, and 
allegations of corruption. Both the Canadian federal government and the Québec 
provincial government were under pressure to ensure Montréal was ready to host the 
events. However, South Africa was not the only  political problem. The Canadian 
government was also concerned with its burgeoning relationship with China and how 
that relationship  may be damaged should Taiwan be allowed to enter Canada to 
participate in the Olympic Games. A key  advantage of choosing a chronological 
historical structure for the thesis is evident here. Statesmen and their advisors rarely 
have the luxury  of concentrating on one thing at one time. Decisions are made under 
the pressure of multiple and simultaneous challenges and problems. Hence, by  looking 
beyond the narrow  anti-apartheid issue to the wider field of diplomacy, we can explain 
why  the Canadian government was caught by  surprise when the African nations finally 
put their boycott threat into action. Trudeau, his officials, the IOC and the press had 
been so focused on the China-Taiwan problem, they  had overlooked the obvious threat 
from the African states. 
Chapter Seven analyses the legacy  of the 1976 Olympic Games. Despite delivering a 
successful spectacle in sporting terms, the Montréal Olympics proved a financial 
disaster with the city  and the Québec government left to pick up a heavy  price tag. The 
Games were also a failure in terms of Canadian foreign affairs. This failure, however, 
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had major international consequences in bringing about further changes in Canada!s 
anti-apartheid sport policies and the effort of Trudeau and his government to ensure 
that the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games did not fall victim to another boycott. 
An "all white!  Commonwealth Games would have been a disaster and the chapter 
examines how Trudeau, closely  supported by  British Prime Minister James Callaghan 
and Commonwealth Secretary  Shridath Ramphal, worked together to develop  the 
Gleneagles Agreement to avoid future boycotts. 
In Chapter Eight, the focus is the Gleneagles Agreement in action. Was the agreement 
effective? How was it implemented? This chapter also tracks the run-up to the 
Commonwealth Games from the Gleneagles perspective, but also from the point of 
view of the Canadian government. As before the Montréal Games, Canada made 
additional changes to its anti-apartheid sport policies. Ensuring the success of the 
Edmonton Commonwealth Games became a major goal of Trudeau. He did not want to 
see a repeat of the Montréal boycott and another stain on Canada!s international 
reputation. 
Overall, the historical narrative moves from the late 1960s where Canada was relatively 
peripheral to the wider anti-apartheid movement to a position nine years later where 
Trudeau was at the heart of negotiating the agreement which would determine the 
conduct of Commonwealth policy  as a whole until the fall of the apartheid regime.3 
Close historical analysis year by year, month by  month - even week by  week or day  by 
day - reveals how the Canadian government itself as a leading Commonwealth power, 
rather than the IOC or the city  of Montréal, became the key  player in the continuing 
drama of sporting relations with South Africa. 
Sources
The key  role of central government in the story  explains the extensive use of state 
archives in this thesis. Here the recent release of a significant body of hitherto 
unavailable government papers of successive Liberal governments is critical. Without 
the declassifying of material through specific requests for access to restricted material, 
which were mostly successful, this study probably  could not have been written and 
certainly would not have been able to reveal the inner workings of government policy. 
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3 A Timeline of Key Events can be found in Appendix A.
These records, supplemented by  British holdings at the National Archives, turned out to 
be far more revealing than the archives of the IOC itself or other public bodies.
A key  resource for this thesis were the fonds of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Department of 
External Affairs and Sport Canada at the Library  and Archives of Canada (LAC) in 
Ottawa. The Trudeau archives were cross-referenced to the Department of External 
Affairs archives for the same time-period. Access to Information and Privacy  (ATIP) 
requests were made to the Canadian government for a wide range of materials dealing 
with South Africa, Canadian diplomacy and sport. Access was granted to the vast 
majority  of these files. The newly opened Department of External Affairs files provided 
a treasure-trove of information. External Affairs meticulously  documented events within 
South Africa and how these events impacted other African nations. These documents 
also showed the urgent need for change expressed in memorandums from External 
Affairs, and cables between External Affairs Ottawa and its offices in South Africa as 
well as those between Canada and key African Commonwealth members. The British 
National Archives at Kew provided key information surrounding Britain!s anti-apartheid 
sport policy and its relationship  with Commonwealth countries, specifically  Canada, 
during this time period. British government documents showed how the head of the 
Commonwealth developed its own anti-apartheid sport policies and how these policies 
influenced Britain!s interaction with other Commonwealth countries. 
The Historical Archives of the International Olympic Committee were also consulted 
and proved more limited, but they did provide key information surrounding the post-
Montréal boycott reaction of the IOC and the repercussions of the boycott. Importantly, 
the IOC archives included evidence from the nations that boycotted the Montréal 
Games. The information gathered from these three archival holdings laid the 
foundation of the thesis and provided an outline to base subsequent research. Given 
the specificity  of the topic, other policies concerning Canada!s foreign policy  towards 
South Africa were not investigated in depth, but any  wider policies referenced in sport-
related documents were researched further and developed in the thesis.
Although the archival research undertaken proved fruitful and the documents revealing, 
a critical approach to these sources is required. Richard Evans notes that historians 
are used to eliciting meaning from documents and comparing them to other 
documents, "...in this way a document can indeed be made to reveal more than its 
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author thought! and what the document does not mention allows an author to bring 
their own thoughts into interpreting a document.4  This interpretation allows for 
documents to be analysed from a multitude of views, with a variety  of supporting 
documentation - that!s why  there are so many  varying accounts of histories dealing 
with specific topics. But, when tackling archival research, it is necessary to look at 
biases and gaps in the interpreted story the documents are telling. Firstly, the 
documents consulted at LAC were those of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and 
Canadian governmental departments. They  focus almost solely  on Canada!s point of 
view and the development of Canadian policies and are skewed towards Trudeau and 
Canada!s point of view. Some insight is provided into the policies and actions of other 
Commonwealth governments through correspondence. Whilst useful, these exchanges 
inevitably offer a rather one-dimensional view of the policies of other countries and how 
they may  have been developed. Secondly, although most of the ATIP requests were 
approved, some documents remained closed to the public with no specific reason 
provided. Occasionally, information was withheld from portions of specific documents in 
the Department of External Affairs files, significant instances of this are discussed in 
the thesis. In particular, there was one file in the Trudeau fonds which, upon donation of 
the files by  Trudeau!s estate, was deemed restricted. The file: "Secret - Denial of Entry 
to Canada to South African Sportsman 23 June 1978! is closed at least until 2014, 
when it is due to be reviewed. Importantly, this file is dated approximately 6 weeks 
before the beginning of the 1978 Commonwealth Games; Canada would have been 
extra vigilant in ensuring that any  and all potential contact with South African sport was 
avoided. Thirdly, the documents provide varying points of view depending on the writer, 
the audience, contemporary  events, the type of document, the security  of the document 
or the writer!s desire to convey  a certain message or discourse for future use or 
legacy.5 While reading and evaluating the archival documents used in this thesis, deep 
analysis and cross-referencing to other types of resources was necessary  to fully 
capture the events surrounding the 1976 Olympics and the 1978 Commonwealth 
Games and Canada!s role in isolating South African sport. And, finally, fourthly, the 
External Affairs documents do not provide information surrounding the points of view of 
either the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) nor the organizing committee of the 
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5 Evans. In Defence, p. 109, 121 and Douglas Booth. The Field: Truth and Fiction in Sport History (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 10.
Montréal Games. There are three main potential reasons for this lack of 
documentation. One, the type of negotiations surrounding boycotts and anti-apartheid 
sport relations were going on at a high level within the federal government and were 
mostly  done secretly. This means that the COC and the Olympic organizing committee 
may not have been aware of how dire the situation had become in regards to the 
boycott threat. Two, the COC and organizing committee may  have been too 
preoccupied with mitigating the disastrous planning situation unravelling in Montréal, 
which is discussed further below. Three, the documents may  be housed in other 
archival holdings not consulted here. Despite these potential gaps, the External Affairs 
documents prove illuminating in shedding light on the historical events discussed in this 
thesis - providing new information on how events unfolded.
Documents at the National Archives provided insight into how the British government 
viewed Canada!s policies and also the development of their own policies dealing with 
apartheid sport. The documents consulted both at the National Archives and at LAC 
dealt mainly  with high politics and diplomacy, various other primary  sources and 
documents were consulted in an effort to provide context and public reaction to the 
policies adopted by the Canadian government.
In an effort to understand the non-governmental side of anti-apartheid activity  in 
Canada during this time period, other archival holdings reviewed at the LAC include the 
fonds of the following grassroots organisations: Communist Party  of Canada, Voices of 
Women (VOW) Canada, OXFAM Canada, Canadian University  Service Overseas-
Volunteer Service Overseas Canada (CUSO-VSO), YMCA Canada, and YWCA 
Canada. VOW seemed to be actively  involved in the anti-apartheid movement in 
Canada in its infancy, but kept no records past the early  1970s, while the YWCA 
Canada were mainly concerned with cutting economic ties with South Africa. Both the 
YMCA and YWCA Canada were concerned with humanitarian issues and often wrote 
letters to Prime Minister Trudeau regarding arrests by  South African authorities, political 
prisoners and the treatment of non-white South Africans. The archives of CUSO-VSO, 
OXFAM and the YMCA focused mainly  on their groups! work on the ground in Southern 
Africa. CUSO-VSO  and OXFAM!s archives, in particular, were only moderately  useful 
as they  did not provide information on specific policies, but instead focused on the 
projects they  were helping fund. Most of the information found in the archival holdings 
of these non-governmental organizations focused solely  on the organization!s 
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individual work, with very  little personal correspondence of staff members retained. The 
documentation focused on each group!s individual policies and mission, rather than the 
individual opinions of staff, volunteers or other participants. Therefore, these holdings 
trace the history and documentation of the collective rather than individual members. 
This fact reinforced the discourse of the groups listed above, while, in comparison, the 
archival holdings of the Canadian and British governments and their departments 
explored a variety  of opinions, depending on varying circumstances, including the 
individual writer of a document, the type of document (memo versus telegram versus 
formal letter, etc), the audience, and other individuals who may read a document by 
happenstance. 
At LAC, research was also conducted in the archives of the Canadian Labour 
Congress (CLC), United Auto-workers Archives and the Communist Party of Canada. 
These groups were mainly  concerned with the treatment of workers in South Africa. 
Although useful for shedding light on the labour movement!s efforts in promoting anti-
apartheid causes in Canada, the documents proved fragmented with no dedicated file 
dealing solely  with anti-apartheid policies. Additional independent archival holdings 
were audited for anti-apartheid activity, specifically: Canadian Federation of Students at 
McMaster University, United Church of Canada Archives and the Anglican Church of 
Canada Archives. Most of these organisations kept partial records of documents they 
deemed valuable when submitting them for archives at their respective locations. 
Although the documents consulted were useful, it proved difficult to track the 
progression and development of these groups and their support of the various anti-
apartheid organisations within Canada. With all archival holdings, what is submitted 
and/or kept for archiving depends on the individual(s) charged with retaining files from 
any department or organization and the individual(s) responsible for handing over 
documents to the archive-holding institutions consulted for this thesis. Richard Evans 
explains: "Archives are the product of the chance survival of some documents and the 
corresponding chance loss or deliberate destruction of others. They are also the 
products of the professional activities of archivists, which therefore shape the record of 
the past and with it the interpretations of historians.!6 Along the way, documents may be 
destroyed, misplaced, retained for personal reasons or deemed unnecessary to an 
historical legacy  or story. The raw documentation consulted and listed in the thesis was 
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illuminating, for the most part, but deeper research needed to be conducted in order to 
contextualise and analyze the documents found. This research included a survey  of 
secondary  sources, a review of key  newspapers, interviews and consultation of other 
important media like magazines and digital archives.
Unfortunately, after the fall of the South African apartheid regime, no formal archival 
holdings were established by  grassroots anti-apartheid groups working in Canada. The 
works of groups like Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa (CCSA) and the 
Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) can be traced 
through the formal archives of other organisations such as YMCA Canada and VOW 
Canada. In an effort to find out additional, non-documented information, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with Linda Lemberg of the CCSA and prominent Canadian 
anti-apartheid activist, former Canadian Olympian and well-known academic, Bruce 
Kidd. Kidd provided insight both from the perspective of an athlete and an activist; he 
was also able to provide context and leads for a variety  of events which took place 
within Canada. Questioning via email also took place with John Saul of TCLSAC. 
Interviews as a research tool are useful, but are subject to the validity of the memory of 
the interviewees, along with the biases that they  hold. These individuals were chosen 
due to their close connections to the anti-apartheid movement across several decades 
and their willingness to share information. The information from Kidd proved reliable - 
the information provided could be cross-referenced to existing secondary  and primary 
sources written by  himself and others, and traces of his active participation in the 
movement were found in the archival holdings at LAC. Kidd did provide the name of 
one individual who may have provided personal memories of the government!s role - 
Eric Morse, former employee of External Affairs. Unfortunately, Morse could not be 
found via general search of local phone books nor internet search. Both Lemberg and 
Saul were helpful, but focused, mainly, on their individual contributions rather than the 
roles of their respective organizations or the role of the actual movement. Lemberg 
seemed preoccupied with the role she felt the government played in repressing the 
CCSA, while Saul only  provided limited information via email, mentioning that he was 
working on his own memoirs. The grassroots movement!s history proved difficult to 
track on paper, the interviews did provide insight into the movement!s actions and 
provided useful leads in the pursuit of additional information and resources. 
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Newspapers were key primary  sources for the assessment of the changing state of 
Canadian opinion. The newspapers consulted were established Canadian dailies: 
Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, left-leaning and historically  supporters of the Liberal 
Party; and the Ottawa Citizen, in the main Conservative Party  supporters, although for 
many years, including those covered by  this paper, sympathetic to the Liberal Party. 
Coverage, especially  editorials, in these papers provided ongoing coverage of key 
events discussed in this thesis, including Commonwealth meetings and declarations, 
the Montréal Olympics and the Edmonton Commonwealth Games. The papers also 
closely  followed the development of the Trudeau government and its role in 
international politics. For the specific period of the Montréal Games the Montréal Star, 
the highest circulation English language daily newspaper available in Québec at the 
time, was consulted. Although this paper shut down in the late 1970s, it was an 
important source in tracking the fast-moving developments surrounding the boycott of 
the Montréal Games in July 1976. Although inevitably  limited in range - this thesis is not 
a study  of the Canadian press and the anti-apartheid movement - these papers were 
carefully selected to provide a cross-section of ideas and opinions circulating in 
Canada.
Other primary  sources included debates of the Canadian House of Commons, CBC 
archived news reports, magazines and documents published by  the United Nations and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat. These sources were used to cross-reference and 
clarify  the information found in the various archives. Most documents consulted 
focused on the development and advancement of Canada!s official diplomacy. The 
most succinct way to track these policies was through a chronological political 
narrative, which permits the reader to see how the policies developed over time, and 
how members of the government reacted to both external and internal events and 
pressures. 
Literature Review and Historiography  
Whilst the thesis relies primarily  on an extensive range of primary  sources, secondary 
sources in the form of books and articles on politics and sport in general, notably 
around Olympic issues, as well as specific studies of Canadian diplomacy, domestic 
politics and sports policy, were consulted. Three key texts deal, in some significant 
aspect, with the relationship between apartheid sport and the development of Canadian 
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foreign policy. First, Linda Freeman!s Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa 
in the Trudeau and Mulroney  Years is a general history focusing on Canada!s anti-
apartheid activities during the 1970s and 1980s.7 Importantly, Freeman discusses the 
sporting boycott, but her book glosses over the role that the Trudeau government 
played in isolating South African sport. To Freeman, despite appearing to be the 
champion of non-white nations of the Commonwealth, Canada!s anti-apartheid policies 
developed under Trudeau were not as supportive as claimed. Second, according to 
Donald Macintosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black, Canada played a leadership 
role in the Commonwealth by  helping negotiate the Gleneagles Agreement, especially 
since "...sport was a convenient vehicle with which Canada could show its resolve 
against apartheid without doing either harm to the economy  or running into any 
significant opposition from special interest groups.!8  Although Canada chose, for 
various internal and external reasons, to be strict on eliminating any sport contact with 
apartheid South Africa, it did so because it was an easy  target - there was very  little to 
lose for Canada as the nation did not hold strong sporting ties with South Africa and it 
allowed the federal government to appear tough on apartheid while continuing its 
economic and trade development with South Africa. Third, in Sport and Canadian 
Diplomacy, Macintosh and Michael Hawes reiterate the fact that strong anti-apartheid 
sport policies were an easy  way  for the Canadian government to show it was against 
apartheid and that the country  was doing all it could to isolate South African sport.9 
Macintosh and Hawes!s main sources for the chapters in the book dealing with 
apartheid sport were interviews, personal correspondence with key  players and 
archival holdings from the Department of External Affairs. When produced, this book 
was ground-breaking as it was the first real examination of the role of sport in the 
development of Canadian diplomatic policy. However, in light of newly  available 
archival materials, the chapters devoted to the development of Canada!s foreign policy 
dealing with South African sport do not heavily  evaluate how the policies developed nor 
the intricacies of the development process.
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A review of publications dealing with the general Canadian anti-apartheid movement is 
limited. Canadian anti-apartheid policies are often discussed in publications on 
Canadian diplomacy, foreign policy  and international relations. The main reason for 
this, as argued in the thesis, is that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement, during this 
time period, was not a major force either in Canadian domestic politics nor 
internationally.
In his autobiography, Memoirs, Pierre Elliott Trudeau makes no mention of either the 
1976 Montréal Olympics boycott nor the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games and 
the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement.10 Although the reason remains unclear, it 
may be because his autobiography  tends to focus on the events which were more 
positive in nature - perhaps the contentious issues, negotiations and events 
surrounding the 1976 Olympics and the 1978 Commonwealth Games were not how 
Trudeau wanted his story  to be remembered. The Pierre Elliott Trudeau and 
Department of External Affairs fonds provide a unique perspective not included in 
Trudeau!s autobiography. Through these primary  sources new light is shed on how 
Trudeau, and key  government ministers, reacted to the 1976 boycott threat, the actual 
boycott as it unfolded on the ground in 1976, and the actions the Prime Minister took to 
avoid a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Where Trudeau fails to address 
the 1976 boycott issue and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in his own writing, new 
archival sources can provide some insight into how the Canadian policy  developed and 
the amount of effort that Trudeau personally  exerted in ensuring the success of the 
1978 Games by  supporting the development of the Gleneagles Agreement and 
ensuring, once developed, that the agreement was adopted. The second part of John 
English!s biography of Trudeau, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 
1968-2000, also provides ample information regarding Canada-Québec relations 
throughout the period covered in this thesis. It does not, however, cover either the 
Montréal Olympic boycott nor the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games and 
Gleneagles Agreement. The book does provide limited information regarding the 
disastrous funding and financial situation which plagued the Montréal Games, but does 
not address the international relations and foreign policies which affected how the 
Games unfolded.11 English!s book portrays Trudeau as a strong leader and tends to 
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limit highlighting the deficiencies in his tenure, which may  be one reason for these 
exclusions. Other reasons include the limited interest from the Canadian public in 
Trudeau!s anti-apartheid policies and the fact that South Africa is no longer an 
apartheid state, so the issue seems less relevant.
Existing publications mainly  deal with general themes of the anti-apartheid movement 
in Canada rather than looking closely at the sporting dimension. Economic and trade 
ties with the apartheid regime were always a focal point for anti-apartheid activists 
within the country. A large and significant target, it was easy  to criticise Canada!s ties 
with South Africa!s economy. In Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic 
History, Brian Douglas Tennyson points out that "the history  of Canadian relations with 
South Africa reveals a general and understandable lack of interest due to distance and 
the absence of meaningful connections. ... Trade is the only  remaining common 
interest and it has always been insignificant in its magnitude, if not its composition.!12 
Consistently criticised for its trading and economic ties with South Africa, Canada 
maintained these relationships with the apartheid regime.
Clarence G. Redekop!s article "Commerce Over Conscience: The Trudeau Government 
and South Africa, 1968-84! echoes Tennyson!s sentiment. According to Redekop, there 
were four basic elements that drove Canada!s relationship with South Africa during the 
Trudeau era "...a commitment to the use of quiet mediatory  diplomacy to bring about 
change in the racial policies of the minority  regime; a desire to maintain normal bilateral 
and multilateral diplomatic relations; an opposition to the use of violence as a 
mechanism for bringing about change; and a strong preference for the maintenance of 
normal bilateral economic relations.!13  These themes repeat themselves across 
Trudeau!s Prime Ministerial terms. The desire to maintain friendly  relations with South 
Africa to solidify  and support economic ties was a key aspect of Canada!s diplomatic 
and economic policies during this time period. Even after the government made strict 
"changes! to its South African trade policies in 1977,  including closing commercial 
offices in the country, the policies were largely  cosmetic. T.A. Keenleyside notes that 
changes in Canada!s policies made no appreciable difference and Canada!s imports 
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from South Africa actually  expanded after the changes were made.14 Despite the public 
rhetoric and the diplomatic concerns about Commonwealth unity  explored in this thesis, 
the Trudeau government was unwilling to impose economic sanctions or boycotts 
against the apartheid regime and, in fact, promoted trade with South Africa. This fact is 
consistently  repeated across the numerous Canadian histories dealing with Canada-
South Africa relations during the apartheid regime consulted here.
Trudeau drove Canadian foreign policy; this fact is reiterated in all the foreign policy 
literature consulted which focus on the Trudeau era. It was his goal to make Canada an 
important middle-power. He established this trend during the first Commonwealth crisis 
he faced over British arms sales to South Africa, which came to a head at the 1971 
Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. Trudeau was able to finesse the Singapore 
Agreement through quiet diplomacy  and appeasing both sides of the argument, 
deploying "...the voluntarist tendency  in Canadian foreign policy  with its emphasis on 
diplomatic mediation.!15  It was Trudeau!s hope that Canada!s foreign policy and 
diplomatic efforts would carve out a new  niche for the nation - one of "honest broker! 
amongst power nations.
Rhoda E. Howard concurs that changes that were made to Canadian policies towards 
South Africa were mostly  symbolic in nature: Canada did not recognise bantustans, 
banned entry of South African athletes into Canada starting in 1977, and in 1978 
Canada introduced a voluntary  code of conduct for companies doing business and 
operating within South Africa. Howard notes, "It is argued that insofar as Canada is 
reluctant to deploy  the full range of economic, as well as moral, weapons at its 
command to persuade South Africa to be more accommodating, it is, by  omission if not 
commission, aiding in the perpetuation of apartheid.!16 These small changes made 
Canada appear tougher on apartheid than most other senior Commonwealth nations; 
however, in reality, they made very  little difference to the anti-apartheid movement or 
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Canada!s formal ties with South Africa. It was easier - and cheaper - to strike a pose 
through sport than business. 
For Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Canada!s South African foreign policies and 
diplomatic relations focused on "...a concern to maintain a liberal image, a very great 
reluctance to intervene to lessen trade and investment linkages and a willingness to act 
on behalf of or in conjunction with Britain and the United States.!17 Echoing previous 
analysis cited, Matthews and Pratt believe that economic policy  and Canada!s relations 
with other countries drove the development of policy  during this era, with humanitarian 
issues taking a back seat to solidifying the country!s middle-power status.
Where do sport policies stand within Canada!s general South African foreign policies 
and diplomacy? Previous studies, though often perceptive, lacked depth and access to 
key  government archives as well as giving little attention to wider opinion. It is here that 
Bruce Kidd has been the most significant contributor to understanding Canada and the 
apartheid sports boycott. A lobbyist, academic and former athlete, Kidd wrote several 
articles about the international boycott of apartheid sport. Kidd!s work is generally 
written in the voice of the activist - highlighting the plight of the anti-apartheid 
movement, while attempting to highlight the detrimental effects of ongoing direct and 
indirect contact with South Africa. In "The campaign against sport in South Africa! Kidd 
contends that the sports boycott was more significantly effective than any  other 
international campaign to isolate South Africa. By  the late 1980s, exchanges in popular 
sports between South Africa and other countries had been virtually  eliminated.18 
Canada!s role in supporting African Commonwealth nations made a huge difference in 
the boycott!s success - Canada acted to help prevent and stop the boycott threat by 
solidifying Commonwealth policies regarding apartheid and sport and its own foreign 
policies which dealt with preventing contact with South African athletes and sports 
bodies. Here Kidd extends the earlier general discussion of the politics of Canadian 
participation in the Commonwealth by  Rich Baka and David Hoy  who, in 1978, 
analysed the Canadian government!s active role in preventing a boycott of the 1978 
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Commonwealth Games and solidifying the Commonwealth!s stance against sporting 
contact with South Africa through the Gleneagles Agreement.19
According to Eric Morse, formerly  of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), Fitness 
and Amateur Sport Canada (Sport Canada) did not have an international policy  and 
operations unit. Though mainly  a granting agency, it became a major source of national 
sport policy.20  However, Sport Canada depended heavily  upon the DEA to convey 
official Canadian policies regarding interacting with South African sporting groups and 
athletes. The DEA itself had a sports relations section as part of the Public Affairs 
Bureau which provided "support and advice to Fitness and Amateur Sport and to 
Canadian teams abroad! and provided "a watching brief on political development in 
sport that might affect Canadian foreign policy interests. It briefed senior management 
and ministers when appropriate, and, when an issue did arise, it became the nucleus of 
whatever formal or informal departmental task force was set up  to handle the 
immediate problem.!21
Several key  Canadian histories cover the period explored in this thesis. Much remains 
contentious due to the nature of the topic and the fact that it is still so recent. Ongoing 
internal strife between Québec and the rest of Canada remains a major area of dispute 
and continues to be at the heart of Canadian history  and internal politics, often over-
shadowing Canada!s role internationally  and its other important successes in fields like 
medicine, technology and the arts. Canadian History: A Reader’s Guide, edited by 
Doug Owram, provides a comprehensive historiography, under a number of different 
themes and categories, including foreign relations, and the Trudeau years.22 
Robert Bothwell!s Canada and Québec: One Country Two Histories, Revised Edition, 
explores the relationship between Québec and the rest of Canada. The book analyses 
Anglo-French relations in Canada through to the 1995 Québec nationalist referendum 
and includes a wide range of opinion including: Jean Chrétien, former Prime Minister of 
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Canada; Stephen Harper, current Canadian Prime Minister; Marc Lalonde, former 
Liberal minister; and Mitchell Sharp, former Liberal minister and senior bureaucrat.23 
Much of the content is focused on the separatist debate that gripped Canada from the 
1960s through to the 1990s and provides valuable context for the narrower debate over 
external sports policy  in the 1970s. Ron Graham!s The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the 
Gang of Eight and the Fight for Canada provides a detailed history  of Trudeau!s keen 
interest in constitutional reform which began while he was Liberal Prime Minister Lester 
B. Pearson!s Minister of Justice, and continued with his quest once he became Prime 
Minister in 1968.24  Outlining why  Trudeau felt that it was imperative to patriate the 
constitution - to help cease the call for Québec separatism and to strengthen Canadian 
federalism - the book goes behind the scenes of negotiations and clearly  plots the 
events which formalised the Canadian constitution and Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. This is complemented by  Contemporary  Canadian Federalism: 
Foundations, Transitions, Institutions, edited by  Alain-G. Gagnon, which contains a 
series of essays from a federalist and separatist perspective by  prominent Québec 
scholars.25 
Turning from Canadian history  in general to the wider historiography  of the anti-
apartheid movement, there is a large and varied literature, including Roger Fieldhouse, 
Anti-Apartheid: A History  of the Movement in Britain, 1959-1994 and Trevor Richard, 
Dancing on Our Bones, focusing on Britain and New Zealand respectively, key 
battlegrounds in the Commonwealth for the anti-apartheid movement. There is, 
however, very  little specifically  focusing on the movement in Canada. Fieldhouse!s 
book is a detailed survey  of the British anti-apartheid movement from its beginnings to 
the end of apartheid.26 Richards!s book focuses on the anti-apartheid movement and 
sport in New Zealand, with specific focus on the anti-apartheid group he helped form - 
Halt All Racist Tours (HALT).27 Cited often in this thesis, these two books provided 
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contextual and background information to the key  anti-apartheid movements in Britain 
and New Zealand.
Don’t Play  with Apartheid: the background to the Stop The Seventy  Tour Campaign by 
Peter Hain, The Politics of Race and International Sport: the case of South Africa by 
Richard E. Lapchick and Apartheid: The Real Hurdle by Sam Ramsamy are important 
contemporary  books written by  anti-apartheid activists. Hain focuses on a very specific 
moment in the anti-apartheid sports movement - the campaign to stop  the 1970 
Springboks rugby  tour of Britain. Hain aptly  points out that the campaign!s 
"...importance rests essentially  in its timing: on the fact that it was in many  respects a 
watershed in attitudes, in political policies, and in the British treatment of the issues of 
race and apartheid.!28 The Stop the Seventy  Tour was a key turning point in the 
movement to isolate South African sport; the attention the movement garnered and its 
successes inspired the worldwide anti-apartheid sports movement which picked up 
steam throughout the 1970s. Lapchick, a leader of the anti-apartheid movement in the 
United States and author of many  works on international politics and South African 
sport, focuses on the progression of South Africa!s isolation from the Olympic 
movement and sport up  to 1975 in his book The Politics of Race and International 
Sport: the case of South Africa.29  Lapchick highlights key  successes and tries to 
negotiate how these successes affected South Africa while Sam Ramsamy outlines key 
events in the anti-apartheid sports movement and provides excerpts from documents 
that deal with the sports boycott, like announcements by the South African government, 
Commonwealth statements and declarations, and United Nations declarations.30 These 
three books provide in-depth information into the movement from the activists! points of 
view, though they are inevitably partial and written "in the heat of battle!.
In The South African Game: Sport and Racism Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon 
discuss the role of sport in South Africa through Marxist theories and analysis. Archer 
and Bouillon theorise that "The links between sporting rights and other social rights … 
which make sport an inherently  political problem only  become apparent when the 
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sports issue is seen as a part of a socio-political credo, of an anti-apartheid or non-
racial programme.!31  Although this book highlights the problems the sports boycott 
movement faced, it does also concede that the movement was the most successful 
boycott that the apartheid regime faced and that there was a moral obligation to 
support the boycott as it was being promoted by  anti-apartheid activists both 
internationally and, especially, in South Africa.
In Onward to the Olympics: Historical Perspectives on the Olympic Games a chapter 
by  Courtney  W. Mason is devoted to the 1976 Olympics and the boycott paradigm. In it, 
Mason chronicles how the movement against apartheid sport brought political and 
social issues and problems into the realm of international sport. Mason also argues that 
the 1976 Olympic boycott succeeded mainly  because boycott threats had worked in the 
past. Citing previous threats from African nations, Mason notes that the 1976 boycott 
did not succeed in its ultimate goal of having New Zealand removed from the Games. 
Yet, it did succeed in polarising public opinion in New Zealand and increased 
international public awareness of apartheid and the anti-apartheid movement.32
In The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa, Douglas Booth analyses the role 
of sport in South African society  and captures the developments in South Africa!s 
movement away  from sports isolation after the fall of apartheid, this includes 
documenting the development of the anti-apartheid movement in sport as a catalyst for 
political change in South Africa.33 For Booth, the sports boycott was an integral part of 
the anti-apartheid movement and sport played a key  role in helping bring about change 
in South Africa.
John Nauright has written extensively  on South African sport. In Sport, Cultures and 
Identities in South Africa, he discusses the role that sport has historically  played in the 
development of South African society. He emphasises the importance of sport to 
Afrikaners and the nationalistic nature of sport in South Africa. He provides a history  of 
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sport in South Africa, for white and non-white South Africans. Nauright points out that 
although the anti-apartheid sports movement was successful internationally  and 
brought keen interest and awareness to the plight of non-white South Africans, within 
South Africa the movement itself was poorly  coordinated and was not able to garner 
great change to sport models within the country.34 A focus on the international sports 
boycott provided an opportunity  to affect change through the isolation of South Africa, 
but sport also provided an outlet for nation-building after the fall of apartheid through 
events like South Africa!s 1995 Rugby  World Cup championship. Nauright is apt to 
point out that there were problems and challenges with sport - the movement did not 
create much change within South Africa and after the fall of apartheid race continued to 
plague South African sport, particularly  rugby. According to Nauright, sport plays an 
integral role in South African society and both positively  and negatively  affected the 
development of the anti-apartheid movement and the development of the new South 
Africa.
Allen Guttmann and Barrie Houlihan provided insight into how sport and politics collide 
in a variety  of ways. However, both have similar points of view on the boycott of the 
Montréal Olympics. In The Olympics: A History  of the Modern Games, Guttmann 
provides a review  of Olympic boycotts and whether or not they were successful. With 
particular reference to the boycott of the 1976 Olympics as an example, Guttmann 
feels that Olympic boycotts are ineffectual.35  Houlihan points out that, for various 
reasons discussed in Chapter Six of this study, the IOC did not give in to the boycott 
demands. "The IOC!s resistance on this occasion was due in part to the feeling that it 
was morally  in a stronger position, due to the lack of support for the boycott from the 
communist bloc states.!36  Both Guttmann and Houlihan point out that the lack of 
support from the Communist bloc was detrimental to the success of the 1976 Olympic 
boycott.37 Houlihan also delves into the role of politics in Commonwealth sport in Sport 
and International Politics. Particular emphasis is placed on South Africa in this chapter 
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of the book, including how New Zealand!s sporting contact with South Africa brought 
about the boycott of the 1976 Olympics and the African threat of boycotting the 1978 
Commonwealth Games. In regard to Canada!s reaction to the boycott, Houlihan notes 
"Canada, although not particularly  active on Third World issues in the 1970s, was 
motivated by  a general antipathy  to racism, and also by  a concern to maintain both the 
role of the Commonwealth in protecting western interests during the Cold War and 
Canada!s reputation as an international peacebroker (Macintosh and Black 1994). The 
fact that Canada was scheduled to host the Commonwealth Games in 1978 was an 
additional factor of considerable importance.!38 This thesis based on the new archival 
material now available is able to develop, nuance and broadly justify this judgment. 
The historiography  covered here shows that Canadian anti-apartheid policy  has 
already  attracted scholarly  attention, but that there is a striking gap between the cluster 
of books and articles which appeared around the end of apartheid and the lack of 
subsequent work. This gap provides an excellent opportunity  to look again at the 
phenomenon in the light of newly  available evidence, in particular newly  opened 
archival documents. To date, interpretation of Canada!s role in the anti-apartheid 
movement has, for the most part, been minimal. Some of the works, for example the 
works of Kidd, Morse and Freeman, are written by  activists or those with a strong 
political interest in the outcome and must inevitably  be rather self-justificatory or 
present-centred. This includes administrators and diplomats who were involved, along 
with anti-apartheid activists. It is in the the best interest of the personal legacies, and 
the legacies of their grassroots groups in the case of activists, to portray  their role as 
one of superior importance. However, a broader historical view shows that several 
factors were at play  in the development of anti-apartheid policies in the 1970s, with 
only a limited number of non-elite leaders able to effect significant change.
To date there has been no specific monograph study of either the 1976 Olympics or 
1978 Commonwealth Games written from a purely  political point of view. Montréal has 
been analysed in terms of the economic and corruption problems that plagued the 
Games. Importantly, Canada was in an extremely unique position, acting as host of 
both the Olympic and Commonwealth Games, a mere two years apart - the first time 
that these two international events have ever been held in the same country  in such a 
short period of time. This made Canada, in an era of increasing politicisation of sporting 
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events, vulnerable to the boycott threat. Freeman!s book, Ambiguous Champion, 
glosses over the Trudeau government!s work in isolating South African sport and 
focuses on the its failures in distancing Canada from South Africa economically. 
Although historians Macintosh and Hawes do delve directly  into Canada!s role in 
isolating South African sport, the subsequent availability  of additional documents shows 
a fuller picture of Canada!s direct role in trying to avoid a boycott of the 1976 Olympic 
Games through the tightening of restrictions on Canada!s contact with South African 
sport, and Canada!s role in the Commonwealth adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement 
in an effort to avoid a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. 
Additionally, general histories regarding the anti-apartheid movement in other 
countries, like Fieldhouse and Richards! books, do not provide a significant amount of 
information regarding the movement in Canada; Canada always appears to be on the 
periphery of the movement and anti-apartheid sentiment, generally. There was a very 
specific set of circumstances in Canada in the 1970s which justifies an in-depth 
historical approach to the events examined, rather than an international relations or 
comparative politics global overview. The purpose of the present study  is to examine 
Canada!s role in the anti-apartheid movement and the development of strict anti-
apartheid policies in light of the fact that Canada was host to two major international 
sporting events in the 1970s. This reexamination and fuller portrait is supported by 
newly available archival sources which assist in redefining Canada!s role.
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CHAPTER 2: The 1960s
The Beginnings of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Canada
The grassroots anti-apartheid movement in Canada, on the whole, did not became a 
successful driving force for change; few grassroots anti-apartheid groups ever had the 
capacity  to work at a national level, unlike groups in other Commonwealth countries 
such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Traditionally, these countries, especially 
Britain, had close trade, cultural and sporting ties with South Africa. In Britain, the 
grassroots anti-apartheid movement can be traced back to the 1950s. It began with a 
focus on the boycotting South African goods.1 It quickly  morphed into a cohesive group 
with various tactics and aims, including calling for both an end to Britain!s trade 
relationship with South Africa and an end to the two countries! sporting relationship. 
Through the 1960s, the movement gained power and popularity  across Britain. At the 
same time, the anti-apartheid movement was gaining momentum in Australia and New 
Zealand, two countries with long-lasting, close sporting ties with South Africa. In all 
three countries, trade union activism, the leadership of the church, and the students! 
movement would all prove to be useful in increasing the capacity  in each countries! 
respective anti-apartheid groups.
In Canada, anti-apartheid advocacy  and campaigning often worked at local, municipal 
levels. The first rumblings of anti-apartheid activism started in the mid-1960s in Toronto 
through the set-up of the Canadian Alexander Defence Committee (ADC). According to 
a pamphlet from the ADC they  were in solidarity  with other committees in Britain, West 
Germany, and the United States. 
Their aims are simply  stated: to publicise as widely  as possible the case of 
young Dr. Neville Alexander, a Coloured teacher and his ten companions 
condemned under the “Sabotage Act” to long terms of imprisonment, 
though no act of sabotage was proven against them. Secondly, to provide 
funds for the defence of political prisoners and aid to their dependents - 
prisoners whose crime is their claim to democratic rights and human 
dignity.2
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From the Communist Party  of Canada archival holdings, it is clear that the ADC was 
active in Toronto from 1964 through to 1969. Smaller ADCs popped up in Canadian 
cities, but the main office remained in Toronto. They  raised money through various 
types of fundraising: poetry and folk-singing performances, movie screenings, and 
other social functions. The ADC also sponsored nation-wide speaking engagements for 
prominent South African freedom fighters, including I.B. Tabata, President of the Unity 
Movement of South Africa, in December 1965 through January 1966.3 And Franz J.T. 
Lee toured during the summer of 1966; Lee was the Secretary  of the ADC in Germany.4 
The ADC in Canada used newsletters and letter-writing campaigns to spread their 
message and to solicit funds for the families of political prisoners. Finally, the ADC also 
undertook a sponsorship campaign in which they recruited prominent Canadians to 
publicly  support their cause. Some notable names included novelist Farley  Mowat, 
journalist Pierre Burton, and literary  critic and theorist Northrop Frye. Mowat sent a 
letter and donation to the ADC secretary  Regula Modlich in 1965: "Apartheid is a 
hideous denial of mankind!s pretensions to be both rational and just. ... This denial lies 
not alone with South African proponents of this barbaric concept; every  man, the world 
over, who fails to raise his voice against apartheid is also guilty  of it, by  default.!5 Mowat 
touches upon a key  aspect of the worldwide anti-apartheid movement, by  not speaking 
out against apartheid governments and individuals were guilty  of implicit support of the 
South African government!s policy  of racial segregation. Most Alexander Defence 
Committees throughout the world slowly began to phase out in 1968.
Another group working in Canada during the 1960s was the Canadian Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (CAAM). Again, this group was based in Toronto in the late 1960s through to 
the early  1970s. The group did not keep formal records nor were there any  formal 
archives created upon its dissolution. Other anti-apartheid groups in Canada kept 
newsletters, fliers, and other correspondence from the CAAM, including the Alexander 
Defence Committee, Voices of Women, and the Canadian Federation of Students; 
some of the CAAM!s history can be tracked through the archives of these groups.
According to a pamphlet from the CAAM, in honour of 1969!s South African Freedom 
Day, the movement sought to influence the Canadian people and government to begin 
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demonstrating their hatred for South African apartheid through a total boycott of the 
country. The CAAM believed that boycotts and sanctions would help promote and 
create change within South Africa. This included boycotts of food, wine and other 
products, and economic  and trade sanctions. Their goals were myriad and included 
the release of South African political prisoners, a ban on arms trades with South Africa, 
economic sanctions, and sport, cultural and academic boycotts.6
In the spring of 1970 the CAAM newsletter included a form-letter of petition that the 
organisation wanted members to sign and return to the CAAM for mailing to the 
government of New Zealand. The letter was written to protest New Zealand!s 
continuing sporting ties with South Africa. Specifically, it was in reaction to New 
Zealand!s upcoming rugby tour of South Africa. The letter stated: 
First, far from improving the situation in South Africa or even remaining a 
neutral element in it, the tour is actively  making conditions worse. Second, 
New Zealand has once again become internationally  notorious for denying 
its own supposed policy  of racial harmony and is now in the appalling 
position of supporting a totally  unjust and repressive position. Third, the 
world will judge all New Zealanders as being responsible for this failure to 
live up to the country!s ideals.7
This letter is one of the few examples of Canadians mobilising behind the anti-
apartheid movement in sport. The CAAM continued to work through the early  1970s. 
Similar to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, they  did not focus on one particular 
type of boycott or protest;  most campaigns and letters were directly  related to what the 
situation was in South Africa at any  given time. Their membership appears to have 
always remained quite limited, with a small number of dedicated individuals working on 
newsletters, letter writing, and planning small protests and gatherings. Letter writing 
campaigns and newsletters were a vital form of communication for the various anti-
apartheid groups working within Canada during the 1960s; letter writing would prove to 
be a key  tool for Canadian  anti-apartheid activists.8 It was the most effective way  for 
groups to get their messages out across the expansive country, to fellow  organisations, 
and to individuals who supported their cause.  
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Between 1970 and 1975, there were few  anti-apartheid groups in Canada. The groups 
were small in nature and focused on the boycott of South African goods and letter-
writing campaigns. Around this time period, churches in Canada were becoming 
increasingly  involved in the movement. In December 1975, the Taskforce on the 
Churches and Corporate Responsibility  (TCCR) was officially  established; its goals 
were "to stem the inflow of foreign capital and ... expose, and seek to prevent, the 
provision of foreign technology and military  equipment for South Africa!s security 
apparatus.!9 The founding churches, organisations and religious orders were: Anglican 
Church of Canada, Baptist Federation of Canada, Canadian Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, Canadian Council of Churches (observers only), Lutheran Church of America 
Canada Section, Presbyterian Church of Canada, United Church of Canada, Canadian 
Religious Conference of Ontario, Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada, Redemptorist 
Fathers, Scarborough Foreign Mission Society, Sisters of Charity  of Mount St. Vincent 
Halifax, and Sisterhood of St. John the Divine.10 According to Linda Freeman, "In its 
campaign against corporate and bank involvement, the taskforce met with senior 
corporate executives, conducted spirited questioning at corporate annual general 
meetings, and submitted shareholder resolutions to stop business dealings with South 
Africa.!11
Compared to smaller, grassroots organisations working in cities across the country, the 
Taskforce was heavily  engaged in Canada, especially  around the movement for South 
African economic and trade sanctions. In comparison to grassroots organisations in the 
early  1970s, churches had more ability  and the resources to coordinate and 
disseminate information on a larger scale. Churches had the funds, resources and 
networks to communicate on a national level - key  to the success of any social 
movement in as large a country  as Canada during the 1970s. Money also afforded 
churches with the opportunity  to purchase shares in banks and corporations that 
continued to work with South African banks and companies and, churches, therefore, 
were able to participate in shareholders meetings. For example, in April 1975, the 
Anglican, and Roman Catholic churches met with representatives and officers from 
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Alcan Aluminum Limited, Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited, and began talks with the 
Bank of Montréal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and the 
Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Bank). "The churches are concerned that Canadian 
companies are doing business with South Africa without working for social change 
there.!12 The churches hoped that they could convince banks and companies to work 
towards bringing social change to South Africa. Some progress was made with one 
bank in regards to evaluating moral or social considerations when granting loans: "Fred 
McNeil, Bank of Montréal deputy  chairman, said the Bank of Montréal did so - it will not 
grant loans for arms production - but officials of the other two banks said their basic 
criterion was “economic good sense.”!13  And, in December 1975 clergy and 
representatives from the Young Women!s Christian Association attended the annual 
meeting of CIBC and called on all three of Canada!s largest banks to stop providing 
loans to South Africa. CIBC bank chairman Page Wardsworth "noted the division of 
clerical, political and public opinion concerning solutions to the South African question 
and added that the bank!s view is that an economic blockade eventually  would be 
detrimental to the people the religious groups say they are trying to help.!14 
These are but two examples of Canadian churches and non-governmental 
organisations at work in the 1970s. Renate Pratt notes that "Church shareholders knew 
that the issues they  were raising were current and important. To make any  impact, they 
needed to be discussed in the presence of directors and fellow shareholders during the 
one annual occasion permitting public discussion.!15  During the annual general 
meetings the Taskforce members, as shareholders of the companies, continued to 
work at lobbying Canadian companies and banks to cease business transactions with 
South Africa. Yet, these tactics were largely unsuccessful; Robert Matthews and 
Cranford Pratt explain:
Canada is a trading nation, as our government is fond of reminding us. 
Canadians are also heavily  dependent on foreign investment while also 
being themselves important investors in foreign countries. Our 
governments for a long time have therefore felt that an open system of 
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international trade and investment was of great importance to Canada. For 
an equally  long time they  have been convinced that Canadian trade and 
investment are as much in the interests of the recipient countries as they 
are in Canada!s interests. Thus Canadian officials and government leaders 
are able with an easy  conscience, to oppose adverse foreign limitations to 
Canadian trade and investment and to ignore Canadians who argue that 
trade and investment in specific countries be limited by  Canada in the 
interests of the peoples of those countries. Because of these essentially 
ideological beliefs, Canadian officials not only see such limitations as 
damaging to Canada but also as not being in the interest of the peoples of 
the other countries that would be affected.16
Calls for trade, investment and other economic sanctions were prominent in western 
and Commonwealth countries. However, these calls largely  went ignored as South 
Africa was a strong and important trading partner for many  western nations. The 
Anglican Church of Canada, a member of the Taskforce, took up the South African 
cause with great vehemence. In 1971, the General Synod of the church recommended 
four key  points: "assistance to families whose breadwinner is held without charge under 
the Terrorism Act; assistance with legal fees to support the Dean of Johannesburg in 
his pending court case; statements to our own government about preferential trading; a 
boycott on South African products as one way  of telling the world that an injustice is 
being done against people who are suffering because they want the ordinary  rights that 
should go with being human.!17 Here, the Church makes a variety  of requests of its 
constituents; the focus is on humanitarian needs, the cessation of trade, and the 
boycott of South African goods. For the most part, however, the Church focused on 
trade and investment, with the boycott of South African goods being key  to their 
campaigns. In 1975 the General Synod passed the following resolution:
That this General Synod re-affirms the 1971 resolutions of General Synod 
urging the Government of Canada to make credible its professed policies 
(abhorrence of apartheid); to refrain from encouraging business, trade and 
investment in South Africa; to foster the goal of social justice for black 
peoples as the major theme for negotiations with the Republic of South 
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Africa; to end preferential tariffs with the Republic of South Africa; and 
calling for individual economic boycott of all South African products.18
For the Anglican Church, involvement in the anti-apartheid movement meant 
pressuring the government in regards to trade and investment. By ceasing trade and 
investment with South Africa they  hoped to undermine the South African economy 
which would force the government to abandon apartheid. 
Throughout most of the 1970s, Canadian churches focused on stopping Canadian 
corporations and banks from doing business with and in South Africa; mainly  because 
the Churches felt that isolating South Africa economically  would affect the most change 
within the country. Towards the end of the 1970s, as anti-apartheid feeling was 
spreading across Canada and became a more hotly  debated topic, Churches began to 
increase the championing of humanitarian efforts.
For many  years the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) had been passing resolutions, 
issuing press releases, and undertaking letter writing campaigns to the government as 
forms of protest against apartheid and the government of South Africa. In 1973, the 
CLC took part in the International Conference on Apartheid held by  the International 
Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU). This was a major step in trade union support 
of the anti-apartheid movement. At the conference a resolution was passed which 
called on governments around the globe to cease cultural, commercial and diplomatic 
contact with South Africa and discourage public and private investment with South 
Africa. It also called for the discouragement of emigration of South African nationals. 
The resolution urged trade unions to put pressure on governments and employers to 
follow resolutions of the United Nations, draw the attention of their workers to apartheid 
and the need for trade union solidarity, and, finally, it called for direct action against 
import and export of South African goods and against sport, economic, trade and 
cultural contact with South Africa.19 As members of ICFTU, the CLC were bound by  the 
resolution and took steps to educate its members through media releases and other 
forms of communication. They supported boycotts of goods from South Africa and 
wrote to the Trudeau government regarding a variety  of South African topics, including 
sporting ties, and labour conditions. 
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As part of their commitment to the ICFTU resolution to promote effective, direct action 
against trade with South Africa, the CLC issued a press release, protesting Ontario!s 
trade missions, supported by  the federal government, to the apartheid state. In 1970 a 
trade delegation from the province travelled to South Africa without hassle; the 1973 
delegation!s trip "caused furore in the Ontario legislature, the press, among anti-
apartheid groups, and especially  in the black community.!20 The CLC!s press release 
criticised the Ontario government for sponsoring the trade mission "suggesting that no 
increase in trade with that country  should be sought until it respects the basic human 
rights of the "majority  of its citizens.”!21 The attack inside the Ontario legislature was led 
by  provincial National Democratic Party  (NDP) leader, Stephen Lewis. He told the 
legislature "“It ill behooves Ontario, for the few dollars involved, to prop up white racism 
in South Africa.”!22 The NDP, strong union supporters, were also supporters of the anti-
apartheid movement, but were ineffective in subverting the mission - it went ahead as 
planned. Yet, "no similar missions to South Africa were planned in subsequent years.!23 
In the 1970s, Canadian unions were not as openly active in the anti-apartheid 
movement as unions in other Commonwealth countries. This appears to be for several 
reasons, including, generally, more union activism in countries like England and the 
lack of sporting ties between Canada and South Africa. Much of the union activity  by 
Commonwealth countries surrounded support for the sports boycott. Things would 
change in the 1980s when the labour movement in Canada took a more active and 
prominent role in the struggle, including organising rallies and increasing media 
outreach.
Specific events in South African history  moved groups, churches and trade unions to 
speak out against specific atrocities taking place within South Africa, using letter-writing 
campaigns to Canadian government officials, including Prime Ministers, and press 
releases to express their opinions. On March 21, 1960 the Sharpeville Massacre 
occurred - during a non-violent protest against pass laws, Sharpeville police fired on a 
group of unarmed African students. In total, 69 Africans were killed and 180 injured.24 
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The Canadian public were outraged, Canada officially  condemned the attack. The 
Rivonia Trial, the arrest and trial of Nelson Mandela and other leading African National 
Congress (ANC) members for treason and sabotage was another event which moved 
Canadian public opinion. At the denouement of the trial in 1964, after the sentencing of 
Mandela and seven others, a Toronto Star editorial noted "Mandela!s guilt is the guilt of 
South Africa, the guilt of a system that drives rational men to sabotage and treason 
because there is no peaceful way left for blacks to seek human and political rights.!25
The 1960s saw some organisation around the anti-apartheid cause, through 
newsletters, rallies, and other small gatherings. According to Pierre François, anti-
apartheid activist, what the early  Canadian movement failed to do was build a strategy. 
He writes "Identifying short and long term battlefronts, isolating enemies, winning 
friends, changing the political culture, in brief waging the "war of position,! as our Italian 
comrade Gramsci says, "the exhausting and patient task of building hegemony.”!26 
These groups were not as effectual as anti-apartheid groups in other Commonwealth 
countries.27 Brian Douglas Tennyson explains that none of the groups was able to 
make the South African apartheid issue a matter of "widespread public concern! as 
businesses trading with or investing in South Africa had "easier access to senior 
government officials!  than anti-apartheid groups.28  Therefore, the banks and 
corporations were more influential than the small, disparate groups of anti-apartheid 
activists, NGOs, unions, and churches working across Canada. The Canadian 
movement was not organised or unified and, generally, the different groups did not 
communicate regularly. It centered around events in Toronto, with limited outreach to 
other Canadian cities. Through much of 1970s, grassroots anti-apartheid groups 
focused on certain aspects of the humanitarian crisis in South Africa, such as trials and 
aid to liberation groups; this appeal had more impact on the Canadian general public 
than economic sanctions and boycotts. By  the 1980s the anti-apartheid movement 
moved into mainstream Canadian consciousness and became a popular social 
movement. 
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South Africa and the Olympics
There has been great discussion and many  publications about South Africa!s history  in 
the Olympic Movement. In this section, you will find a general progression of events, 
brought together through a variety  of sources in an attempt to see the broader picture 
of how the demise of South Africa!s relationship with the IOC devolved over 15 years. 
In his book Reflections on a Life in Sport, Sam Ramsamy  points out that the nature of 
history  allows for many  points of view on any given topic. He notes "If four people 
gather in one place and talk for an hour, and each of them is then asked to outline what 
was said, the result will be four different accounts.!29 This is a summarised history  of 
events; an opportunity  to unpick the facts regarding a difficult topic, for which a great 
many points of view and histories exist.
Challenges to racial sport in South Africa began soon after the official adoption of 
apartheid. The first, most notable case, was that of table tennis. Dennis Brutus explains 
that in 1956, after six years of negotiation, "...the non-racial table Table Tennis Board 
was granted membership of the International Table Tennis Federation [ITTF], and the 
Europeans-Only  Table Tennis Union was expelled.!30 By  accepting the non-racial Table 
Tennis Board as the rightful representative of South Africa, the ITTF was well ahead of 
its time. The Federation set a groundbreaking precedent amongst international sport 
bodies and federations. Reacting to the Federation!s decision, the Minister of the 
Interior for South Africa, Dr. Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges, outlined South Africa!s 
policy  of racial separation in sport in Die Burger: "“...Whites and non-Whites should 
organise their sporting activities separately; that there should be no inter-racial 
competitions within our borders; and that the mixing of races in teams to take part in 
competitions within the Union and abroad should be avoided.”!31 The South African 
government wanted to prevent all forms of inter-racial and mixed sport from 
international through to club level.
In 1958, the South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed. Douglas Booth 
explains its origins:
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...weightlifters and body  builders invited other black federations to a 
conference to discus the sports situation. They had formed their own 
federation in 1956 and applied to the IOC [International Olympic 
Committee] to partake in the Olympic Games in Melbourne. The IOC 
instructed them to affiliate to the white Weightlifting Union which refused to 
recognize the black Federation on the grounds that it has “grossly 
exaggerated” its membership and had not provided a constitution. The 
white Union also claimed to have received a letter from a rival group of 
black weightlifters expressing dissatisfaction with the “political motives” of 
the Federation and signaling their intentions to create a new non-European 
association. ... Frustrated by  the IOC and the white Union, black 
weightlifters, led by Dennis Brutus and the white liberal Alan Paton, called a 
conference of black federations at which they  formed the South Africa 
Sports Association (SASA) - the first nonracial sports organization.32
The white Union tried to undermine the weightlifters! campaign; by  doing so, they  cast 
doubt on the unity of the non-racial sports movement with the IOC. Realising a united 
front, with increased non-white membership would be more successful, the group 
organised the conference in which SASA was born. The power was in their numbers, 
according to Richard Thompson, as SASA represented 70,000 non-white athletes from 
a variety of sports, including soccer, cycling and softball.33
In the beginning, SASA!s main goal was "...pressuring merely  for recognition and 
representation in South African teams. The demand for full integration was to come 
later.!34 They  wanted to convince sports bodies to reject racial discrimination in sport. 
Paton and Brutus were "Prominent in this body!s lobbying, petitioning and appeals.!35 
SASA started out at local level with protests against racial discrimination in sport, but 
were unsuccessful. They  then went "directly  to international bodies in attempts to win 
recognition of the right for black South African sportspeople [sic] to compete 
internationally.!36 Its international recognition by  sports federations and bodies would 
help boost the cause of SASA in South Africa; if these organisations had chosen to 
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support the non-white athletes it is possible that changes and amendments would have 
occurred within apartheid sport.
Allen Guttmann points out that in 1958, Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, of the Norwegian 
Olympic Committee, told Avery  Brundage that Norway  was "prepared to exclude South 
Africa from the games.!37  The following year, 1959, the issue of South Africa!s 
membership in the IOC was first officially  raised at the session in Munich. According to 
Marc Keech, "Nikolai Romanov, the Soviet delegate, accused SANOC [South African 
National Olympic Committee] of never having done anything to prevent apartheid and 
that, he argued, was an infringement of the Olympic charter.!38 SASA also approached 
the IOC with hope that the Committee would decide that all South Africans had a right 
to compete in the Olympic Games.39 Despite protests from the Soviet delegate, South 
Africa remained a member of the IOC, mainly  due to a  promise made by  Reg Honey, 
South Africa!s IOC member. Honey reported that he had a guarantee from his 
government that all South African athletes entered by  SANOC would be issued with 
passports.40 This implied that all eligible, qualified athletes, of any  colour, would be 
given passports to travel and participate in the Olympic Games.
By the time the IOC met in Rome, 1960, Brundage was facing increased pressure 
regarding the South African issue. The Reverend Michael Scott wrote to the IOC 
requesting permission to address the committee on behalf of SASA and his own 
organisation - Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD). He noted to Brundage 
that he was there on behalf of Brutus, the President of SASA, who was not able to 
travel as the South African government would not issue him with a passport.41 
According to David Maranis, Scott was granted an audience with the committee, but 
only  in accompaniment with Honey. Scott pleaded the anti-apartheid case, "...urging the 
IOC to live up to its Olympic Creed and expel the apartheid delegation from South 
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Africa, while Brundage took South African leaders at their word that they  were letting all 
citizens compete for roster spots, but colored natives simply  were not talented 
enough.!42 This was typical of Brundage; publicly, he took much of what Honey  said at 
face value. He was strongly  against the politicisation of the Olympics and attempted, at 
every possible juncture, to remove politics from the Games. Honey  met with the 
committee and, in the end, a statement was issued by  IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, 
indicating that SANOC had made reasonable efforts to ensure that all eligible 
competitors had been included in the South African team.43 The IOC was unwilling to 
accept the arguments against apartheid sport and chose, yet again, to side with 
SANOC. Lord Killanin aptly  points out, however, "It did not go unnoticed ... when the 
Games of the XVIIth Olympiad were staged in Rome that the entire South African team 
was white.!44
In the face of constant adversity  and harassment SASA chose to expand; the South 
African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) was formed in 1962 as a sub-
committee of SASA. Brutus became the president of SAN-ROC and the group fought to 
eradicate racism in international sport. Its main goals were: SANOC!s expulsion from 
the Olympic movement, an international boycott of South African sport, and South 
Africa!s expulsion from international sport federations.45 Within South Africa itself, the 
leaders of SASA and SAN-ROC were harassed and issued with banning orders. 
Nelson Mandela explains:
Banning was a legal order by  the government, and generally  entailed 
forced resignation from indicated organisations, and restriction from 
attending gatherings of any  kind. It was a kind of walking imprisonment. To 
ban a person, the government required no proof, offered no charges; the 
minister of justice simply declared it so. It was a strategy designed to 
remove the individual from the struggle, allowing him to live a narrowly 
defined life outside politics.46
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Brutus!s story  is well known: once banned he was arrested, shot, imprisoned on 
Robben Island, and eventually  forced into exile.47 SAN-ROC virtually  disappeared in 
South Africa. But, in 1966, once in exile in London, they regrouped and became a 
major player in the anti-apartheid movement.  
The 1963 IOC meeting took place in Baden Baden. It was scheduled to be held in 
Kenya, but the Kenyan government refused visas for Honey and other South African 
officials.48 At the meeting, SANOC was told that "it must abide by  Principle 1 and Rule 
24 of the Olympic Charter which outlawed racial, political and religious discrimination 
and required national Olympic committees to resist governmental pressure.!49 SANOC 
would have to follow  the Olympic Charter if it hoped to remain a member of the 
movement. SANOC was given until December 31 to obtain "a modification of its policy 
of discrimination in sport matters and in competitions in its country.”!50 This ultimatum 
was issued by a vote of 30 to 20, against a backdrop of the Rivonia trials, taking place 
in South Africa.51 The IOC wanted assurances from SANOC that they  would comply 
with the Olympic Charter and field a mixed race team. The IOC wanted to ensure that 
the internal politics of South Africa did not interfere with the Olympic movement!s 
apolitical policies. The government of South Africa announced that a mixed team 
representing South Africa was impossible.52 Frank Braun, President of SANOC, noted 
that his government refused to see the IOC!s point of view.53  As the government 
refused to comply  with the IOC!s resolution they  were banned from participating in the 
1964 Tokyo Olympics.
Here it is important to note that there were no South African laws which specifically 
prohibited mixed sport. Donald Woods explains that "Before the introduction of formal 
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apartheid in 1948 there had for many years been an informal but effective bar against 
black participation against white in sport.!54 By the time Malan!s National Party  came to 
power in 1948, segregated sport was "normal!  in South Africa. Douglas Booth points out 
"...custom and “tradition” kept sport segregated.!55  It was by 1960  that "...the 
government officially  discouraged black and white contact in sport, though no official 
legislation existed that specifically  banned mixed or non-racial sport.!56 There was, 
however, legislation which prevented mixed sport opportunities. For example, Peter 
Hain explains: "the Urban Areas Act of 1945 controls black sports facilities and restricts 
their use by permit.!57 Other examples include:
The Population Registration Act of 1950 provided for a rigid system of racial 
classification in terms of white, coloured, Indian or native groups. ... The 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 permitted owners of 
property  to evict or exclude members of certain racial groups from the 
premises or amenities, including sporting amenities. ... The Group Area!s 
Act of 1966 divided South Africa into areas of occupancy  and residential 
segregation on the basis of race. The consequence of this for the majority 
of black South African sportsmen and women was that it hindered the travel 
to and from matches and competitions which were outside an individual!s 
designated residential area.58
The South African government did not make mixed sport illegal because they did not 
have to - apartheid laws prevented the mixing of races; every  level of human social 
interaction was legislated through these laws. And, the South African government used 
sport as a way to reinforce apartheid policies. Jon Gemmell explains that "Sport, as a 
means of transmitting the values of the ruling group, is a component of the dominant 
hegemony.!59 In the 1960s in South Africa, petty  apartheid was enforced as strongly  as 
political apartheid; it helped reinforce apartheid at every  level of society. In the April 
1964 volume of Liberal Opinion, published by  the Liberal Party  of South Africa, it is 
noted:
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...multiracial sport IS legal in South Africa and it is a lie to say  it is not. What 
most people do is to confuse POLICY with LAW, so that while it is against 
Government policy  to play  multiracial sport, it is not against the law. Bodies 
such as the South African Olympic Council (S.A.O.C.) play  upon this 
confusion to create the impression overseas that they are powerless 
against the Government!s dictates.60
By misleading international sporting organisations, the South African sports 
administrators gave into the pressure from their government to keep sport racialised. 
Going by what organisations like SANOC said, international sport organisations and 
federations were misled and did not have the facts regarding the current laws 
surrounding mixed sport in South Africa.
In 1968 an IOC fact-finding group was dispatched to South Africa to report on the state 
of sport. The group was sent by  IOC President, Brundage. "Brundage did not regard 
racial discrimination as a sufficient reason to exclude a nation from the Olympics.!61 
But, due to the continuing international pressure within the Olympic movement, 
Brundage had to act; he needed to show that the movement was beyond reproach and 
had performed due diligence in terms of the South African Olympic team. The 
commission found that there had been changes in the South African sport policy:
It reported favourably on the change in South African policy, which entailed 
a commitment to sending a single team that would live together, wear the 
same uniform, march together under the same flag, and include members 
of different racial groups competing in the same event. While the 
commission was critical of the segregated character of South African sport 
and the prohibition on mixed trials for the Games, it stressed the desire of 
Black sportsmen to take part in the Games.62
In his autobiography, My Olympic Years, Lord Killanin, who led the fact-finding mission, 
describes what the group discovered:
In our report to the IOC we said that the Government was strong and 
determined in its policy  of separate development and, where necessary, 
imposed restrictions in sport by  applications of its laws. We found that the 
South African NOC had made serious, though unavailing, representations 
to the South African Government, but the NOC took the view that it could 
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not operate in open defiance of the policy  of its Government. ... While the 
Killanin Commission report fairly  indicated that South Africa was not 
subscribing to Olympic rules and principles, the vote was in favour of 
keeping them in, provided their next team was multiracial with all their 
athletes enjoying equality of treatment.63
Killanin!s expedition found that South African sport was, in fact, not integrated; sport 
continued to develop  along racial lines. SANOC continued to follow  the rules laid out by 
the government regarding no mixed sport but, according to Christopher Hill: 
The Commission seems to have been not much concerned with the 
composition of SANOC, since there was no discrimination in its statutes, 
which they  had examined. The commissioners had also examined the 
various federations! rules and found that, although several had no non-
white members, none had restrictive rules. The control of South African 
sport appeared to be largely  in white hands, because of general, rather 
than specific, legislation; for example non-whites might not carry  arms, and 
therefore could not compete in shooting.64
It was naive and disingenuous for Killanin!s group to suggest that SANOC was doing all 
it could to integrate sport in the country. Despite knowing that South Africa was not 
adhering to the stipulations set out in the Baden Baden resolution they  supported 
SANOC!s continued membership in the Olympic Movement.
In 1967, in a remarkable move, South African Prime Minister BJ (Balthazar Johannes) 
Vorster announced that "One team would represent the Republic and all members 
would travel together, live together, wear the same uniform and march together under 
one flag.!65 Each racial sporting body  would choose their own representatives who 
would then represent South Africa; there would be no mixed trials.66 At the 1967 IOC 
meeting in Tehran Frank Braun reiterated South Africa!s new policy  and announced 
that the country was able to meet the requirements set out by the IOC. 
At the 1967 meeting, Jean-Claude Ganga, Secretary  General of the Supreme Council 
for Sports in Africa (SCSA), appealed to Brundage not to turn his back on the 
Africans.67  Taking into account the information provided by  Braun, the changes 
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implemented by the Vorster government and the Killanin Report of 1968, a resolution 
was put to vote by the IOC. It read that the IOC:
noted with concern the racially  discriminatory  sports policies of the South 
African government that prevent the SAOC [South African Olympic 
Committee] from completely  adhering to fundamental Principle One of the 
Olympic Code;
was nevertheless encouraged by  the intention of the SAOC to select on 
merit a multiracial team; 
resolved that the SAOC could enter a team which conformed with 
fundamental Principle One of the Olympic Code provided that it vigorously 
continued to have all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport 
removed;
would consider the question by the end of 1970 (SARIS, pp. 18-19).68
The IOC approved South Africa!s participation in the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico 
City.  The vote was held by  mail and resulted in 37 voting in favour of South Africa, 28 
against and six abstentions.69 The members of the IOC accepted at face value the 
promise of a multiracial team from South Africa. The IOC believed that, given the 
announcement by  Vorster, change was beginning to occur within sport. Reconsidering 
the question in 1970 showed appeasement to the African nations - this would allow 
South Africa to participate in Mexico City  in 1968, but left open future participation in 
the Olympics, based on an evaluation of South Africa!s progress in two years.
According to a paper called "The Role of Sport in the International System! by David B. 
Kanin, presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association at 
the University of Toronto, international propaganda plays an important role in 
politicising the Olympic Games: "Each state attempts to demonstrate to other states 
and peoples the strength of its human resources.!70 By  showing its natural affinity  and 
dominance in sport, South Africa wanted to prove its legitimacy  as a state to the 
international community; the Olympics was key  to showing South African pride, 
legitimacy, and nationalism. These feelings and ideas pushed the South African 
government to start bending the rules regulating apartheid in sport. Acceptance of 
South Africa at international sporting events was tantamount to acceptance of their 
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policy  of apartheid. For South Africa its sport policy  was legitimised by  the fact that the 
IOC approved the country!s participation in the 1968 Games.
Within two weeks of the IOC!s decision, the SCSA called on its member nations to 
boycott the 1968 Games. The SCSA was formed in 1965 and passed as resolution in 
1966, the main goal of which was the expulsion of South African sports organisations 
from the Olympic Movement and international sports federations until the country 
complied with IOC rules.71 The SCSA wanted to see South Africa completely  isolated 
from international sport; the organisation knew that South Africa!s isolation in sport 
would be difficult for the government to justify  to its sports mad white population. Once 
the boycott was called, socialist and other third world countries threatened to join the 
boycott, along with black American athletes.72  Time magazine reports that the 32 
nations of the SCSA voted unanimously  to skip the Games and were joined by  Iraq, 
Syria, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Somalia. India and the Soviet Union 
also threatened to pull out.73 
Mexico, the host of the 1968 Games, became concerned by  the boycott threat. 
According to the Canadian ambassador in Mexico "They  placed great value on holding 
the Games and were greatly  concerned that they  would lose their international 
character, involve normally  neutral Mexico in contentious international politics, and 
leave Mexico hosting an all-white Olympics.!74 Hain contended that "It became clear 
that Mexico was not prepared to stage the Games without the presence of African and 
Asian countries, and they had said they  would not participate if South Africa was 
admitted. To this extent, the pressure of the Third World was decisive.!75 The threat of 
an all-white Olympics looming, Brundage, under increasing international pressure, flew 
to South Africa, under the auspices of visiting a game park; while there he appealed to 
Braun and SANOC.76  His appeal failed, however, and a special meeting of the IOC 
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Executive was called for April 1968. The decision to withdraw  South Africa!s invitation 
was unanimous and
Brundage stressed that the invitation had been withdrawn not because of 
its racial policies, political pressure, or threat of boycott, but out of concern 
for the safety  of the team, given the “international climate” at the time, 
which included disturbances, destructive demonstrations, and even 
assassinations.77
Gail-Maryse Cockram indicates that "Brundage explained that there has been threats of 
physical violence all over the world, that Martin Luther King had been assassinated in 
the USA, and that if the Springboks went to Mexico there might be actual physical 
violence attempted against them...!78 Blaming worldwide racial tension and ongoing 
protests due to Vietnam, and the assassination of Martin Luther King and Robert F. 
Kennedy  was misleading. Yes, this created a hostile atmosphere for the apartheid 
government of South Africa, but the boycott threat was the major reason the South 
African team!s invitation was withdrawn. The fact that the decision to exclude them was 
unanimous shows that the threat of an all-white Olympics, due to a boycott, was top of 
mind for IOC officials. Racialisation of the Olympics could have led to the destruction of 
the Olympic Movement. James Worrell, the Canadian representative on the IOC, felt 
that:
“it is possible that the IOC has been forced to yield to pressure, but if there 
is a precedent, it is a dangerous one. It means that anytime somebody 
doesn!t like something, he can force a change by  threatening a boycott. I 
think the South African Committee should be given credit for getting as far 
as it did in a difficult situation. They had been proceeding in good faith 
under what they considered were the required conditions.”79
Worrell, a former Canadian athlete, worried about the continuing use of the boycott 
threat; its efficacy was clear.
In Canada, Olympic team members also considered boycotting the 1968 Games in 
support of the SCSA. Allan MacEachen, Minister of Health and Welfare at the time, 
said it was up to individual athletes to decide whether or not they  would participate in 
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the Olympics.80 In February  1968, several Canadian Olympic track and field athletes 
were interviewed for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation!s (CBC) television show 
The Way It Is. According to track and field athlete, Abby Hoffman "I!m not sure what the 
effect, at this point, of white nations withdrawing from the Games would be. ... I think it 
might almost be a more powerful weapon if the Games were held, all the white nations 
participated and the African nations did not.!81 Here, Hoffman plays on the international 
fear of an all-white Games; growing discontent pointed to the possibility  that the African 
nations would boycott any  Games in which South Africa participated, with many  other 
non-white nations following suit. Hoffman!s analysis is thought-provoking: how would 
an all-white Games affect the Olympic Movement? What would the repercussions be? 
She implies that an all-white Games could be the event that would propel the IOC into 
doing something about the South African situation.
Other athletes were more concerned with Canada!s role in the IOC decision to readmit 
South Africa into the Olympics. The Canadian representative to the IOC, Worrell, would 
not disclose how he voted.  Former Canadian Olympian and track and field superstar, 
Harry Jerome, felt that athletes should have been consulted before the vote as they 
were the ones who had to compete and, therefore, should have been given the 
opportunity  to voice their opinion.82 Although fellow athlete Bruce Kidd agreed with 
Jerome, he focused on what actions Canada could take to prompt the IOC to reverse 
its decision:
I think that although in other spheres the Western countries have been 
pretty  hypocritical in their attitude towards South Africa, i.e. condemning 
them in legislative bodies, such as the UN, and then simultaneously 
investing heavily  in their country, I think that in sport we shouldn!t allow this 
type of thing to go on. And, I think that if Canada supported the African 
nations who are presently boycotting, who sought support from other 
Commonwealth countries, I think that the politically  sensitive IOC would ... 
change its mind and tell South Africa that the Olympics is no place for token 
integration.83
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The international furore surrounding participation in the 1968 boycott was the first time 
that the sports boycott made waves within Canada. In the end, Canada did participate 
in the 1968 Olympics as South Africa!s invitation to the Games was withdrawn under 
the boycott threat. 
Richard E. Lapchick writes that in March 1970, the SCSA met in Cairo "the result being 
a list of charges against South Africa and a resolution demanding that South Africa be 
expelled from the Olympic Movement entirely  rather than merely  suspended from 
individual Games.!84 Charges against SANOC indicated that South Africa contravened 
Olympic rule 25 as its sports policies were tied up with the government!s apartheid 
policies; they  contravened rule 24 as the national sports federations did not guarantee 
membership to non-whites; they  contravened rule 1 because they  did not allow non-
whites "full and equal participation in the competitive and administrative activities of the 
committee!, they  practiced racial discrimination by not allowing multiracial competitions, 
by  not providing equal facilities and training opportunities as whites; and they  had not 
complied with the Baden-Baden resolution.85 African countries made a forceful, logical 
argument for the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. South Africa was obligated to 
follow IOC rules; they  continued to flout these rules by practicing and promoting 
segregated sport.
After the African nations brought their concerns forward to the IOC at the 1970 
Amsterdam meeting, South Africa was given the opportunity  to respond to the claims. It 
is well documented that Frank Braun, head of SANOC, gave an inflammatory  speech 
which dwindled support for the South Africans.86  According to a Canadian External 
Affairs brief:
How the decision was arrived at, what types of cases were proposed, how 
the resolution was worded, what the conditions for re-admission are, and 
whether the motivation behind the expulsion was based on concern with 
the status of sports in South Africa, or on more general political 
considerations with respect to South Africa is not known.87
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South Africa was expelled from the IOC by a vote of 35 to 28 with three abstentions.88
Honey, the white South African representative, remained a full IOC member.89  Lord 
Killanin explains that Honey  had offered to resign, but "...there was no reason for him to 
do so; he had broken no rules or regulations as a member of the club and I felt we 
needed the thin link to South Africa which he could provide.!90 By keeping Honey, and 
by  extension a South African representative, as a member of the IOC there was hope 
that South Africa would eventually  acquiesce and follow  IOC rules in order to be 
readmitted into the Olympic movement. South Africa was not completely  isolated from 
the IOC and, as a voting member, Honey would retain some influence on the 
committee and help South Africa!s voice to be heard.
Canada-South Africa Relations 1960-1968
As long-time members of the Commonwealth, Canada and South Africa had much in 
common. Both countries were colonised by white Europeans and both struggled with 
finding solutions on how  best to deal with native populations; each country  undertook 
policies of segregation in order to control native inhabitants. By  the turn of the twentieth 
century  Canada had established a complex reservation system and ensured its 
maintenance through the Indian Act of 1876. In 1948 the National Party  of Daniel 
Francois Malan officially  adopted the policy  of apartheid in South Africa; this policy 
ensured the formalisation of legal racial segregation in all aspects of South African 
society. 
By 1960 Canada had become a country  with an increasing immigrant population and, 
as  one of the oldest members of the British empire, it hoped to pursue a leadership 
role in the ever-expanding Commonwealth of nations.  Worldwide reaction to the 
Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 was quick and condemnatory, especially  in Canada 
where fairness, and a dedication to diversity  and international relations, was an 
important aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Conservative Canadian Prime Minister, 
John Diefenbaker, believed that the Commonwealth should be "colour blind! and was 
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vehemently  opposed to apartheid.91 At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
in 1960, the situation in South Africa was discussed; Diefenbaker reiterated that 
Canada abhorred apartheid, indicating that such a policy  could not be justified and that 
"...the equality  of every human being "whatever colour or race must be a basic principle 
of the Commonwealth.”!92 At this Conference Eric Louw, the South African Minister of 
External Affair, attending in place of the Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who was 
recovering from an assassination attempt, let it be known that in October 1960 South 
Africa would hold a referendum in which those who were eligible to vote would decide 
whether or not South Africa would remain a constitutional monarchy  or make the move 
to republicanism. Louw requested that the conference consider whether South Africa 
would be allowed to remain a member of the association; the Conference put off its 
decision until the actual referendum was completed. The referendum yielded a pro-
republic vote. 
Therefore, the decision on whether to allow South Africa to remain a member of the 
Commonwealth was not dealt with until the Commonwealth Prime Ministers! 
Conference of 1961. During the Conference in London, Canada supported the Afro-
Asian Commonwealth members in their opposition to South Africa!s request to remain 
a member of the Commonwealth once it declared itself a republic in May 1961. The 
conference ended with South Africa withdrawing its request for Commonwealth 
membership. Diefenbaker did not want Canada to be implicitly  condoning apartheid 
and, therefore, spoke out against the regime!s continued membership in the 
Commonwealth. 
Diefenbaker set a precedent in Commonwealth relations - by  siding with the non-white 
nations he showed that Canada was a useful ally  to the junior members of the 
Commonwealth. Canada also made clear that it did not approve of apartheid. Canada 
also set itself up to take on a middle power and mediator role in international and 
Commonwealth relations. In the end, however, external pressure and a desire to 
ensure the appeasement of the newer, non-white Commonwealth states forced 
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Canada to step-up in support of these countries, by  speaking out against South Africa 
Canada endeared itself to the non-white countries within the Commonwealth. Canada, 
as the older, supportive state showed these countries that it would provide them with 
much needed senior-level support within the Commonwealth.
Diefenbaker was followed by  Liberal Lester B. Pearson as Prime Minister. Pearson!s 
government supported United Nations resolutions condemning apartheid and South 
Africa!s refusal to come to terms with South West Africa. During most of the 1960s, the 
Canadian government refused to subject South Africa to any sort of economic or 
financial sanctions.93 Pearson!s government made no significant changes to Canada!s 
diplomatic relationship with South Africa throughout his Prime Ministerial term. 
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CHAPTER 3: Trudeau and Canada!s New Path
The Liberal Government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Canadian Confederation occurred in 1867, bringing together Ontario, Québec, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia; Confederation was completed in 1949 when 
Newfoundland joined. This federation is made up unique provinces and regions, 
English and French speaking citizens. Under the British North America Act, the act 
which formalised Canada!s union, provinces were given jurisdiction over powers 
related to social institutions, education, family  and the legal system; the federal 
government was given powers not specifically  assigned to provinces like the power to 
tax, postal service, banking, communications, and criminal law.1  Canada is made up of 
an uneasy  balance of powers between the provincial and federal governments, English 
and French speakers, and even regions such as the east (Maritimes) versus central 
Canada versus west (the Prairies) versus British Columbia. Canadians have developed 
separate loyalties - loyalties to Canada, to their province, to their region or city. To be 
Canadian is to embrace all of these separate identities. 
In 1960, there was a major shift in the federation. Québec, which had always 
maintained the language and culture brought over by French settlers, elected the 
Liberal Party government of Jean Lesage to its Legislative Assembly. The previous 
Québec premiere had been Maurice Duplessis of the conservative Union Nationale 
party. The election of Lesage!s government marked the beginning of the Révolution 
tranquille (Quiet Revolution) within the province.  According to Mary K. Flowers, 
Québecers had witnessed the domination of their economy  and diminution of their 
culture by  Anglo-Canadians and Americans. What Lesage!s Liberals did was take up 
the theme of provincial autonomy, "they  believed that the provincial government should 
no longer perform only the role of an obstacle to the extension of federal powers, but 
should actively command the social and economic development of Québec.!2 This 
government wanted to ensure the continuation of French culture and education within 
the province; they  wanted to stop the tide of Anglicisation and solidify  French 
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autonomy. Samuel LaSelva notes that most French Canadians supported 
Confederation as it allowed them to maintain their own culture, develop their own 
society  and control their destiny.3 The Quiet Revolution marked the beginnings of the 
nationalist and separatist movements in Québec. The Union Nationale were voted back 
into power in 1966; although nationalist in nature they  "adopted a more emphatically 
autonomiste position when dealing with the federal government, by demanding greater 
provincial powers in international affairs, social welfare, and broadcasting.!4 To gain 
power in Québec after 1960, provincial parties reinforced the idea of French autonomy 
and the uniqueness of their culture and language.
French-Canadian Liberal, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, won a majority  government in the June 
25, 1968 federal election; with this win he brought the idea of a Just Society  to the 
Canadian public. To Trudeau "Achieving such a society  would require promoting 
equality of opportunity  and giving the most help to those who were the most 
disadvantaged.!5 The notion of "just! became an important aspect of Trudeau politics 
and, as such, Liberal Party  policy  well into the 1980s. Trudeau came to power at a key 
time in Canada!s evolution. In the same year Trudeau was elected, the Parti 
Québécois, led by  René Lévesque, was formed; its main goal was independence for 
Québec. It was against this political backdrop  that Trudeau came to power with an 
important goal - to make Canada more cohesive by  patriating the Canadian 
constitution. When Trudeau came to power, the Canadian constitution could only  be 
changed by Act of the British Parliament; Trudeau wanted to bring Canada!s 
constitution home, under the jurisdiction of Canadians. The patriation of the constitution 
would allow Canada to amend its own constitution without going through Britain and 
would also allow the country to assert its sovereignty. 
In foreign policy  terms, Trudeau wanted to hone Canada!s image and position as a 
strong middle power, reaching out and befriending a variety  of nations in the hopes of 
solidifying Canada!s position as a trusted force on the world stage. Tom Keating notes 
that when Trudeau took office in April 1968, "...he had no experience in hands-on 
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management of foreign policy  and little contact with foreign service officers.!6 So, the 
Trudeau government took active steps to reevaluate Canada!s foreign policies. In 1970 
the white paper Foreign Policy  for Canadians was published by authority  of the 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp. Six policy  themes were 
identified:
Fostering Economic Growth is primarily  a matter of developing the 
Canadian economy, seeking to ensure its sustained and balanced growth.
Safeguarding Sovereignty  and Independence is largely  a matter of 
protecting Canada!s territorial integrity, its constitutional authority, its 
national identity and freedom of action.
Working for Peace and Security  means seeking to prevent war or at least 
contain it.
Promoting Social Justice includes policies of a political, economic and 
social nature pursued in a broad area of international groupings (the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie).
Enhancing the Quality  of Life implies policies that add dimension to 
economic growth and social reform so as to produce richer life and human 
fulfilment for all Canadians.
Ensuring a Harmonious Natural Environment is closely  linked with quality  of 
life and includes policies to deal not only  with the deterioration in the natural 
environment but with risks of wasteful utilization of natural resources.7
Sharp writes in his memoirs that the clarification of Canada!s foreign policy and the 
publication of these policies were a major step in Canadian politics:
Never before 1968 had any  Canadian government tried to express 
Canadian foreign policy  in a single set of public documents. Until then, the 
content of Canadian foreign policy was to be found in ministerial speeches, 
in occasional documents, in the annual reports of the Department of 
External Affairs, and in papers and books written by academics. Nor, until 
then, had any  Canadian government tried to place foreign policy  within a 
consistent framework of Canadian interests and objectives.8
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The Trudeau government had a clear vision on how they  saw Canada as a nation; the 
government felt that Canada had the opportunity  to become a powerful country. 
Trudeau and his colleagues started to develop policies which would promote Canada 
as a nation, both in world politics and in the economy. By making Canada strong within, 
they believed this would help strengthen its international reputation as well. The 
solidification of consistent foreign policies was an important development in Canada. 
However, applying consistency in these policies would prove difficult and, at times, 
impossible. Most of these policies would not affect the day-to-day  transactions of the 
Canadian public. But, the publication did include specific sections on foreign 
relationships that were important to lobby  groups within Canada, including relations 
with the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and major trading partners. 
According to Keating, one of the main reasons for Trudeau!s reevaluation of foreign 
policy  was his desire to exert power over the Department of External Affairs. Keating 
notes:
...the review informed members of the Department of External Affairs that a 
new leader was in charge, one with very different ideas about how policy 
should be made and carried out. Trudeau entered office with reservations 
about the department, suspicions about its tendency  to control policy 
making, and dislike of its apparent resistance to change and innovation. 
The review, alongside the appointment of Ivan Head as Trudeau!s principal 
foreign policy  adviser, sent a clear message that external affairs officials 
would be relegated to a supporting role in the making of Canadian foreign 
policy. The review led to a fundamental and permanent restructuring of the 
foreign policy-making process in Canada.9
Trudeau wanted External Affairs to see that he was serious about foreign affairs and 
that decisions relating to foreign and external relations would be made by  himself and 
the Cabinet. Thomas Axworthy  points out that under Pearson!s government, Canada!s 
foreign policy  was largely  decided by  Paul Martin, the Secretary  of State for External 
Affairs and that, generally, Cabinet ministers ran their departments with a large amount 
of autonomy, with little deference to the Cabinet as a whole.10  Despite his limited 
experience in foreign relations, Trudeau took control and pushed through changes that 
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allowed the Cabinet, led by  Trudeau, to make decisions as a collective rather than each 
Minister being solely responsible for the decisions in their own departments.
On his first visit to Washington in March 1969, Trudeau infamously  told the Washington 
Press Club: "“Living with you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant: no matter 
how friendly  and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by  every  twitch and 
grunt.!”11  The statement hinted at Trudeau!s larger concerns regarding America!s 
influence on Canada and the dynamics of the long-standing relationship. It was under 
Trudeau!s leadership  that Canada began to reevaluate its strong ties with the United 
States of America. For decades Canada and the United States had maintained a 
special relationship, mainly  due to their close physical proximity  to each other and their 
close economic ties. Interestingly, Foreign Policy for Canadians did not include a 
section devoted to America, Canada!s closest neighbour, a dominant nation, and a 
main Cold Ward protagonist. Instead, reference to the US is weaved throughout the 
document. One important section of Foreign Policy  for Canadians explains that in order 
for Canada to develop freely  "...according to its own perceptions will be the judicious 
use of Canadian sovereignty whenever Canada!s aims and interests are placed in 
jeopardy  - whether in relation to territorial claims, foreign ownership, cultural distinction, 
or energy  and resource management.!12 Early  on in the Trudeau era, External Affairs 
hints at a change in Canadian policy  dealing with the US. Additionally, by not devoting 
an entire section of the White Paper to the US, Canada sends an important message - 
the Canadian relationship with the United States will not hinder Canada!s ability  to 
increase its international capacity  and that Canada intends on developing relationships 
and economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, thereby, decreasing American 
influence on both Canadian society and the Canadian economy.
By 1970, Canada was the main trading partner of the United States. According to 
Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head, US exports to Canada exceeded US exports to Japan, 
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France, United Kingdom, and West Germany  combined.13  During and immediately 
following World War II,
...Canada transformed itself from a predominantly  agricultural and 
resource-extractive society  into a modern, industrialized power, 
overwhelmingly  due to the sizable transfers of capital, technology  and skills 
from American sources. These transfers continued and increased in the 
postwar period, and were complemented by  the attractiveness and 
availability of the burgeoning US domestic market.14
American-Canadian economic ties were well-established and deep. Despite this, in 
August 1971, President Richard Nixon announced that he would be implementing 
practices to protect the US dollar - the practices were aimed at countries that were 
capturing markets which traditionally  imported from America, but were now open to 
other imports. Often referred to as Nixonomics, the changes came about due to the 
increasing costs of the Vietnam War and inflation within the US. The changes included 
surcharges on Canadian exports to the US, and would have a huge impact on the 
Canadian economy. Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau!s office, led by  Head, and members of 
External Affairs moved quickly  to reach out to Nixon and his government in order to 
mitigate damage to the Canadian economy. By  December 1971, the two sides met and 
it was decided that the surcharge would be lifted and no demands would be made in 
respect to the value of the Canadian dollar.15  Canada walked away  from the 
implementation of Nixonomics bruised and weary.
Importantly, in 1972, Peter C. Dobell wrote: "It is difficult to think of any  major area of 
Canadian domestic policy  - trade, finance, transport, communication, energy  sources, 
defence, water, fisheries, agriculture - where the impact of the US are not of vital 
importance.!16 Canada was so connected to the US, especially  through cultural and 
economic influences, there was a general fear of American dominance. So, the 
government adopted its Third Option in 1972. The goals of which were "...strengthening 
Canadian ownership of the economy, diversifying Canada!s trade abroad and 
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protecting Canadian culture.!17  The Third Option allowed Canada to assert its 
sovereignty  and decrease American influence on Canada. But, as J.L. Granatstein and 
Robert Bothwell point out, the US-Canada relationship during the 1970s mainly 
focused on bilateral relations, never had a sense of urgency  and, finally, Canada!s 
opinion on global politics mattered little.18 The relationship was fairly one-sided, with 
Canada often demurring to its strong neighbour to the south in order to ensure the 
stability of the Canadian economy.
Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, Canada butted heads with the US over a 
variety  of issues. In 1973, Canada, at the request of the US, joined the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), alongside Indonesia, Hungary  and 
Poland. The ICCS was formed to help bring an end to American involvement in 
Vietnam. The credibility of the ICCS was called into question and Canada did not 
remain a member for long.19 Nixon was followed by  Gerald Ford in 1973 and Ford by 
Jimmy Carter in 1977. Under the Ford and Carter administrations, the US-Canadian 
relationship continued to focus on economic issues, including fisheries and gas 
pipelines, along with issues of territory  and culture, including disputes over the Arctic 
waters. In 1975, the Trudeau government started to focus its attention inward due to 
increases in domestic inflation, increases in unemployment and the rise of Québec 
nationalism. Importantly, Canadian and American social movements during this time 
period had little contact with each other. Interestingly, Canadians had participated in 
activism surrounding the Civil Rights movement, including Bruce Kidd. But, in the 
1970s, contact was limited and mainly  focused on the Vietnam War - Canada became 
home to many American "draft-dodgers.! The anti-apartheid movements in each country 
had communication with each other but no meaningful, tangible coordination. Although 
it is debatable whether the Third Option significantly  allowed Canada to decrease 
American influence within the country, especially  in terms of ongoing economic ties, it 
did allow Canada to develop important relationships with other nations, including China 
and many Commonwealth countries.
As the Trudeau government evaluated and developed external policies through the end 
of the 1960s, domestically  the Prime Minister faced serious problems in Québec. The 
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Parti Québécois and its separatist agenda was growing in popularity  within the 
province. Violent demonstrations were increasing throughout the province, led by 
separatists, Maoists and Trotskyites.20  The Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), a 
socialist separatist group, had been wreaking havoc on the province with bombs and 
violence since its founding in 1963. In 1969 they had bombed the Montréal Stock 
Exchange - a symbol of Anglo-Canadian and American economic dominance. In May 
1970 the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa was elected. By  October 1970, the 
province had reached an unbelievable breaking point - British Trade Commissioner, 
James Cross, was kidnapped on October 5 by  an FLQ  cell and then Québec Labour 
Minister, Pierre Laporte, was kidnapped by another FLQ cell on October 10. It soon 
became clear that the province could not handle this situation on its own; Trudeau 
reported that Premiere Bourassa called him on the day  Laporte was kidnapped and 
asked the Prime Minister to send in the army and consider invoking the War Measures 
Act.21 Trudeau did send in the army, but put off invoking the Act. 
After a long debate in Cabinet and after a formal request by  Bourassa and Montréal 
Mayor Jean Drapeau, for the first and only  time during peace, the Trudeau government 
invoked the Act, thereby suspending civil liberties on October 16.22  Laporte was 
murdered on October 17. According to Peter Desbarats, although there had been 
opposition in the way  the federal and provincial governments were handling the 
situation, Laporte!s murder changed things: "Public opinion polls showed that the ratio 
of support for the governments! action was from 70 to 90 per cent.!23 Cross continued 
to be held until December. The federal government always maintained it would not 
negotiate with terrorists, but on December 2 a federal negotiator reached an agreement 
with FLQ cell members. They  were provided safe passage to Cuba and Cross was 
freed.24
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Domestically, this was a terrible time for Canada. The country  was at a tipping point. 
Anglo-French relations were at their lowest point since Confederation. Not an ideal 
situation considering Montréal had been awarded the 1976 Olympic Games at the IOC 
meeting in Amsterdam on May 12, 1970. This should have been a unifying time in 
Canadian history, yet the call for separatism was growing in Québec. The October 
Crisis did help settle things for a while; the province had to recuperate from the shock 
of the events. A series of constitutional conferences had begun in 1968, under the 
Pearson government. Constitutional reform and the patriation of the constitution had 
been a Pearson priority, one which Trudeau inherited, and promoted, as the new  leader 
of the Liberal party. 
In 1971, the Victoria Conference took place and the Victoria Charter was drafted. 
According to Trudeau the charter could have been good for all Canadians as it would 
have patriated the constitution, provided an amending formula, and enshrined official 
languages for the legislative, judiciary  and executive branches of the federal 
government. Québec would be given veto powers along with Ontario "there would have 
been formal recognition that three judges of the Supreme Court would be members of 
the Québec bar; provincial paramountcy  would have been recognised over family, 
youth, and occupational training allowances; and the federal government would have 
given up the powers of reservation and disallowance.!25 Québec was not satisfied with 
the proposals at the Conference and other provinces were concerned that the country 
was being separated into first and second class provinces - those with the veto rights 
and those without.26 The Conference and its Charter failed. Rather than cause further 
regional and Anglo-Franco schisms, Trudeau put constitutional politics to one side for a 
few years. His government focused on quieting the separatist movement in Québec, 
increasing policies surrounding the Just Society, and increasing Canada!s international 
reputation. By  the beginning of the 1970s, foreign relations was one of the Trudeau 
government!s main priorities. 
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Canada!s policies towards South Africa
Under Trudeau, Canada!s foreign policy  with Southern Africa was explicitly  defined 
under the section dealing with the United Nations in Foreign Policy  for Canadians. It 
addressed Canada!s abhorrence of apartheid and indicated that Canada continued to 
support UN resolutions that called for a voluntary  arms embargo and another resolution 
supporting the termination of South Africa!s mandate over South West Africa.27 
In addition to condemning apartheid and indicating Canada!s ongoing support for UN 
resolutions, the white paper outlined Canada!s current policy pertaining to Southern 
Africa. The Canadian government policy  highlighted two divergent themes: social 
justice and economic growth -
The first theme has been pursued in Canadian policy  statements and in its 
actions against the illegal regime in Rhodesia, as well as the embargo on 
the shipment of significant military  equipment to South Africa and Portugal. 
The second reflects Canada!s basic approach, which is to trade in peaceful 
goods with all countries and territories regardless of political considerations. 
This principle has motivated Canadian trade with China and Cuba, as well 
as with authoritarian regimes of the right and left with whose policies 
Canada does not agree.28
South Africa was an important trading partner and, therefore, the Canadian government 
would not terminate the favourable trade relationship. When South Africa departed the 
Commonwealth, Canada retained its preferential trade agreement with the new 
republic. According to Yves Forest, Parliamentary  Secretary  to the President of the 
Privy  Council, in 1969 the value of imports from South Africa was $45.9 million and 
were subject to the preferential tariff if shipped directly  to Canada. Canadian exports  to 
South Africa totalled $78.5 million, of which, $10.2 million was eligible for the 
preferential tariff.29 Canada continued its lucrative trading with South Africa. But, in an 
attempt to demonstrate their abhorrence of apartheid and their support for freedom and 
equality in Southern Africa, Canada would also "...make available further economic 
assistance to black African states of the area to assist them to develop their own 
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institutions.!30 In addition, the federal government indicated that it would also increase 
its contribution to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern 
Africa and open a new diplomatic mission in the area.31
Many historians and researchers contend that Canada!s trade and investment with 
South Africa was, in fact, insignificant. Some critics cited that, as of the early  1970s, 
Canadian exports to South Africa made up  a small fraction of a percent of Canada!s 
total trade export.32 According to The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy  Towards 
Africa, South African exports accounted for 1/50 of one per cent of Canadian trade.33 
Analysts and activists agreed that Canada!s main focus continued to be economic 
stimulus and trade growth; social justice was not the government!s main priority. As 
mentioned above, this became increasingly  clear when, in 1972, Canada developed its 
Third Option. Linda Freeman contends that with the adoption of the Third Option, South 
Africa became even more important to Canada as a trading partner.34  Through the 
Third Option Canada hoped to increase its autonomy and decrease its dependence on 
the Canadian-American relationship. As such, maintaining trade with a variety  of 
nations, including South Africa, would continue to be a priority. 
OXFAM Canada submitted a rebuttal document, in regards to Foreign Policy for 
Canadians, to the Parliamentary  Committee on External Affairs. The document 
addresses the inconsistencies in Canada!s policy for southern Africa:
We are glad to note that the White Paper makes clear the Government!s 
distaste for Southern African regimes which are governed by  a white 
minority  whose prosperity  and power are based on the subordination of a 
black majority. We agree that “the Canadian Government!s attitude can be 
seen as reflecting two policy  themes which are divergent” but we dissent 
most strongly  from the conclusion of the White Paper, that Canadian 
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interests would be best served by  maintaining the current policy, which is to 
support the principle of freedom but to continue trading with the present 
regimes. We are especially  concerned when such trading is actively 
promoted by  Canadian Government publications, and at the continued 
extension of Commonwealth preferences to South Africa, which has the 
effect of denying access to the Canadian market to products of other 
countries. We believe that this is an issue on which the stance taken by 
Canada will affect for good or ill this country!s relationship  with other African 
nations. The position outlined in the White Paper is ambiguous and morally 
indefensible. We urge the Government to review  this question again and 
give greater emphasis to the claims of justice and freedom.35
OXFAM!s stance reflects the point of view of many Canadian NGOs at the time. The 
1973 YWCA report Investment in Oppression was heavily  funded by  many of the 
founding members of the Taskforce. Like other international NGOs, the YWCA was 
active in the anti-apartheid movement in Canada. They published several pamphlets, 
and local and regional YWCA offices often wrote to the federal government to protest 
Canadian policy  and to lobby  the government to speak out on a variety  of issues 
affecting South Africa at any  given time. The publication focused on South African 
homelands, black working conditions, contract labour, and corporate and government 
policies for investment and trade. Renate Pratt notes:
...the study  found that the apartheid system and foreign investors served 
each other!s interests. Investors contributed to the growth of the white 
economy while repression, to the degree that it was successful, provided 
the “stability” that attracted foreign investors. Investment in Oppression also 
warned that foreign investors served South Africa in yet another way: they 
strengthened the pro-South African lobby  abroad, inviting tolerance for 
South Africa!s apartheid system.36
Investment in Oppression was a key  source for the anti-apartheid movement!s 
argument against Canadian trade and investment in South Africa. Its main conclusion 
was that, in contradiction to what was written in Foreign Policy  for Canadians, 
repressive South African policies such as the denial of civil and political liberties to 
Africans, exclusive white control of political institutions and the confinement of Africans 
to less than 14 percent of the land in South Africa would continue in South Africa and 
that increasing Canadian investment would only  strengthen the country!s economy  and 
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the apartheid regime.37 The report gave Canadians a challenging view of where their 
money  was going when they  supported investment in South Africa. The fact that 
Canada!s trade with South Africa accounted for such a small portion of Canadian 
exports reinforced this fact. Yet, South Africa had been a long-time white 
Commonwealth dominion alongside Canada and long-time trading partner with 
Canada. The partnership  was deemed lucrative and important by  Canadian 
government and businesses and, therefore, would not be severed easily.
The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy  Towards Africa also published a rebuttal to 
the white paper: The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy  for Canada towards Southern 
Africa. In it they accuse the government of placing a price tag "...on the basic social and 
political values which Canadians might expect their foreign policy  to reflect. That price 
tag is pitifully  small and almost inconsequential to the broad economic welfare of this 
nation.!38 The Committee, made up of a cross section of society  - church leaders, 
officials of voluntary  organisations, trade unionists, businessmen, academics, and 
members from Canadian University  Service Overseas (CUSO) - proposed an 
alternative policy. The paper called for changes to Canada!s South African foreign 
policy, including limiting Canadian economic involvement in Southern Africa and 
achieving a foreign policy which reflected the value of human dignity, both of which 
were fundamental to Canadians.39  Policies which reduced Canada!s investment in 
Southern Africa would, in turn, decrease Canada!s indirect support of the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. Anti-apartheid organisations and lobbyists continued to lobby 
the Canadian government to cut economic and investment links with South Africa 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Organisations like OXFAM Canada, YWCA and other 
committees dedicated to reducing Canadian relations with South Africa provided the 
government with alternative solutions. However, these alternatives were not considered 
by  the new Trudeau government, despite the recognition that Canada!s policy  with 
South Africa was based on two opposing goals: increasing economic ties and 
promoting Canada!s abhorrence of apartheid.
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The 1971 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
Prior to 1970, Trudeau had little experience in dealing with the Commonwealth and, 
generally, a limited interest in the association. However, a key event in Commonwealth 
history  would push Trudeau to the forefront of Commonwealth diplomacy and 
leadership. In the late 1960s, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson had 
ceased selling arms to South Africa. In July  1970 the new British Conservative 
government of Edward Heath announced that Britain would resume selling maritime 
arms, including planes and helicopters, to South Africa under the Simonstown 
agreement. The Ottawa Citizen points out that "...the provision of such material would 
almost certainly  be interpreted as a violation of the British government!s pledge that no 
weapons would be provided which could be used against blacks either inside or 
outside South Africa.!40 African nations feared the white South African majority  would 
use the weapons, purchased from Britain, to suppress the black majority. What ensued 
was a dispute between African Commonwealth nations and Britain over the latter!s 
resumption of arms sale to the apartheid government. According to Charles Redekop 
reaction to Britain!s decision was swift:
Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone all 
threatened either to leave the Commonwealth or to press for the expulsion 
of Britain. The government in London in turn charged that the attempt by 
African countries to veto its decisions was at variance with the 
Commonwealth principle of foreign policy autonomy and was, furthermore, 
something which these countries would not tolerate if the situation were 
reversed.41
Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Ivan Head in The Canadian Way  ask, in regards to the 
African reaction to the resumption of arms sales to South Africa "Why  should they 
remain in an association that included as a member a country  so willing to offer military 
assistance to a mortal enemy?!42 Trudeau and his foreign policy  advisor, Head, realised 
the detrimental effect the British arms sales would have on the Commonwealth. This 
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was reiterated to Head when Shridath "Sonny! Ramphal, Attorney  General and Foreign 
Minister of Guyana, warned Head that African nations were serious about leaving the 
Commonwealth should Heath!s government proceed with the sales. Head worried 
about a domino effect: once African nations started to  leave it was possible that other 
non-white Commonwealth nations would follow.43
As mentioned previously, part of Canada!s new foreign policy  initiative was to pursue 
middle-power, mediator roles in international relations; this Commonwealth situation 
was an ideal moment for Canada to step forward and act as a mediator. Trudeau felt 
that
...it was the duty  of a middle power like Canada, which could not sway  the 
world with the force of its armies, to at least try  to sway  the world with the 
force of its ideals. I wanted to run Canada by  applying the principles of 
justice and equality, and I wanted our foreign policy  to reflect similar 
values.44
To Trudeau, Canada!s middle power status played on important role in the 
development of its new foreign policy. In this particular case, the Toronto Star notes: "A 
mediating position is logical for Canada as the senior white member which has 
cultivated close and friendly  relations with the non-white nations of the club, including 
black African countries that are threatening to walk out if Britain goes ahead with the 
arms deal.!45 Being able to work towards peaceful and civilised solutions to difficult 
diplomatic situations allowed Canada the opportunity  to influence world politics. 
Axworthy  writes that "...Canada took the lead in suggesting ideas based on different 
assumptions than those of our larger, more powerful allies. Trudeau knew that one of 
the essential strengths of a middle power is that it can afford to fail.!46 By  choosing to 
wade into Commonwealth politics and work in finding a solution to the South African 
arms crisis, Trudeau hoped to increase his international political capital and prove that 
Canada was a supportive, useful middle power.
In July 1970 Trudeau wrote to Heath and expressed his main fear was the 
"...consequence for the future of the Commonwealth if Britain went ahead with arms 
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sale to South Africa.!47 Also, Secretary  of State for External Affairs Sharp, met with Alec 
Douglas-Home, Britain!s Foreign Secretary, at the United Nations in September 1970, 
to discuss Britain!s position. In the run up to the 1971 London conference, Trudeau and 
his ministers and staff undertook various meetings with British representatives "to press 
actively for some compromise which would enable the Commonwealth to survive.!48 
During Heath!s visit to Ottawa in December of the same year he discussed Britain!s 
position with Trudeau. A memorandum dated December, 18 1970 indicates that Heath 
"...has emphasised that there must be recognition within the Commonwealth that each 
member has the right to pursue its own national interests, and that this applied to 
British policy  on arms sales to South Africa.!49 The memorandum goes on to state that 
Heath was willing to leave the conference if the meeting developed "into a protracted 
debate on the arms sales issue!.50  By the end of 1970 Britain was determined to 
resume arms sales with South Africa through the Simonstown agreement; they were 
unwilling to be bullied by other Commonwealth nations to reverse their decision.
Head undertook trips to key  African states in 1970 to see what could be done to resolve 
the issue with Britain. He met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth 
Kaunda of Zambia. According to Head "Both presidents regard the supply  of arms to 
South Africa and the conclusion of a defence treaty  with that country  as equally 
repugnant for each lends legitimacy to a white supremacist regime.!51 Trudeau trusted 
Head to nurture the Prime Minister!s burgeoning relationships with Nyerere and 
Kaunda. A proposal for a Commonwealth Declaration was made by  President Kaunda 
and Head indicated to Trudeau, in a memorandum, that a declaration may be the best 
way  to avoid a Commonwealth showdown and, at worst, the break-up of the 
Commonwealth.52 For Trudeau it was important to retain close, personal relationships 
with key  Commonwealth leaders, which included these two men.53  Trudeau and his 
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government often used personal relationships and friendships to help  resolve issues, 
especially  within the Commonwealth. Tom Keating points out that "On every occasion, 
he tried to develop personal relations with foreign leaders as a means of promoting his 
foreign policy objectives.!54 In this case, quiet diplomacy  and gaining the trust of both 
the African members of the Commonwealth and Prime Minister Heath were key 
components to Trudeau!s mission to see the Commonwealth through this crisis.
Trudeau was thrust into a leadership role at the conference, something which he 
embraced. Redekop indicates "Trudeau!s diplomatic efforts may be attributed to the 
implicit demands of other Commonwealth members that he play  a mediating role.!55 
Yet, documents show Trudeau had always intended to embrace opportunities for 
Canada to act in mediation roles in international relations. At home, Canadians 
questioned what Trudeau and the Canadian government were doing to resolve the 
crisis. According to Linda Freeman "Generally, the Trudeau government did not support 
arms sales to South Africa on the grounds of Canadian support for the U.N. Security 
Council arms embargo. In this stance, it was supported by  most of Parliament and by 
significant quarters of opinion in civil society.!56 In the House of Commons Mitchell 
Sharp, Secretary  of State for External Affairs, reported that Trudeau had made clear his 
support of the African states and had warned the British Prime Minister of the possible 
consequences of a resumption in arms sales and shipments.57 Trudeau stepped into a 
high profile diplomatic situation, it was an opportunity  for him to act upon the new 
Liberal Party  foreign policy  of working to find solutions to international situations and 
showing Canada!s strength.
According to the minutes of the evening meeting on January  20, 1971 Heath indicated 
that Britain would take the actions which it thought necessary in order to continue its 
global defence policy, Britain was bound to carry  out its legal obligations under the 
Simonstown agreement, and the British government had received assurances from 
South Africa that they  had no aggressive intentions for the spare parts being 
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provided.58  Yet, on January  9, 1971, Val Sears of the Toronto Star explains that 
although the British claimed that the Cape of Good Hope was significant in the Soviet 
threat and that the country  had contractual obligations under the Simonstown 
Agreement:
The Americans, who ought to know, don!t regard the Soviet threat to the 
Cape route as significant. Certainly, they  can!t imagine a few frigates and 
planes making any  difference in any  case. ... And as far as the agreement 
is concerned, former prime minister Harold Wilson had law officers examine 
the treaty  giving the British army  use of the Simonstown naval base and 
they concluded the sale of arms was non binding.59
Heath!s main goal, at this point, was to ensure Britain could develop and apply its own 
foreign policy. The British government did not appreciate nor approve of interference in 
its foreign policy  and took special exception to interference from its former colonies - 
the new Commonwealth nations. Roger Fieldhouse writes: "Despite all the problems it 
faced, and the very  great hostility  to the new policy  expressed by  many  Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers at Singapore, the Government did not back down.!60 Heath made clear 
that Britain intended to maintain its policy  of supplying South Africa with the equipment 
listed under the Simonstown agreement. 
Heath did, however, agree to the adoption of a Commonwealth Declaration of 
Principles. Trudeau used his political savvy  to find a solution to the arms sale problem; 
during meetings he made statements against racial discrimination but also pointed out 
that the long-term security  of the area had to be considered.61 On January  21 Trudeau 
discussed the role of the Commonwealth in the 1970s. The minutes from the meeting 
credit Trudeau as "...glad to note that Dr. Kaunda did not conceive the Declaration as a 
charter or constitution since experience over the years had shown the value of flexibility 
of procedure based on precedents and conventions without a formal charter or rigid 
procedural rules. Canada supported the idea of the Declaration of Principles.!62 
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Trudeau!s support of the declaration was identified as the best compromise to settle the 
dispute. In addition, a study  group of Commonwealth nations was established to 
investigate the security  of the trade routes in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. 
Britain supported the declaration and Afro-Asian nations celebrated a defined 
Commonwealth policy  against racial discrimination. One key  component of the 
declaration reads: 
We recognise racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the 
healthy  development of the human race and racial discrimination as an 
unmitigated evil of society. Each of us will vigorously  combat this evil within 
our own nation. No country  will afford to regimes which practice [sic] racial 
discrimination assistance which in its own judgment directly  contributes to 
the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy.63
The declaration allowed both Britain and non-white Commonwealth nations to continue 
their membership  in the face of the Simonstown agreement crisis. It was worded to 
please both sides and allowed some room to manoeuvre in terms of Britain!s 
adherence to its existing arrangements with South Africa. Trudeau, with the help  of the 
Australian delegation, was responsible for the last sentence in the quote above.64 By 
inserting this sentence the declaration became palatable for both the British and the 
non-white Commonwealth nations. According to the Ottawa Citizen, Trudeau!s personal 
intervention helped push the declaration through; he worked up to the last day  of the 
Conference to have the leaders accept the amended wording of the declaration "...by 
buttonholing other leaders at a coffee break which he managed to keep going for an 
hour.!65 Although, both sides were able to save face, Britain went ahead with the sale of 
seven Wasp helicopters to South Africa in February 1971. Arms sales to South Africa 
remained official policy  until 1974 when the Labour government of Harold Wilson came 
into power.66
The policy  of opposing British arms sale to South Africa whilst taking on a mediation 
role in order to maintain a viable Commonwealth was well received by  the Canadian 
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public and anti-apartheid advocates. For example, the CLC!s President, Donald 
MacDonald, wrote to Trudeau indicating member support for the embargo. Support 
rallies also took place in Toronto and Ottawa.67 In addition to support at home, during 
this arms crisis, Afro-Asian Commonwealth nations trusted Canada to act as an honest 
broker. Head and Trudeau note that "No delegation was more jubilant over this 
outcome than the Canadian, for none had invested more of its negotiating efforts and 
stature. ... Chairman Lee [Kuan Yew] selected Trudeau, of all leaders present, to 
receive praise for his “outstanding contribution....”68 Canada, and specifically Trudeau, 
gained the trust of these new members and in future they  turned to the Canadian 
government for support and advice on a variety of matters.
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CHAPTER 4: Changes in Canadian Policies
Canada!s South African foreign policy in the early 1970s
Canada!s South African foreign policy  as outlined in the 1970 External Affairs White 
Paper, Foreign Policy  for Canadians, changed little through the early  1970s. Canadian 
industries, government branches, and banks continued to trade and invest in South 
Africa. According to Linda Freeman, Canadian private investment in the 1970s focused 
on white Southern Africa; the involvement took the form of "...ongoing direct investment, 
expanded participation in consortia offering bank loans to South Africa, and the 
underwriting of bond issues on behalf of the South African government by  Canadian 
investment dealers.!1 By  1972, it was estimated that trade with South Africa made up  1 
percent of Canada!s total trade export.2 And, John Schlegel writes that, according to 
Statistics Canada, "by  1974, Canada imported over $117 million worth of South African 
goods while exporting only  $91 million of Canadian products. Canadian involvement in 
trade and investment in South Africa continued to increase throughout the early 
1970s.!3
With this increase in investment, there was also an increase in public condemnation of 
Canada!s South African foreign policy. In 1973, the Montréal Gazette ran a series of 
articles by  Hugh Nangle which showed that only  one in six Canadian subsidiaries 
working in South Africa paid their black workers above the Poverty  Datum Line, "i.e. a 
minimum calculated for mere existence but not a minimum living wage.!4 Internationally, 
this became an important argument against supporting trade with South Africa, and 
within Canada, it was a key  fact used by anti-apartheid groups to build a case against 
Canada!s continuing trade with South Africa. 
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Despite repeated requests to cease trade and investment with South Africa, it was the 
Liberal government!s policy to continue:
We have been urged on many  occasions to break off trading with countries 
because people do not agree with the policies followed by these 
countries. ... We believe that we should encourage trade as a means of 
making useful contacts between peoples. We believe that this is a principle 
that is worth preserving and that we should follow  our practice, as in the 
past, of breaking trade relations only  when sanctions are approved by  the 
United Nations.5
The Secretary  of State for External Affairs reiterates the Canadian policy. And, at a later 
date, points out that the Commonwealth was never asked to abandon the preferential 
tariff with South Africa.6  By  extending preferential tariffs to South Africa, Canada 
continued to support the apartheid state. New Zealand and Malaysia also extended 
South Africa favourable tariff agreements.7 The government claimed that these tariffs 
were useful to Canada and that ongoing contact with the apartheid regime was key  to 
helping bring about the end of apartheid.
In 1973, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Ottawa, the final 
communiqué indicates that the heads of governments had "“recognized the legitimacy 
of the struggle to win self-determination” in Southern Africa, and that they “agreed on 
the need to give every humanitarian assistance to all those engaged in such efforts.”!8 
As such, in 1973, the government set up a new high commission in Lusaka "...intended 
to symbolize Canadian support for countries in the front line of racial confrontation in 
the region.!9 In 1974, as a progression of its policy  to support the struggles in southern 
Africa, the federal government decided "...to provide humanitarian assistance to African 
liberation groups in Southern Africa through grants by  the Canadian International 
Development Agency  (CIDA) to such non-governmental organisations like OXFAM 
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Canada, the International Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches.!10 No direct 
aid would be provided to liberation groups in southern Africa as the government feared 
"...that this would imply  governmental approval of the armed struggles. The aid 
disbursements, furthermore, were dependent upon NGO initiatives and upon their 
financial resources in order to qualify  for CIDA matching grants.!11 Providing funding to 
groups working with South African liberation movements was a major change in 
Canadian foreign policy  at the time. This move also helped enhance Canada!s 
international standing, especially amongst African nations.
These moves were welcomed by  NGOs. In April 1974, OXFAM Canada wrote to the 
Standing Committee for External Affairs and National Defence commending the 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp!s announcement regarding 
funding to NGOs. They stated:
The decision to allow CIDA to contribute through Canadian Non-
Governmental Organizations to projects of a humanitarian or development 
nature is a concrete and positive step towards the recognition of the 
legitimate struggle by  indigenous people of Southern Africa to achieve 
human dignity and the right to self-determination.12 
The implementation of funding for liberation movements in southern Africa allowed 
NGOs like OXFAM Canada, YWCA Canada, YMCA Canada, and CUSO, which were 
already  working in the region, to expand their programs and increase their outreach. 
Many of the projects receiving funding focused on education and training, farming, and 
nutrition.13
Canada remained steadfast in maintaining its investment and trade ties with South 
Africa through the early  1970s. The federal government, however, did start to increase 
humanitarian aid and also made several changes to Canada!s foreign policy  regarding 
sporting links with South Africa throughout the decade. 
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Canada!s South African Sports Policy up to c. 1973
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
published a comprehensive background book called Racism and Apartheid in Southern 
Africa. In it UNESCO  addresses how apartheid effects every aspect of life; with regards 
to sport, they stated:
Sport can only artificially  be considered in isolation from other human 
activities. Even if whites and non-whites could legally  play  together, or even 
watch sports in unsegregated accommodation, bad nutrition and poor 
health place the non-white, and especially  the African, at a disadvantage. 
The average white has far more leisure for sport, and money  for equipment 
and so on. Facilities for non-whites are poor or non-existent. Whites have 
swimming pools, private sports clubs and facilities, the African often has a 
spare patch of earth. Limited finances and the travel permit system 
severely restrict competition between non-whites. In other words the racial 
inequality  officially  institutionalized applies to sport as much as to any  other 
aspect of life.14
UNESCO  applauded the international sports boycott to date and called for an increase 
in support of the anti-apartheid sports boycott. Sport was an important part of South 
African society; as white South Africans held sport in such high regard, anti-apartheid 
movements, protesters and international bodies like the UN and the Commonwealth 
realised that focusing on the sports boycott and South Africa!s isolation in international 
sport was one of the key  components in voicing opposition to the apartheid regime. 
This movement gained momentum in throughout the 1970s.
In 1971, Canada supported United Nations General Assembly  Resolution 2775D XXVI, 
which focused on apartheid in sport. The Assembly  "called upon all sports 
organizations to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination, expressed regret 
that some sports organizations had continued exchanges with racially  selected South 
African teams and commended the international campaign against apartheid in 
sports.!15 Canada!s support of this resolution became an important weapon in the anti-
apartheid movement!s lobbying of the federal government to have the Canadian policy 
surrounding South Africa and sport changed. Part 5 of Resolution 2775D XXVI:
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Urges all States to promote adherence to the Olympic principle of non-
discrimination and to encourage their sports organizations to withhold 
support from sporting events organized in violation of this principle.16
Anti-apartheid organisations and lobbyists seized upon this section to try  and force a 
change in policy. The resolution was often quoted in anti-apartheid literature and in 
letters of protest to the federal government.
Up to the mid-1970s, the Canadian federal government took a hands-off approach to 
Canadian-South African sporting contacts. Official foreign policy  in regards to sport was 
to allow each sporting organisation or federation to decide whether or not to continue 
contact with their South African counterparts. This policy  was initiated in the 1960s, 
after South Africa!s departure from the Commonwealth. When the Liberal government 
of Pierre Trudeau came into power in 1968 it maintained the same policy  as previous 
governments. According to a letter from R.G. Hatheway, Acting Director of the African 
Affairs I Division of External Affairs to E.W. Thomas, the Executive Director of the 
Canadian Water Ski Association in March 1973:
Although the Canadian Government takes the view that the ultimate 
decision regarding participation in South African-hosted sporting activities 
rests with individual athletes or sports governing bodies concerned, it does 
not encourage such participation. This is because the Canadian 
Government strongly  disapproves of the policy of apartheid or racial 
segregation.17
Government policy  was to openly  discourage any Canadian-South African sporting 
relationships, yet there was no official policy  towards preventing sporting contact. A 
very  similar policy  was enforced in Britain at the time. A memo from M.E. Cook of the 
Central and Southern African Department to E.P. Woods of the Squash Rackets 
Association in London, dated January 1973 states:
The Government!s policy, which I outlined in our previous correspondence 
about the South African squash team!s recent visit to the United Kingdom - 
namely  that it is for sporting bodies to reach their own decision about 
fixtures with South African teams - applies equally  to events held in South 
Africa.!18
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Both Canada and Britain took the line that they  could not prevent citizens and 
sportsmen and women, and sport organisations and federations from traveling to South 
Africa to participate in sporting events, nor would they cease issuing visas to South 
African athletes wishing to enter their respective countries. The most they were willing 
to do was openly discourage any sporting contact with South Africa.
Public outcry  against Canada!s South African sport policies gained momentum through 
the 1970s, a key period in Canada!s role in international sport. The country  was 
gearing up to host both the 1976 Olympics in Montréal and the 1978 Commonwealth 
Games in Edmonton. Between 1970 and 1974 the federal government faced mounting 
external pressure to formulate a strict policy  to help prevent continued sporting contact 
between Canada and South Africa.
South African Sport Policies in Other Commonwealth Countries
Sports protests were becoming common in Commonwealth countries. In Wales, in 
1958 the Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD) was created. Dennis Brutus 
notes that, under CARD!s leadership, "...more than a thousand signatories protested at 
the exclusion of non-Whites from the South African Team! during the British Empire and 
Commonwealth Games.19  Anthony Steel explains that British sportsmen also called 
"...upon all sportsmen to work to persuade the international federation controlling each 
sport to adopt the Olympic principle.!20 This anti-apartheid sport protest was an early 
harbinger for South Africa!s international sport contact. CARD would progress to 
sending a letter to the IOC at their meeting in Munich in 1959 and, as perviously 
mentioned, Reverend Michael Scott also made a plea on behalf of CARD and SASA at 
the IOC meeting in Rome in 1960. The letter outlined South Africa!s disregard for the 
Olympic principles and called on the IOC "to apply its charter sincerely.!21 In his eye-
opening and thought provoking analysis in 1959, Brutus notes:
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Sport dramatizes their [White South Africa] dilemma and exposes the 
anachronism of apartheid as few other things do: White South Africans 
must not only  succeed in imposing their racial lunacy  on the entire 
population of the country, they  must also succeed in selling it to the entire 
world at international sporting events. The sporting world is, in conscience, 
bound to reject it eventually, and apartheid may well face its severest test 
then. For South Africa!s sport-mad White population will either have to 
conform to the principles of international sport or be doomed to dispirited 
games of jukskei in its own backyards.22 
Sport was likened to religion in apartheid South Africa; white South Africans took sport 
and international competition very  seriously. Brutus points out that it would sorely  hurt 
the apartheid supporters to be excluded from international sport - denial of international 
sporting contact was white South Africa!s major weakness.
In 1960 there had been pressure on the New Zealand Rugby  Union because they 
chose to exclude Maori players from an All Blacks team touring South Africa.23 Despite 
the adoption of the catchy slogan: "No Maoris, no tour! by  anti-apartheid groups, the 
New Zealand Rugby Union refused to cancel the tour. It has been noted above that 
even  in the 1950s, when South Africa was still a member of the Commonwealth, 
member countries and citizens were trying to raise public awareness of South Africa!s 
racial discrimination in sport. Commonwealth protests against South Africa really  began 
to gain momentum in the early  1960s. These early  protests set the scene for mass 
protests which began to dominate the anti-apartheid movement in the late 1960s. As 
such, an All Blacks tour of South Africa in 1967 was cancelled by  the New Zealand 
Rugby Union due to the fact that the South African government refused to admit 
Maoris.24
One of the early  sparks to ignite the anti-apartheid sport movement was the 1968 Basil 
D!Oliveira controversy. D!Oliveira was considered "coloured!, a South African cricketer 
who left the country  to play cricket in England.25 In 1968, the Marylebone Cricket Club 
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(MCC) was due to send an English cricket team on tour to South Africa. It is well-
documented that South Africa intended on canceling the tour if D!Oliveira was named 
to the English side; Prime Minister Vorster was determined to keep D!Oliveira  from 
playing cricket for England in South Africa.26 Jack Williams notes that Vorster even sent 
a message, through Lord Cobham, former MCC president, to the current executives of 
the organisation, letting them know  that a team including D!Oliveira would not be 
acceptable to the South African government. There was back and forth 
correspondence between England and South Africa in regards to D!Oliveira. Cobham 
did pass the message along to the MCC Secretary, Treasurer and President; however 
these men kept the message confidential and did not share it with others. It was 
revealed later that the message was not passed on because it conflicted with 
information provided by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. He travelled to South Africa in 1968 
and during a meeting with Vorster was given the impression that no decision had been 
made as to whether the government would allow D!Oliveira to play; Douglas-Home 
gave the opinion that the odds were 5/4 that he would be allowed.27 Before the team 
was announced, the MCC did not push the South African government into making a 
decision as to whether or not a team which included D!Oliveira would be acceptable. 
According to the MCC, D!Oliveira was not named to the tour, but for purely  cricketing 
reasons.28  D!Oliveira was excluded from the team, despite the fact that he played 
"...with much distinction for Worcestershire and was a regular member of the England 
team. It was noted that, far from D!Oliveira having lost form on the field, he played in 
the last test at the Oval in 1968, against Australia, and actually  scored a century.!29 
There was outcry  in Britain and D!Oliveira was eventually  included on the team when 
an original member dropped out due to injury. However, South African Prime Minister 
Vorster vetoed the team, citing it had been chosen on a political basis.30 Yet, Donald 
Woods, a South African journalist, notes that he interviewed Vorster around the time of 
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the D!Oliveira affair and Vorster seemed amenable to allowing D!Oliveira to tour. 
Woods believed that, in the end, Vorster capitulated due to South African party politics:
...the announcement of the English team including D!Oliveira coincided with 
the Orange Free State congress of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party  and with 
growing unease in the Broederbond over the possible effects on apartheid 
if D!Oliveira toured, scored well, behaved himself and impressed the 
crowds. Accordingly, the Broederbond message to Vorster was a negative, 
Vorster hadn!t the courage or the inclination to defy  it, and the cheering 
"delegates! to the party  congress heard him declaring that the tour would 
not be allowed.31
It appears that elite white politicians feared what D!Oliveira!s success against South 
African teams would mean for the country. Although the Vorster government changed 
its policies to allow non-whites to play in international sides within South Africa, Basil 
D!Oliveira was seen as unacceptable due to his status as a coloured South African.32 
Seeing a non-white South African succeed could have sparked unrest amongst the 
non-white population. Williams hypothesises:
...more could have been made before the start of the 1968 English cricket 
season to establish whether a side including D!Oliveira would have been 
allowed to play  in South Africa. Whatever Vorster!s answer may  have been, 
a blow could have been struck against apartheid in South African sport. 
Had Vorster agreed to accept a side including D!Oliveira, the presence of a 
Cape Coloured born and raised in South Africa playing cricket against white 
teams in South Africa would have been an open challenge to apartheid in 
sport. Had Vorster been forced to declare that he would not accept a team 
including D!Oliveira, the refusal of the MCC to send a team would have 
emphasized to white sport followers in South Africa that retaining apartheid 
in sport would lead to the exclusion of South Africa from international 
sport.33
It is easy  to make these conclusions with hindsight, especially  since the boycott of 
sport became so important to the anti-apartheid movement in general. At the time, the 
MCC would not have been concerned with the political repercussions of either 
situation. They  wanted to field a team which would allow  the tour to go ahead. Booth 
writes that "...a South African Coloured person posed an unacceptable situation! and 
Vorster said he would not accept a team selection based on the political objectives of 
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the Anti-Apartheid Movement, SAN-ROC and others.34 South African politics played a 
major role in the country!s decisions on how  to engage in international sport. Appeasing 
the Afrikaner Broederbond was key  to the success of any  South African prime minister; 
this meant ensuring apartheid in sport continued to be strictly followed, with as little 
concessions to international federations as possible.35 
In 1969, the Stop the Seventy  Tour (STST) was formed to cease the 1970 cricket tour 
of Britain by  South Africa. In preparation for the cricket tour of 1970, STST targeted the 
1969 South African rugby  tour of Britain. It was a broad based protest, which included 
churches, several different anti-apartheid groups, politicians and students. Peter Hain 
was one of the leaders of the campaign and explains:
The campaign against the rugby  tour started off as a "trial run! for the cricket 
tour; it turned into a massive expression of anger and opposition to the all-
white touring side and the system it represented, and developed in to one 
of the most successful and sustained protest movements seen in Britain.36
The campaign caused chaos during the 25-match tour. According to George W. 
Shepherd Jr., "A special feature was the nonviolent direct-action campaign, participated 
in by  students and militants, which led to the tearing up of pitches, interruptions, and 
picketing.!37 The campaign garnered a large amount of press. In its aftermath, "Thirteen 
African countries threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games due to be held in 
July  [1970] in Edinburgh. Forthcoming cricket tours by  India and Pakistan were also 
threatened.!38 The British government, after much public debate and many  international 
meetings, asked the Cricket Council to cancel the tour. The Home Secretary, James 
Callaghan, agreed with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that the following reasoning 
would be used in his meeting with the Cricket Council in May 1970:
The Home Secretary  said that he had in mind to take the line that on 
grounds of public policy, the Government considered that the tour should 
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not go ahead. He would refer to potential damage to race relations, the 
Commonwealth Games, to the interests of the coloured community in the 
United Kingdom. He would also refer to the burden on the Police, though 
making it clear that they would, if necessary, be able to deal with any 
situation that arose. He would point out that he was not seeking to 
pressurise them. He would take the line that it was his duty to draw their 
attention to the wider considerations outside the interests of cricket.39
In his memoirs, Callaghan recounts that he told M.J.C. Allom and Billy  Griffith, the 
Chairman and Secretary of the MCC:
...that while, as Home Secretary, I had no power to prohibit the tour, the 
Government certainly  accepted responsibility  for expressing a view about 
the consequences, and I believed that the tour would have a serious 
adverse impact. On the grounds of broad public policy the Government 
would prefer the MCC to withdraw the invitation. Messrs Allom and Griffith, 
who were always cooperative and helpful during our meetings, told me that 
the MCC would almost certainly  agree to such a request, and shortly 
afterwards I was glad to hear that they had cancelled the tour.40
One of the main reasons to request the cancellation of the tour was to ensure the 
Commonwealth Games went ahead with a full Commonwealth contingent. If the 13 
African nations boycotted the Games and other non-white nations followed suit, there 
was a genuine possibility  that the Games would only  be attended by white 
Commonwealth nations. If this had happened, it would have sorely  undermined the 
Games and put any future editions in jeopardy. Also, according to Andre Odendaal, the 
demonstrations heightened international awareness about apartheid.41  This, in turn, 
pushed the anti-apartheid movement into the mainstream media and popularised the 
movement. STST was a turning point, an important catalyst in the anti-apartheid 
movement!s momentum. It became a source of inspiration and set a an example and 
precedent of how a successful protest movement worked. According to Meredith 
Burgmann, an anti-apartheid activist in Australia in the 1970s:
We were very influenced by  the Stop the Springbok Campaign in England 
led by  the exiled South African activist Peter Hain. We used to rush home 
to watch the news on telly  and see how the protesters climbed up  the 
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goalposts and stormed the rugby  fields. We were always looking for new 
ways to get around the police, new ways of disrupting the sporting events.42 
During the 1970s, following Britain!s example, the anti-apartheid movement would 
become worldwide with numerous groups and organisations calling for boycotts, 
sanctions and the general isolation of South Africa.
In 1971, a South African rugby  team toured Australia; this tour was met with massive 
demonstrations across the country. Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes:
The South African team had to be transported in Australian Air Force planes 
as the trade unions refused to service planes or trains carrying them. 
Seven hundred people were arrested and many  were injured in 
demonstrations. The State of Queensland declared a 10-day  state of 
emergency  during the tour, provoking a general strike by  trade unions. The 
South African cricket tour for later that year was cancelled.43
Much like the 1969 rugby  tour in Britain, citizens came out in force to protest the tour in 
Australia. Protests were consistent and well-attended. According to Christopher 
Merrett, Australia cancelled the tour because "...the cost of policing and social 
divisiveness was too great a price to pay  for links with South Africa.!44 Jim Boyce, a 
former Australian rugby player who had travelled to South Africa to play the 
Springboks, and then became an opponent of Australian-South African sporting 
contacts, reiterates Merrett!s point "No-one in Australia was prepared to play  if it meant 
the police had to be there to keep order; no-one was prepared to have another state of 
emergency  declared in Queensland over a sporting event. ... The South Africans didn!t 
play rugby against Australia for another 22 years after that.!45
In 1970, the All Blacks rugby  team undertook a tour of South Africa, despite protests 
from within New Zealand. In order to ensure this particular tour was not cancelled, as 
the 1967 tour had been, South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster reversed the decision 
of the previous Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, and allowed Maoris to tour South 
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Africa with the All-Blacks team. The Maoris players would be treated as "honorary 
whites! while visiting South Africa.46 This ensured that the Maoris All Blacks members 
were not in contravention of apartheid laws; as honorary whites they  were subject to all 
of the same allowances permitted to whites in South Africa. A relaxing of the ban on 
Maori players entering South Africa was a major step in amending and relaxing South 
Africa!s apartheid policy.47
In 1973, South Africa was due to tour New Zealand with an all-white, racially  selected 
rugby  team. As the worldwide anti-apartheid movements were gaining momentum, 
press coverage, and membership, New Zealand became especially  prominent as "a 
strategic pressure point for the anti-apartheid movement because of the importance of 
its rugby  ties with South Africa.!48 Prime Minister Norman Kirk tried to convince the New 
Zealand Rugby  Union (NZRU) to cancel the tour. "Numerous organizations opposed 
the visit and some vowed non-violent disruption of the matches. African 
Commonwealth countries and India announced in April 1972 that they would boycott 
the Commonwealth Games in Christchurch if the tour went ahead!.49 In the end, Kirk 
asked the NZRU to cancel the tour:
The prime minister gave four reasons for cancelling the tour: (a) the strains 
it would place on New Zealand society  by exacerbating difference of 
attitude in racial matters; (b) the disorder and violence to which it would 
give rise; (c) the effect on New Zealand!s international relations; (d) the 
virtual certainty that the 1974 Commonwealth Games to be held in New 
Zealand would be a failure, or have to be cancelled.!50
The Commonwealth Games boycott threat posed by  African nations was a major 
contributing factor in Kirk!s request to the NZRU, who reluctantly  cancelled the tour. 
Threatening the Commonwealth Games became a major tool in the anti-apartheid 
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arsenal of African Commonwealth nations; they  realised that an all-white Games was 
something that senior members of the Commonwealth feared due to the precedent 
they would set and the fact that it would ruin their reputation as a multinational, 
multiracial organisation.
Jon Gemmell writes that "Britain!s imperial links were enhanced through a cultural 
assimilation largely  built on literature, cricket, and - in the "white! colonies - rugby.!51 
However, unlike other white Commonwealth countries, Canada was not a major 
competitor in cricket nor rugby. Cricket, although played in the early  twentieth century 
in Canada, was replaced by  baseball, America!s favourite past-time, during the years 
between Confederation and the First World War as "Canada!s summer sport of 
choice!.52 Rugby  was once quite popular in Canada, however, over time it morphed into 
Canadian football, with traditional rugby  still being played only  in some parts of the 
country.53 As a member of the British empire, during the late 1800s and through to the 
mid-1900s, Canada continued to play  traditional British sports like rugby and cricket. 
But, as the empire diminished, Canadians began to play  more American games, to the 
point that they were no longer competitive with white Commonwealth countries in 
traditional British sports and, therefore, had fewer and fewer sporting links with these 
nations.
Changes to Canada!s South African Sports Policies
Canada did not have the deep and long-standing sporting ties that New Zealand, 
Australia, and Britain shared with South Africa. And, as such, protesting against 
apartheid in sport in Canada was much more low-key  than what was going on in other 
white Commonwealth nations. Most of Canada!s grassroots anti-apartheid sports 
boycott campaign involved letter writing and the dissemination of information.
Along with having limited links with other Commonwealth countries in regards to 
sporting contact, Canada was often criticised for its own policies that dealt with its 
native population. The reservation system, often compared to South Africa!s 
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Bantustans, shuffled Aboriginal Canadians onto designated areas of land. Australian 
activists were also subject to such comparisons; activist Meredith Burgmann notes:
As anti-tour protesters, we continually had to justify our arguments. We 
were often accused by our opponents of not doing anything to clean up our 
own backyard before we complained about apartheid. We took that 
accusation very seriously.54
As relatively  new nations, with complicated situations involving native populations, 
Canada and Australia were often criticised for their Native and Aboriginal policies and 
laws. More importantly, Canada was often compared to apartheid South Africa in its 
treatment of its Native population.
In May  of 1971, the same year Canada helped finesse a resolution to the South African 
arms disagreement within the Commonwealth, Abraham Ordia, President of the 
Supreme Council for Sports in Africa, made a statement to Nigerian papers calling on 
Australia and Canada to stop sporting exchanges with South Africa.55 A cable from 
Lagos to Ottawa reveals:
Statement goes on to say that Canada is a fine country  and quote 
Canadian always sincerely  support us in our struggle to eliminate all forms 
of discrimination in sport. This is all the more why  news of impending visit of 
six top Canadian badminton players to racist South Africa has come as a 
great shock. Between now and July is enough time for Canadians to 
change their minds. Canada must avoid contamination with racist South 
Africa unquote.56
The cable writer requested additional information surrounding the potential tour and 
questioned whether or not the tour received financial support from the Canadian 
government. This was a key  question in development of Canada!s new foreign policy 
surrounding South African sporting ties.
The Canadian Ambassador to South Africa, Harry  Havilland Carter, wrote to the Under 
Secretary  of External Affairs, A. Edgar Ritchie, to inform the Secretary  that he was 
invited by  the Southern Transvaal Badminton Association to attend the badminton 
match between Canada and South Africa, alongside South African Prime Minister 
Vorster. Carter asks if he should accept the invitation, and provides some insight:
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...South Africans are very  sensitive to pressure in the field of sport and that 
it is one area in which we can show our dislike of apartheid in an effective 
and non-violent manner. There is also the further point, it seems to me, that 
our badminton people would be taking a very  considerable risk of 
international ostracism in their sport if they  proceed with the visit to this 
country. Perhaps this could also cause a back-lash in non-White countries 
against other Canadian sporting bodies whose international participation is 
more important to us than badminton. ... On the other hand, I think that if 
we intervene too heavily  in bringing pressure to bear on our badminton 
people to cancel the tour we are in danger of leaving ourselves open to 
precisely  that same criticism that we make against South Africans, i.e. of 
using sport as an extension of politics.57
He highlights one of the major problems that white Commonwealth nations faced in 
continuing to participate in sport engagements with South Africa: the nagging and very 
real fear that non-white Commonwealth nations would see this participation as 
acceptance and support of apartheid. Like Australia, Britain and New Zealand in the 
early  1970s, the Canadian government started to struggle with what to do about the 
anti-apartheid movement and sport.
In the case of the badminton tournament, it is revealed that: one, the Canadian 
Badminton Association (CBA) did not receive federal funding for the tournament and 
two, Under Secretary  of External Affairs Ritchie wrote a letter to the Association 
outlining the national and international implications of the tour. This included "the 
probability  of adverse publicity  and criticism.!58 External Affairs also met with members 
of the Association on June 9, 1971 and soon after, the Association announced that the 
tour was cancelled. In this case the government used quiet diplomacy  to remind the 
CBA of current realities within South Africa for non-whites and persuaded them that 
negative repercussions may follow their participation.
Also in 1971, coinciding with South Africa!s expulsion from the Olympic Movement, 
Prime Minister Vorster announced changes to apartheid sport policies. A committee 
was appointed to find a new sporting policy; a policy  that would be palatable both 
internationally  and nationally.59 Vorster realised the importance of sport in South African 
society  and wanted to have South Africa readmitted into associations and organisations 
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from which they  had been expelled. Multinational sport was announced in April, its 
main concepts were threefold: firstly, mixed teams from countries with traditional 
sporting links with South Africa could tour the country  and play against separate white 
and non-white teams; secondly, "black sportsmen affiliated to white federations would 
be permitted to take part, as individuals, in “multinational” competitions; within South 
Africa these would be strictly  “national” (race against race), but internationally  (in the 
Davis Cup or the Olympic Games etc.) might take a relatively “open” form!; no racial 
mixing at the provincial or club level.60  Multinational sport was the South African 
government!s first attempt at easing petty  apartheid. According to Hain, "In essence, it 
meant that the different racial groups in South Africa - Whites, Africans, Coloureds and 
Asians - would be allowed to compete against each other as four separate “nations” 
within the country, but only  in major “international” events with foreign participants.!61 It 
showed the great importance which surrounded sport in South Africa; the South African 
government wanted it to appear as though laws affecting apartheid sport were being 
eased. Dennis Brutus links this new National Party  ideology  to the idea that mixed 
sport could ease racial conflict and increase social stability: "The new thinking was a 
direct result of the boycott that altered the regime and state to the importance of 
sporting relationships as a register of South Africa!s international standing.!62 Most 
countries and associations saw through Vorster!s idea of multinational sport and 
continued to block South Africa from major sporting events, tournaments, associations, 
and federations.
By December 1972, the government of Canada was inundated with requests for 
information and inquiries surrounding upcoming sporting events in South Africa. In a 
memo to the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria, External Affairs explains:
Invitations have been received by  several Canadian sports governing 
bodies to participate in competitions in South Africa during 1973. These 
bodies have in turn requested financial assistance from Sports Canada to 
help defray  cost of participation. The general policy  guide line that 
Canadian teams and athletes not be encouraged to accept invitations to 
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participate in competitions in South Africa is consistent with Canada!s 
opposition to South African apartheid policies. By refusing to provide 
federal funds to assist Canadians to take part in such events, the 
government can effectively  shut off most of Canadian participation in 
competitions in South Africa, especially for amateurs.63
And here is where the possibility of a change in Canadian policy  becomes clear. 
External Affairs and Sports Canada, a part of the Ministry  of National Health and 
Welfare, were considering the idea of ceasing funding to groups and individuals who 
participated in sporting events in South Africa. The telegram goes on to request specific 
details surrounding the current state of apartheid sport:
Your comments on following subjects are therefore requested in order to 
document apartheid nature of sports in South Africa: (You should indicate 
what is government policy  and what is policy of private organizations. 
Useful also would be comments on instances where policy  and practice 
differ. On this latter point we are thinking of cases where written regulations 
might be liberalized for show but watered down in practice.) (1) Training 
and development facilities including financial assistance, coaching and 
technical assistance (2) participation in domestic and international events 
(3) attendance at events including seating and cost of tickets (4) publicity 
regarding both participation and attendance (5) compensation for amateurs 
and professionals (6) facilities for athletes at stadiums.64
The government was trying to decipher if South Africa!s policy  had changed in any 
appreciable way. Gathering information regarding the state of sport was an important 
step in Canada!s reevaluation of its South African sports foreign policy.
A review of the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, and the House of Commons 
Parliamentary debates reveals that there was no official announcement nor press 
release regarding a change in Canada!s official South African foreign policy  regarding 
sport. However, Dick Beddoes of the Toronto Star writes that in late 1972 "...the director 
of Sport Canada, Louis E. Lefaive, advised institutions governing amateur sports that 
“absolutely  no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any  Canadian athlete 
contemplating participation ... in any international events hosted by South Africa.”!65
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In a telegram dated February  23, 1973, External Affairs requests additional information 
surrounding the upcoming South African Games. These Games were instituted after 
South Africa!s expulsion from the Olympics and were held as an international event. 
After it was excluded from the Mexico City  Olympics, the government compensated its 
athletes
by  staging its own national games under the Olympic symbol; whites and 
black competed at separate games at different venues! The white South 
African Games were held in 1969 in Bloemfontein and the black Games in 
1970 in Soweto.66
1973 would be the first year the Games were held since the implementation of 
multinational sport. The Canadian government made requests for information 
surrounding multinational sport, and "arrangement for accommodation and changing 
facilities for participants and seating for spectators.!67 
On March 5, 1973, External Affairs received confirmation from their offices in South 
Africa - participants for the Games included: Rhodesia, Malawi, United States of 
America, Canada, England, Ireland, Wales, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, 
Japan, Holland, Hong Kong, Israel, Australia, and Jersey. According to the telegram:
Canada is entered in skating with 2 skaters and one judge and in mens and 
womens [sic] bowls with six competitors. Non-white South African teams 
will be primarily  homeland based and not integrated with whites. Difficult to 
ask about accommodation changing facilities seating etc but Rhodesian 
contingent for example will be integrated and could not very  well be split up. 
Games are massive propaganda and organizers can be expected to stretch 
South African policies to limit in order give appearance of maximum 
integration and equal treatment. ... Agree with you Games are attempt to 
whitewash apartheid policies as applied to sport. Polices are being 
stretched however and in case of soccer broken.68 
The official word on the ground from Canadian staff in South Africa indicated the 
Games were not truly  multinational. Multinational was a misnomer, as there had been 
no true change in South Africa!s sporting policy.
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But, by March 26, 1973 there was a shift. A cable from External Affairs to Accra reveals:
Canadian participation is by  individual athletes at least some of whom are 
sponsored by  recognized Canadian sports bodies e.g. Canadian Water Ski 
Association, Canadian Figure Skating Association and Canadian Squash 
Racquets Association. At this stage we do not know which of these bodies 
will be participating in Edmonton Commonwealth Games. 
Canadian government quote does not encourage unquote participation in 
these games. Sports Canada has informed national sports governing 
bodies quote absolutely  no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any 
Canadian athlete contemplating participation in these games or other 
international event hosted by  South Africa unquote. We have instructed 
Cape Town not to send any  official representatives from embassy  or from 
Canadian Trade Commissioner!s Office to Games.70
The shift in policy  is clear, Sports Canada decided to cease funding for events being 
held in South Africa. It is prudent to note that this decision was taken, at some point, in 
March 1973. A review of the Canadian House of Commons Debates reveals no official 
policy  change in regards to South African sporting contact was announced in 
Parliament in 1973.71 
Although the South African government tried to convince the world that the South 
African Games were integrated, in reality  South Africans competed "...as for separate 
“nations”, in the presence of international sportsmen.!72  Some Canadians did 
participate in the South African Games in track and field, figure skating, water skiing, 
95
69 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - March 6, 1973.
70 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - March 26, 1973.
71 Indexes 1972, 1973, 1974, House of Commons Debates.
72 Hain,"The politics of apartheid and sport!, p. 241.
and lawn bowling.73 Through their participation these Canadian athletes disregarded 
government advice and traveled to South Africa to participate. By  doing so, these 
athletes showed implicit support for sporting contact with South Africa. Following the 
Games, life went back to normal for black South African athletes. An article in the Rand 
Daily Mail explains:
The Black sportsmen who spent two weeks as honoured guests at a 
Pretoria five-star hotel dare not set foot in the place again, except as menial 
workers; the Africans among them, in their ordinary  lives, will have to 
produce their passes on demand or court summary  arrest. Any  Black 
person who now tries to use a “Whites only” toilet at the Rand Stadium 
risks a clip on the ear, or worse. Any  White and Black sportsmen who set 
up a friendly  games together are likely  to have the full rigour of the law 
used against them.74
After the South African Games, after the international community  left the country, black 
South Africans returned to life under apartheid. And, Dr. Piet Koornhof, Minister of 
Sport, reiterated South Africa!s sport policy "Multiracial sport at any level, but in 
international competition, and mixed trials were not part of the Government!s plan and 
would not come at any  time in the future.!75 Multiracial sport was only  permitted in 
international competitions and mixed trials remained forbidden. James Barber and 
John Barratt note that "the games only  served to show the gulf between the Republic 
and the rest of the sporting world.!76
In a letter from the Canadian Squash Racquets Association (CSRA) to a Canadian 
citizen, the Association outlined its justification for participation in a 1973 International 
Squash Federation Tournament being played in South Africa. J.W.S. Chapman writes 
that CSRA is a founding member of the International Squash Federation (ISF) and, as 
such, must abide by  its rules. In 1971 the ISF passed a resolution that "...insofar as 
South Africa were prepared, as hosts, to accept all entries from all countries and 
guarantee equal treatment to all competitors, that they would be allowed to host these 
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matches.!77 The letter goes on to state, as such, the Canadians had entered their team 
and "such an entry  is not to be considered as support for South African policies, but 
rather as support for the International Squash Federation.!78 This particular squash 
tournament touched a nerve with Canadian anti-apartheid activists.
The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal!s African Colonies (TCLPAC), 
founded in the early  1970s, wrote a letter in June 1973 regarding the upcoming CSRA 
tour. The letter was addressed to the Chairman of the International Committee of the 
CSRA and Ritchie, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs:
The Canadian Squash Racquets Association, which last year received 
about $7,000 in travel grants from Sports Canada, may  still send a team to 
South African to play  under the official Canadian colours. No one will ask 
who paid their plane fare. And South Africa will be able to boast of 
Canada!s participation in Johannesburg. This would frustrate the intent of a 
good government policy  and allow the Association to continue to claim 
public financial support in the future. ... The Association should decline the 
invitation to play  against a team that practices racial discrimination, before 
audiences that are racially  segregated, and in a country  where there are no 
facilities or opportunities for black players to compete.79
Copies of the letter were sent to various associations, including the CLC. Executive 
Vice President of the CLC, Joe Morris, wrote to Ritchie as well, showing his surprise 
that the CSRA planned on sending athletes to South Africa:
We hope that this is not true for this would undermine the position that 
Canada has taken on the question of apartheid and sport at the United 
Nations. ... In the name of true international sportsmanship, the Canadian 
Government should urge Canadian squash players to not play  in South 
Africa and if they do that they  are not representing Canada in any  way, 
shape or form.80
Why  this particular event created a stir amongst anti-apartheid groups is unclear. 
However, it did not go unnoticed by  External Affairs. Ritchie responded to Morris stating 
that it was the policy of the Canadian government:
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No support of any  kind, financial or otherwise, is given to Canadian athletes 
who accept invitation to take part in sport events in South Africa and this 
policy  has been made known to all Canadian Sports Associations. On the 
few occasions that Canadian athletes have taken part in sports events in 
South Africa they  have done so as individuals and not as representatives of 
Canada. ... In this connection,  you will have noted that the Canadian 
Squash Racquets Federation has decided not to participate in the 
Championships being held in South Africa and this decision was welcomed 
on July  17th by the Minister of Health and Welfare Canada, the responsible 
ministry in the Federal Government for international athletic activities.81
On July 18th, the Member of Parliament from New Westminster, Stuart Leggatt, asked 
Prime Minister Trudeau about this telegram. Trudeau indicated that he would have to 
make himself aware of the wording of the telegram. Leggatt also asked if the 
"...telegram represents government policy  regarding athletic participation in South 
Africa?!82 No specific answer is provided during this oral question period. It appears 
that not even members of parliament were aware of changes in Canadian policy 
surrounding sporting ties with South Africa. And, interestingly, it is noted that the CSRA 
chose not to participate in South Africa. The role of anti-apartheid campaigning by  the 
CLC and other organisations in this decision remains unclear, but given the visceral, 
widespread reaction by these groups, it seems they  were effective, in the very  least, 
by  bringing attention to the CSRA!s plans to compete in South Africa to the Canadian 
government and the Canadian public.
In March 1974, the President of the YWCA of Canada, F.W.D. Campbell, wrote a letter 
of protest in regards to Canada!s upcoming participation in the World Trampoline 
Championships in Johannesburg. According to her information, the government had 
received many  letters of protest in regards to the tour and that "...sports federations, 
including the Canadian Gymnastics Federation, know that they  are precluded from 
using federal government funds to participate in events in South Africa and that if they 
accept invitations from South Africa, they  do so as individuals and not as 
representatives of Canada.!83  It appears that in regards to its sport policy, the 
government provided information on an as-needed basis, i.e. in reply  to direct 
questioning.
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Also in March 1974, Bruce Kidd, Assistant Professor at the University  of Toronto!s 
School of Physical and Health Education, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of the 
Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA), Harry  Kerrison. In it he protests the 
CTFA sending athletes to the South African Games, stating:
...the regime benefits enormously  from these Games. The well-publicized 
“integrated” competitions give the appearance that the Vorster regime is 
liberalizing its racial policies, thereby  strengthening its reapplication for 
participation in the Olympic Games, which in turn would enhance its image 
in world markets. South African [sic] depends very  much upon trade with 
the western world, so it must continually  strive for public acceptance. We 
strengthen its campaign when we go along with the charade. As you well 
know, for these and other reasons, the Canadian Government has ordered 
all sports governing bodies not to use public funds to send athletes to 
South Africa.84
Kidd points out that support of South African sporting events is akin to condoning the 
policies of apartheid. In a return letter, Kerrison explains to Kidd that the board of the 
CTFA decided:
...that it was not their position or job, or an objective of the CTFA to become 
involved in politics in any  way  whatsoever at any  level of Government, 
either National or International. It was further felt that what an athlete did, 
so long as their actions were within the rules as laid down by the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation and the Canadian Track and Field 
Association, was their own business and a matter of personal 
conscience. ... It should be completely  understood, however, that the CTFA 
does not spend any  money  or other of its resources in order to facilitate this 
particular participation, nor does it take any particular stand pro or con...85
Clearly, opinion in Canada was divided on what the "right! thing to do was in regards to 
Canada!s participation in South African sporting events. Kidd, like most of the anti-
apartheid activists, advocated the complete cessation of ties and the isolation of South 
African sport. However, the CTFA, as a member of the IAAF, was not bound to cut ties 
with South Africa as it remained a member of the IAAF until 1976.
Files from the External Affairs Department show that in March 1974 a draft letter began 
circulating that outlined Canada!s position regarding funding for athletic events with 
South Africa. The letter was sent to various sport governing bodies. A review  of one 
External Affairs file shows that several draft letters and memoranda regarding the 
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policy  were bounced back and forth between External Affairs and Sport Canada.86 For 
the first time, the threat of an Afro-Asian boycott of either the Montréal Olympics in 
1976 or the Edmonton Commonwealth Games in 1978 became a part of the argument 
used to cease sporting links with South Africa.
The file reveals a final form letter, indicating "signed May 24, 1974! from Minister for 
National Health and Welfare, Marc Lalonde. It reiterates the existing Canadian policy 
that it is up to individual athletes and/or sport governing bodies to decide whether or 
not to accept invitations to events in South Africa. It goes on to state:
There is another aspect of this matter which must be of concern to the 
sporting public and the Canadian Government. You may recall the threat of 
boycott by  African and Asian countries to the Christchurch Commonwealth 
Games over this issue. We think you will agree that we should do what we 
can to forestall the possibility  of boycotts against either the 1976 Olympics 
or the 1978 Commonwealth Games. ... As you are aware, South Africans 
are avid sports enthusiasts, and wide coverage is given to sports in the 
country!s newspapers. Any  international competition involving South African 
athletes is accorded particular attention because it is considered to be a 
test of the degree to which South Africa!s policies of racial discrimination 
are accepted by  foreign athletes and governments. ... We hope that all the 
ramifications concerning racial difficulties, as well as the position taken by  a 
number of International Sport Federations concerned, will be taken under 
consideration by  the executive of your sports governing body, and also by 
the individual athlete invited to compete in South Africa. We can assure you 
that absolutely no federal assistance will be forthcoming for any  Canadian 
athlete contemplating participation in competitions hosted by South Africa.87
Lalonde!s letter was sent to sport governing bodies and federations within Canada, it 
was a clear reproach and warning from the Canadian government. The success of two 
huge international sporting events was at stake if other countries began to see Canada 
as a complicit partner in apartheid because of its continuing sports contact. As early  as 
1974, Canada elucidated its fears regarding a boycott of the two major sporting events 
being held within its borders between 1976 and 1978; Canada took pro-active steps in 
an effort to avoid any boycott threats.
A memo from External Affairs dated June 1975, reminds the Secretary  of State for 
External Affairs that the policy  was to provide no federal funding for participation in 
100
86 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - March 28, 1974 and April 19, 
1974.
87 Department of External Affairs Fonds. RG25, Volume, 10934, File 1.1 - May 24, 1974.
events in South Africa and that "current policy, however, only  seeks to “discourage” the 
reciprocal travel of South Africans to compete in Canada, without making specific 
means of discouragement.!88 While focusing on Canada!s participation in South Africa, 
funding for events with participation from South African nationals in sporting events 
hosted by  Canada were not addressed. This policy of discouragement remained 
unchanged and appeared to be a major loop-hole which could cause problems for 
Canada as the date of the Olympic Games quickly approached.
To rectify  the situation, an amendment to official policy  was deemed necessary. 
According to the writer of the memo, H.B.R., presumably  H. Basil Robinson the Under 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs, officials of both his department and the Ministry 
of National Health and Welfare:
...now believe some modification of policy  is required, because various 
Canadian sports bodies have continued to issue invitations to South African 
teams to compete in Canada. The invitations have repeatedly  caused the 
Government considerable embarrassment, since they  run counter to the 
position which we have taken in every  international forum against the South 
African policy  of apartheid in general and its application to sports in 
particular. In addition, as long as we do not actively  discourage participation 
by  South Africans athletes in events hosted in Canada, we may  be viewed 
by  other countries, particularly  by  African countries, as failing to live up to 
the spirit of decisions taken by most international sports bodies, including 
the International Olympic Committee itself, to bar South African teams from 
participation in events under their respective jurisdiction. The creation of 
such an impression by  the Canadian Government would not enhance our 
relations with African states, and could lead to the belief that we are 
supporting attempts by  the South Africans to regain respectability  in 
international sports while South Africa continues to practise those policies 
of apartheid which make them ineligible to compete in, for example, the 
Olympics.89
Robinson encourages the Secretary  of State for External Affairs to sign a letter to the 
Minister of National Health and Welfare indicating that he approves of the proposed 
changes in policy. The change in policy prevented the use of federal funds for 
upcoming, scheduled events in Canada which included South African participants. 
By 1975, Canada managed to amend its policies surrounding the Canadian-South 
African sporting relationship. On the eve of the 1976 Olympics, Canada was standing 
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its ground against apartheid in sport. Clearly, the main reason for the change in policy 
was the prevention of an African led boycott of the upcoming Olympics and 
Commonwealth Games. External Affairs hoped to avoid contact between Canada and 
South Africa on Canadian soil by withholding funds for events held in Canada that 
included participants from the apartheid state. At this juncture, monetary  disincentives 
and moral condemnation were still Canada!s main tools in discouraging sports contact 
between South Africa and Canada. 
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CHAPTER 5: Preparations for 1976
South Africa!s International Sporting Contacts, 1975-1976: The immediate 
Context to 1976
By 1975 the Canadian government had taken a stand against maintaining sporting 
links with South Africa. Although Canada maintained trade and economic ties with the 
racist regime, the Canadian government continually  professed to abhor apartheid and 
pushed Canadian athletes to not participate in events taking place within the republic. 
The federal government did not enforce a mandatory  cessation of sporting contact, but 
instead chose to withhold moral and financial support. The government would not 
provide funding to athletes or teams who travelled to South Africa to participate in 
sporting tournaments, and they would not provide funding to tournaments, held in 
Canada, in which South African athletes were invited and/or participated.  The changes 
to Canada!s South African sports policies were made quietly, a simple announcement 
via letter was sent to Canadian sporting bodies from Marc Lalonde, Minister of National 
Health and Welfare.
In the run up to the 1976 Olympics, the boycott and call for sanctions against South 
African sporting contact increased and became one of the main foci of the worldwide 
anti-apartheid movement. Pressure began to mount on international sports federations, 
governments, athletes, and teams to cut ties with South Africa. In March 1973, 11 
representatives from non-racial sports associations within South Africa met in Durban 
and formed the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) - an important move because 
SACOS was formed to apply  pressure from within South Africa.1 They became an 
important lobby against South Africa!s readmission into international sporting circles. 
Their main goal was an end to apartheid in sport as "this was the only  way  to guarantee 
equal access for all individual South Africans to sports facilities and training 
opportunities, selection for national teams on the basis of merit as determined by mixed 
trials, opportunities for high level sports administration and coaching, as well as the 
chance to witness all sports events as part of an integrated audience.!2 Hassan Howa 
of SACOS coined the phrase “No normal sport in an abnormal society”, which, by the 
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late 1970s, became a common declaration used by  anti-apartheid groups.3 As groups 
within South Africa began to increase pressure on the government, the movement was 
gaining momentum internationally  with the boycott of high profile events and increased 
pressure by advocacy groups.  
On March 21, 1975, Eric Morse of the External Affairs Department sent a cable to the 
Canadian foreign office in Pretoria regarding invitations to pre-Olympic events being 
held in Canada. External Affairs was concerned about South African athletes being 
invited to such events. According to the cable, the department was trying to secure lists 
of potential invitees. Morse noted: "Federations are not required to invite all members to 
pre-Olympic competitions, and certainly  there is no reason to invite South Africa, which 
is not members [sic] of Olympic movement itself.!4 South Africa was still a member of 
the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and, theoretically, their athletes 
could have been invited to the athletic event being held in Québec as the event in 
question was to be held by  the Federation de l!Athletisme du Québec, a branch of the 
Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA). However, Morse felt an invitation would 
have been unnecessary  as the event was an official pre-Olympic competition and 
South Africa was no longer a member of the Olympic movement. Two days previous to 
this correspondence with Canada!s office in Pretoria, the matter had been queried by 
Otto Jelinek, Member of the House of Commons. Jelinek felt that there was a serious 
misunderstanding and controversy. He indicated that the invitations were extended to 
South Africa and then retracted. According to the Acting Secretary  of State for External 
Affairs, Mitchell Sharp:
I am informed that an essentially  private letter of inquiry  was sent to the 
South African Track and Field Federation but that no formal invitation has 
been extended inviting them to compete in the pre-Olympics competitions. 
The letter referred to was apparently  sent by the Québec Athletic 
Federation in the name of the Canadian Track and Field Association to all 
member of the International Amateur Athletic Federation.5
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After a meeting with the CTFA, Morse notes, representatives of Sport Canada felt 
assured that South Africa would not be invited to the event; writing that the invite to the 
South African team was sent in error as South Africa was only allowed to enter 
individual athletes and were forbidden to enter teams under IAAF regulations.6
The SCSA paid increasing attention to even the smallest of sports events involving 
South Africa. The Canadian embassy  in Lagos sent a telegram to External Affairs in 
Ottawa on June 20, 1975 to inform the government that the SCSA!s President, 
Abraham Ordia,  had contacted the embassy  over the fact that the President of the 
International Federation of Body  Builders, a Canadian citizen, had organised a world 
championship competition to be held in South Africa.7 Ordia indicates that he received 
many protests from Africa, Europe and the USA and, more importantly, the staging of 
such an event under the Canadian President, Ben Weider, "could prejudice African 
participation in the Olympics.!8 The Olympic boycott threat was plausible, considering 
the SCSA!s strict stance on discouraging sporting contacts with the apartheid state and 
their desire to completely  isolate South African sport. Even sporting contact which 
seemed innocuous and insignificant was noted by  the SCSA; they were vigilant about 
monitoring all of South Africa!s contact with international sport. The SCSA felt that even 
the smallest sports contact helped give international legitimacy to the apartheid regime.
In July  1975, African sports groups, including the SCSA and the South African Non-
Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), "called for boycotts and protests in an attempt 
to renew support for the expulsion of South Africans for international tennis 
competitions.!9 With India!s refusal to play against South Africa in the Davis Cup final in 
1974 there was increased pressure on the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF) 
to suspend or expel South Africa from international tennis. But, the ILTF remained firm 
in its continued support of South African participation in international tennis. 
The Canadian government, however, in August 1975, began to waiver in regards to 
tennis and the government!s recently  established anti-apartheid sports policy. An article 
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in the Globe and Mail reports that a South African tennis player named Lurjan 
Sosnoswki travelled to New York, paying his own way, and then travelled to Ottawa 
with the support of a soft drink company  that was sponsoring a junior tennis event in 
the Canadian city.10 Although not formally  invited to the event, Barbara Knapp, the 
tournament chairman, indicated that Sosnoswki would be included in the draw for the 
event as long as the government assured the Canadian Lawn Tennis Association 
(CLTA) that it was not breaking any rules. And that the government did. Dr. Tom 
Bedecki, Director of Sport Canada, indicated that the tournament was not directly 
supported by  Ottawa. Although not receiving direct funding, there was some funding 
provided for junior team coaching clinics for the closed junior championship that was 
being held. According to Bedecki, the government "“could [cut funding] but we!re not 
going to go that far.”!11 This tournament received both indirect financial funds from the 
federal government and indirect moral support, despite the fact that Canadian policy 
explicitly  forbid any type of government funding and government moral support for 
events involving South African athletes. 
At the beginning of July  1975, Don Farquharson, President of the Canadian Masters 
Association (CMA) and organiser of an upcoming track event in Toronto, asked the 
government to clarify  its position around government funding and invitations to athletes 
from Southern Africa.12  An official at the Department of Health and Welfare told 
Farquharson that if athletes from South Africa take part in the event then federal 
support would be withdrawn.13 On August 9, 1975, the CTFA decided not to let the 
athletes from South Africa compete due to the Canadian government!s threat of 
withholding funds. "An aide to Health Minister Marc Lalonde was quoted as saying 
Ottawa “will not support apartheid morally or financially” and will cut off all financial aid 
to any Canadian event that invites teams from South Africa.!14 
However, on August 12, the 11 member delegation hosting the Masters tournament 
decided in a vote of 6-5 to allow the 13 South African and two Rhodesian athletes to 
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compete. The federal government indicated that they  would not pay  the $30,000 grant, 
however, organisers claimed that they  had already received $24,000.15 Upon learning 
of the vote, the Yugoslavian team pulled out to the tournament in protest of the 
participation of the South African and Rhodesian athletes.16  The track meet went 
ahead, with approximately 20 people protesting the inclusion of South African and 
Rhodesian athletes. According to the Toronto Star, "The group of Protestant churchmen 
and supporters have asked the federal government to bar these athletes from the 
meet.!17  And, Peter Bunting, Chairman of Canadians Concerned about Southern 
African (CCSA), wrote to the Globe and Mail regarding the CCSA!s participation in the 
protests; he indicated that the protests  also included representatives from: Canadian 
Council of Churches, OXFAM Canada, Development Education Centre, Toronto 
Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC), and the African National 
Congress (ANC). They were protesting because:
The fact is that multiracial teams based on merit alone are not found in 
South Africa, and it is the apartheid regime which introduced politics into 
sport in that country. Second, the South African athletes present at the 
meet asked for “a little time” before changes occur in that country. The 
present Government has had 27 years to bring about change. “Western 
civilisation” has been in South Africa for 300 years. Apartheid is still the 
dominant policy there. How much time will they need? 18
Barely  active in the anti-apartheid sports movement, Canadian anti-apartheid activists 
came out to the Etobicoke event to voice their disagreement with the organisers! 
decision to allow the South African and Rhodesian athletes to compete. Although the 
threat was small, this example shows that some anti-apartheid activists were aware of 
Canada!s sports contact with South Africa and took the opportunity  to protest this 
contact, however small the opportunity.
In August, Paul Woodstock, Assistant Deputy  Minister, Fitness and Amateur Sport, 
followed up on a phone conversation with Don Farquharson. He confirmed, via telex, 
that the Canadian government does not support, morally  or financially, events with 
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South African participants and that if the CMA did not comply  with the government!s 
policy, he would have to refund the financial contributions provided by the Fitness and 
Amateur Sport Branch.19 On August 19, 1975 J.J. Taylor the British High Commission 
in Ottawa wrote to the Rhodesia Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
to update the British government on the situation surrounding the Masters event. Of the 
event, Taylor wrote:
Despite CMA claims to the contrary, I am told by the Department of External 
Affairs (DEA) that the Federal Government made clear their opposition to 
South African and Rhodesian participation early  this year. ... Pressure from 
the other participants forced the CMA to ignore the Federal Government!s 
threat. The South Africans competed. Now the Government is demanding 
its money  back and despite publicised offers from South African 
businessmen and the US team to make good the money, the CMA are not 
sure that they  can produce the $32,000 which has already  been spent. 
Media handling of the whole affair has not shown the Government in a 
favourable light despite their “liberal” stance. They  have, however, been 
inundated with congratulations from church organizations and anti-South 
Africa pressure groups throughout Canada. Overall the DEA consider they 
could not have benefitted more had they engineered the accident 
themselves.20
In the brief, Canada was portrayed as pleased with the fact that they were hard on 
apartheid sport, an important position to take in the run-up to the Olympics. The CMA 
event was the first event in Canada for which the federal government came out in very 
vocal opposition to South African participation in a Canadian sports events; opposition 
based on its new guidelines governing Canada-South Africa sporting relations.
The federal government, following its policy  of no moral or monetary  support of events 
where South African athletes were participating, asked the CMA to return the funds that 
were already  distributed. Farquharson indicated that he felt that the CMA was not 
morally  or legally  obligated to repay  the money  because the government had taken too 
much time to officially  notify  the organisers of its decision to withhold funds if the South 
Africans participated in the event. By  the time the CMA had received the decision the 
athletes were en route to Canada: "Farquharson said the CMA!s final decision was not 
based on politics but “on fairness to the South Africans who had already  arrived here.” 
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Therefore, he says, he is not morally  responsible to refund the money.!21 However, 
according too Bruce Kidd, the CMA did return the money to the federal government.22
At the end of 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed another resolution on 
apartheid in sport. Resolution 3411 E (XXX) reinforced the previous 1971 resolution. 
The new resolution called on government and organisations to refrain from contact with 
apartheid sport bodies and racially  selected teams from South Africa. It also called for 
countries to exert their influence to ensure implementation of the Olympic principles, 
especially by sport bodies which continued to have contact with apartheid sport.23
The World Softball Championship, being held in New Zealand in January 1976, 
became a major catalyst in the SCSA!s call for an Olympic boycott. In January  1976 
Ordia claimed that "if South Africa was allowed to compete in the world softball 
championships, African countries reserved the right to boycott any sporting event in 
which New Zealand participated....!24  As 1976 wore on, the SCSA and other 
international organisations would increasingly  back the call for a boycott and as the 
year progressed they solidified their position through resolutions and active media 
engagement.
Trevor Richards of Halt All Racist Tours (HART) in New Zealand sent a telegram to 
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in regards to the upcoming World 
Softball Championships being held in New Zealand. HART had "launched a campaign 
to “write the tour off”! and was urging people to write to the New Zealand government, 
newspapers, and heads of governments of countries which planned on sending a team 
to participate.25 In his telegram Richards stated:
Many New Zealand organisations and scores of prominent citizens have 
signed a personal appeal to you to take all possible measure to ensure 
Team Canada withdraws from World Softball Championships being held in 
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New Zealand this month unless racially  selected South African apartheid 
team withdraws. Mr Ordia of Supreme Council of African Sport has strongly 
condemned South African participation and those countries which are 
continuing plans to participate and play  South Africa. Ordia says an insult to 
Africa and slap in the face to the Third World. Wide international attention 
now focusing on this tournament and those who compete. Anti-apartheid 
movement here along with many  others determined to protest against all 
apartheid loving competing teams and to publicise throughout the world our 
disgust at this consorting with apartheid.26
Richards appeals to Trudeau to stop the Canadian team from participating in the event. 
Ivan Head, Trudeau!s personal foreign policy  advisor, indicated that copies of the 
telegram should be sent to Marc Lalonde, Minister of Health and Welfare, and Allan 
MacEachen, Secretary  of State for External Affairs and that Richards should be given a 
simple acknowledgment. Head also wanted to confirm if the Canadian team was being 
subsidised with funds from the federal government and if Canadian rules about 
sponsoring athletic events in Canada extended equally  to Canadian teams participating 
in such events with South Africans abroad (i.e. not in South Africa, but in a third party 
country).27  Since Canada had limited sport contact with South Africa, smaller, less 
popular international sporting events became the focus of anti-apartheid groups. As 
Canada and South Africa did not play  many of the same sports, events like world 
softball championships, trampoline events, and squash tournaments became anti-
apartheid fodder as advocates tried to engage Canadians in the movement to isolate 
South African sport.
On April 14, 1976, the Canadian consulate in Lagos sent a message to Ottawa 
regarding a press release from the Lagos Daily  Times by  Ordia, who was both the 
President SCSA and Chairman of the Nigerian Olympic Committee. In it
Canada is described as having had quote excellent record over years of 
refusal to participate in apartheid sport. Of late however she appears to be 
departing from this principle unquote. Specific mention is made of 
Canadian participation in recent world softball championships after having 
ignored all appeals to withdraw. 
Press release concludes with advise that quote if Canada wants to restore 
the confidence of her numerous friends she must do the following (a) not 
admit racist South African sports teams to her country (b) not to permit 
Canadian sports teams to participate in racist South Africa (c) not to permit 
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Canadian sports teams to participate in any  competitions/championships/
games anywhere if racist South Africa is also participating in them (d) not to 
admit South Africa to participate in World Youth Sailing Championships due 
to be held in Canada in Jul/76 [sic] (e) close down the infamous centre - 
South African Hospitality  and Friendship Centre - being mounted by South 
Africa in Montréal, venue of the 1976 Olympic Games.28
Canada is indirectly  threatened by  Ordia. The remainder of this telegram has been 
excluded from an Access to Information request on the file. This leads to the question, 
what information was provided by the office in Lagos? Canada had implemented many 
of the demands listed in the press release. However, due to the upcoming Olympic 
Games the country  was scrutinised by  Ordia and his press release was a clear 
message to Canada - they must sever all sporting ties with apartheid South Africa.
Canadian policy  regarding participation in sporting events with South Africa remained 
difficult to understand for the Canadian public, Canadian sports organisations, and 
even for members of the Canadian government. A clear cut, defined, publicly  stated, 
widespread statement with consistent application would have gone a long way  in 
reducing confusion and frustration. However, the Canadian government remained 
inconsistent and unclear on exactly what was allowed and was was not allowed.
The Toronto Paralympiad Controversy
Understandably, in the run up to the 1976 Montréal Olympics, the federal government 
became increasingly  conscious of international public opinion. In an attempt to 
minimize the politicisation of the forthcoming Olympics, in 1975, the government 
undertook a review of possible political interference based on previous Olympic 
situations, which included: nations boosting prestige through spectacular 
performances, national rivalries being carried into events; threat of a boycott of the 
Games over the racially  discriminatory  policy  of Rhodesia and South Africa, and 
domestic politics.29  In being prepared and armed with information, the government 
hoped to avoid any political problems which had plagued previous Olympics.
Yet, it proved impossible to avoid the politicisation of the Olympics. The first major 
problem the government encountered surrounded the Olympiad for the Physically 
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Disabled, being held in Etobicoke in August 1976, less than two weeks after the closing 
of the Olympics. 30 As early  as September 1974, Dr. Robert Jackson, Chairman of the 
Olympiad for the Disabled asked Minister of Health and Welfare, Lalonde, to clarify 
how Canada!s new policy  regarding not funding travel for Canadian athletes to South 
Africa would affect South African participation in Canadian events. Lalonde responded 
on November 21, 1974 that "because the presence of a South African team could have 
embarrassing repercussions for the Olympiad, he strongly  suggested that the South 
Africans not be invited.!31 At this point, Lalonde discouraged the Paralympiad in its 
desire to invite the South African team to the competition. Lalonde!s response was 
consistent with the government!s policy of that time - no moral support for events with 
South African participants being held in Canada.
In July  1975, "in order to bring about greater consistency in the policy  on sporting 
contacts with South Africa, the Government formally took the position that it could not 
fund events in Canada to which South African participants were invited.!32 By  the fall of 
1975, Lalonde informed Canadian sports federations of the government!s new  policy. 
Jackson wrote to Canadian officials to try  and convince them that the disabled team 
from South Africa should be exempt from the new policy  as the South Africans were 
sending a truly integrated team, picked on the basis of mixed trials. 
According to a confidential memorandum, dated December 18, 1975, following an 
earlier meeting between Olympiad organisers and Lalonde on December 8, and 
organisers and Sport Canada on December 10, the Canadian government reiterated its 
current policy.33 As per the memorandum, the Olympiad was due to receive a $500,000 
federal grant, which was contingent upon the Olympiad conforming to the government!s 
new rules and regulations in regards to its policy on apartheid in sport.
Whereas formerly the Government merely  indicated to Canadian groups 
that it would discourage them from inviting South African athletes to events 
in Canada, present policy specifies that if South Africans are invited to 
participate in a sporting event in Canada which is receiving Federal 
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financial support, the Canadian organizers shall forfeit all such funding, and 
shall be required to reimburse the Federal Government any  such funds 
which may have already  been paid out. This policy  was enunciated by  the 
Honourable Marc Lalonde, Minister responsible for sport, in a letter dated 
October 3, 1975 to all sport bodies.34
For more than a year up to December 1975, the government and the organisers for the 
Disabled Olympiad were corresponding around South African participation. At first, the 
Canadian government discouraged South African participation. Jackson ignored 
governmental warnings and extended an invitation to the South African team in July 
1975.35  On December 18, 1975 the Toronto Star reported that the Etobicoke Parks 
Commissioner, Tom Riley, was waiting to hear from the government on whether or not 
the South African team would be allowed to participate in the 1976 Olympiad, "since the 
country  does not practice apartheid in sports for the handicapped!  and had promised to 
have mixed trials and teams.36  Riley confirmed that invitations had been issued to 
countries belonging to the International Society  of the Disabled, of which, South Africa 
remained a member in good standing.
In 1975, the British government investigated claims made by the President of the 
International Stoke Mandeville Games Federation, the organisation responsible for the 
Olympics of the Paralysed. According to the President, Sir Ludwig Guttmann, in a letter 
to Prime Minister Harold Wilson:
I have received a message from the Chairman of the South African Sports 
Association for Paraplegics and other Physically  Disabled that the South 
African Government has agreed that an official multiracial team of 
paralysed athletes will come to the 1975 International Stoke Mandeville 
Games (the Olympics of the Paralysed) next July.37
Guttmann!s letter prompted the Prime Minister!s office to confirm with foreign officials in 
Cape Town as to whether the information being provided was accurate. As per the 
cable response, the information provided by Guttmann was correct:
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The Chairman and other officials of the South African Association for 
Paraplegics have told us that the government have agreed to the despatch 
of a single “multinational” team. ... If this is correct, it will be to the best of 
our knowledge be [sic] the first occasion on which a mixed team has 
represented South Africa in a team as opposed to individual sport. The 
government designation of the team as “multinational” would be to give the 
appearance of conformity  with nationalist ideology. I cannot guarantee that 
the selection will go as planned, but we shall watch developments carefully. 
Meanwhile I hope that there will be no obstacles being put in the team!s 
way. This would create a deplorable impression here and would discourage 
other South African sporting bodies who have been pressing the 
government to agree to mixed trials.!38
The British government allowed the mixed South African team to travel to England to 
participate in the 1975 Olympics of the Paralysed. By  doing this, the British set a 
precedent surrounding disabled sport and South African participation. The South 
African team remained a member of the Stoke Mandeville Games Federation and of 
the International Sports Organization for Disabled (ISOD).
The Canadian government, however, did not accept the integrated team from South 
Africa at face value. After its change in policy, in the summer of 1975, the Canadian 
government threatened to withhold the promised grant of $500,000 if the Olympiad 
allowed South African athletes to participate. In December 1975, Jackson wrote to the 
federal government requesting that special consideration be made for the disabled 
athletes of what he believed was a truly  legitimate, integrated team, but also pointed 
out:
The Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympiad for the Physically 
Disabled has been clearly  informed of the government!s posture regarding 
its inability  to financially  or morally  support any  endeavour that involves 
South African participation. We accept this position and understand the 
reasons for adopting such a posture. We have consequently informed the 
leaders of the handicapped sportsmen and women of South Africa that they 
will not be able to participate in the Olympiad in Toronto.39
While admitting that the organising committee accepted the government!s policy, 
Jackson also requested that an exemption be made for the South African team. He 
continued to fight for both the participation of the South African team in the 
Paralympiad and for the government!s moral and financial support.
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Allan MacEachen, Secretary  of State for External Affairs, wrote to Jackson in January 
1976 in response to Jackson!s request that the government make an exemption for the 
mixed South African team of disabled athletes. MacEachen states:
I and the Government have reviewed on a continuing basis reports from our 
mission in South Africa on the practice of apartheid as applied to sport, as a 
result of which Canada co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations 
General Assembly  last November condemning the South African 
Government for its policies in this area. ... I do not believe that 
circumstances in South Africa have changed materially  since that resolution 
was adopted, whatever modifications the South African Government may 
permit in any particular case.40
Most importantly, MacEachen notes in his letter that, based on the additional 
information provided by  Jackson to External Affairs for review, "...I do not believe that 
Cabinet needs to re-open the issue at this time. Mr. Lalonde shares that view.!41 Two 
senior Cabinet ministers decided there is no need for Cabinet to discuss the 
Paralympiad issue. They  were confident that their policies were accurate and being 
applied appropriately. This harks back to the Pearson days, where ministers were 
responsible for making the decisions that affected their portfolio. Through MacEachen 
and Lalonde, the government stood firm in its stance that it would not provide any 
financial assistance to the Olympiad if South African athletes were invited and 
participated.
By March 1976, the Paralympiad was picked up in the newspapers. On March 1, the 
Globe and Mail reported that the organising committee dropped the South African team 
from the Games because the federal government informed them that the $500,000 
grant would be withdrawn if the team participated. The organising committee was also 
worried they  would lose matching grants from the Ontario provincial government and 
the Toronto municipal government if the feds withdrew its funding.42 And, on March 2 
the Toronto Star reported, in an article entitled "Apartheid brings ban on crippled 
athletes!, that the Torontolympiad for the Physically  Disabled organisers would not risk 
losing the $500,000, but would continue to try and change Ottawa!s mind.43 Major 
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papers picked up the story and ran with it. The language used by  the press biased 
readers towards the plight of the Paralympiad Committee; the press took up  the 
Committee!s cause, keeping the story  alive for a significant amount of time. They 
began to report on every  detail of events and how they unfolded in regards to the 
$500,000 and the participation of South African athletes.
So, with the situation prominent in major Canadian daily  newspapers, the government 
began to fight the tide of public opinion. Canadians wrote in to papers and, for the most 
part, admonished the government for its policy. Mrs. B.E. Munro, a volunteer worker 
with the Olympiad and someone who attended the Games in England in 1975, said she 
was dismayed by  the federal government!s threat to withdraw financial support: "The 
verifiable fact is that, in disabled sport, South Africa has broken the apartheid barrier.!44 
Eileen Charters wrote that barring the South African team was senseless and shameful 
and pointed out that in 1973 the South African Sports Association for Paraplegic and 
Other Physically  Disabled abolished apartheid in their organisation.45 In April, Dickson 
Russell, a Toronto resident, wrote a letter in support of the federal government. He 
stated that the decision to bar the integrated team was neither senseless nor shameful, 
"rather, it is part of the continuing effort to demonstrate to the government of South 
Africa our abhorrence of apartheid. ... By  ignoring them completely, we may  one day 
bring bigots of South Africa to their senses. They may learn that all men are equal.!46 
Public opinion was divided, but most individuals seemed to support the Paralympiad 
and its efforts to ensure the Canadian government provide its $500,000 grant and allow 
the South African team to participate in the Games. Despite domestic public pressure 
to let South Africa participate in the Games, Canada stood firm in its decision not to 
provide funds to the Paralympiad should South Africa participate. The international 
consequences of South African participation far out-weighed the domestic backlash. 
Canada repeatedly  stated that the country deplored apartheid and ensured that their 
policy  in regards to South African sport was strictly  applied. The Trudeau government 
wanted to increase Canada!s positive international reputation - they could not allow  the 
Olympics to fail and ensuring that their anti-apartheid sports policies were followed was 
an important part in preventing failure.
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Nora McCabe of the Globe and Mail wrote that the government continued to promote 
economic trade with South Africa, stating "The Government tells Canadian athletes and 
organizations it will not finance them if they  invite South Africans, while it allowed 
Canadian businessmen to import around $180-million in South African goods last year, 
mainly  wines and sugar.!47 McCabe pointed out that this stance was hypocritical. She 
advocated for the acceptance of South African participation and indicated that the 
Canadian organisers invited the team because they  remained an active, valid member 
of the Stoke Mandeville Games Federation.
Sport Ontario chairman, Dr. Philip Jones, was featured in a Toronto Star article 
indicating that he and the board of Sport Ontario deplored the actions of the federal 
government.48 He also wrote to Trudeau:
We believe a policy which discriminates against an integrated South African 
team conveys exactly  the opposite impression to the intended viz. that all 
men are equal. ... Surely  no-one believes that handicapped Olympic 
athletes in South Africa can use this cancellation to bring meaningful 
pressure on their Central Government. In fact, it seems to us that support of 
a team which follows Canadian policy  strengthens rather than prejudices 
Canada!s international position in this matter.49
In response to Jones, Trudeau explained that he understood the South African team 
was integrated and that this was a departure from the norm. But, he also pointed out 
"...that the South African Minister of Sport has assured the South African Parliament 
that his acceptance, on a selective basis, of an integrated athletic team is not intended 
to foreshadow any alteration in the basic principle or practice of apartheid in South 
Africa.!50  The government defended its decision and stood firm in its belief that, 
although this team of athletes appeared integrated, it was an exception to apartheid 
laws and the South African government had no intention of altering those laws.
The Canadian Orthopaedic Association wrote to Lalonde in April 1976 condemning the 
government for its stand:
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In our view it would be consistent with the United Nations resolution, 
passed in November, 1975 and co-sponsored by Canada, if the Canadian 
Government were to commend the efforts of sports groups in South Africa 
who have made significant moves towards the elimination of apartheid. In 
particular, we feel that denying this group of disabled sportsmen the 
opportunity  to compete, is morally  unjust from a humanitarian viewpoint, 
and would adversely  affect rehabilitation efforts not only  in South Africa but 
in other parts of the world. There is no doubt that sports have contributed 
significantly  in helping the disabled members of our population regain self-
respect and self-confidence, and to become contributing citizens in our 
society.51
Many letters of protest were received by  the Canadian government, and kept on file by 
Sport Canada. Leslie B Sehume, the Secretary General of the Committee for Fairness 
in Sport, wrote in April 1976: "Present day  international trends to boycott, suspend and 
even expel South African sportsmen are clearly directed against the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa of which the Sportsmen are not a part of. This, clearly, is not 
fair play and certainly, is not in accord with the principles of natural justice.!52 Strong 
words were also submitted by  Dr. Robert McCormack, Assistant Professor at the 
University of Winnipeg!s History Department:
Firstly, I cannot accept the notion that Government support for this sporting 
event constitutes implicit support for South Africa!s racial policies. Secondly, 
the South African team is a racially  mixed team, a reflection of the South 
African Association!s (for Paraplegics and Disabled) policy  since 1974. In 
effect, I could possibly  have sympathized with your attitude two years ago, 
but not now. Thirdly, I and many other Canadians see the Government 
position and threat as a blatant attack upon the disabled, not upon 
apartheid. And, considering that (a) Canada recognizes South Africa 
diplomatically, and (b) continues to have extensive commercial and 
investment relations with the Republic, I find that the pettiness of your 
expressed threat to the organizers of the Olympiad to be incredibly 
hypocritical.53
Canadians had deep and solid opinions about the disabled Olympiad. They  felt that the 
Canadian government was in jeopardy  of marginalising the disabled community. The 
Canadian public were vocal in their backlash of the government, much more vocal than 
they were, generally, around any anti-apartheid topics.
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International organisations did provide some support to the Canadian government. 
Peter Bunting of the CCSA wrote in to urge the government to maintain its stand and 
further extend the boycott to cultural activities, while Sam Ramsamy  of SAN-ROC also 
wrote a letter of support, but also voiced concern that the disabled sport association in 
South Africa seemed sure that they  would be able to participate in the Games in 
Canada.54 The limited support the government did receive was important, as it came 
from groups that supported the isolation of South Africa in international sport. 
With the public push-back around the Olympiad for the Physically  Disabled, the 
government became more consistent in its messaging and the application of its anti-
apartheid sport policies. Although public opinion, for the most part, was against the 
government within Canada, a strong stance against apartheid sport was important in 
the months before the Montréal Olympics in order to avoid possible negative 
repercussions from African countries. This consistency  in messaging was key; there 
could be no ambiguity  in messaging and application of the policy  by  the government. 
The OAU was watching Canada and other Commonwealth countries closely in the run-
up to the Olympics. Canada had developed and tweaked its new policies in regards to 
apartheid sport, it was now important for the government to give voice to this policy  by 
reiterating it publicly, in newspapers and press, and in formal and informal 
correspondence. The Olympics are a major international event and host nations are 
often thrown into the spotlight in the years preceding the Games. It was imperative that 
Canada portray itself as a strong multiracial nation which was hard on apartheid in 
order to avoid the embarrassment of an unsuccessful Games due to a boycott.
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CHAPTER 6: The Montréal Olympics
Planning Disaster
It is widely  believed that when Montréal was granted the Olympics in 1970, they  were 
the winning bid for one, unique reason - they  proposed that they  would be completely 
self-fund Games; the first in IOC history. However, Kay  Schiller and Christopher Young 
have pointed out that Montréal may have been awarded the Games for another reason 
- both Moscow and Los Angeles were also vying to host the 1976 Games. In the height 
of the Cold War, the decision to appoint the Games to either country  would have been 
contentious and "In the end, either neutralized by the worldwide campaigning of the 
super powers or shying away from an awkward decision, the IOC opted for the 
compromise candidate, Montréal, a city few  had given any  chance before the vote.!1 In 
the end, it was probably  a combination of the two which led to the Montréal choice - the 
desire to avoid choosing between the main Cold War players and Montréal!s promise to 
have a modest Games that would take the Olympic Movement away from the flash, 
expensive Games which had been held in recent years. The man behind the Olympic 
bid, Montréal Mayor Jean Drapeau, had promised a modest Games. He noted that the 
Games would not require federal funding, apart from existing federal programs, such 
as those that provided funding for low-rental housing which could be used in the 
Olympic Village.2  His estimated budget for the Games was $310 million. As the 
successful mastermind behind Montréal!s Expo 67, there was great confidence in 
Drapeau!s ability  to plan large, international events. Trudeau assured the House of 
Commons that the federal government would not be paying for the Olympics. But, the 
Treasury Board, responsible for the federal budget, did offer assistance through 
existing programs for things like security, customs, immigration, broadcasting through 
the CBC, and Olympic Village construction through the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation.3 The federal government also approved self-financing revenue-generators 
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for - a lottery, minted coins and Canadian stamps. In December 1974, when questioned 
by  Member of Parliament, Otto Jelinek, whether or not the federal government would 
step in to ensure taxpayers would not have to bear any  extra burden due to the 
increasing costs of the Olympics, President of the Treasury  Board, Jean Chrétien, 
replied "The agreement concluded with the City  of Montréal and the Québec 
government is quite clear. We are helping them collect as much funds as possible 
through the lottery, stamps and other available means, but we do not intend to make up 
any deficit.!4 Trudeau and high level federal government officials distanced themselves 
from the Games. Trudeau did not want to be seen as favouring the Montréal Olympics 
and providing federal funding to a Games being hosted in his home province of 
Québec. Due to the struggles between English and French Canada during the 1970s, it 
was imperative that he was not portrayed as biased towards either side. 
It was obvious, as the building and preparation for the Games progressed, that 
Drapeau and the Organising Committee were in over their heads. The revenue being 
generated by  commemorative Olympic stamps and coins, along with the Olympic 
lottery, could not cover the increasing costs due to Drapeau!s mismanagement of 
resources and his poor decisions in contracting builders, architects, etc. The 
Commissioner General of the 1976 Olympic Games, Rogers Rousseau, assured 
Canadians that the Games would cost only as much as they  would bring in.5 There 
were real fears that Montréal would not be ready  for the Games and they  would have to 
be cancelled. By  1975, the provincial government of Bourassa was bailing out 
Montréal!s Organising Committee and the province took over the completion of 
construction. The Games, which were supposed to be the most economically  austere 
Games to date, became the victim of out-of-control spending and poor planning. In the 
end, however, the city was ready to host the Olympics.
The Politicisation of the Olympic Movement
By 1976, the boycott threat was a well-used tactic of African nations. As mentioned 
above, they  had previously  threatened to boycott the 1968 Mexico Olympics along with 
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the 1970 and 1974 Commonwealth Games. Yet, overall, the Olympics had become 
politically  charged events. In 1968, dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, the 
assassination of Robert Kennedy  and unhappiness with academic bureaucracy  led to 
increased student protests in many  countries. Ten days before the beginning of the 
Olympic Games in Mexico City, the Tlateolco Massacre occurred. Students protesting 
at the Plaza of Three Cultures were fired upon by the army.6 More than 40 people were 
killed; the Olympics went ahead as planned. And, during these Olympics, American 
sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos, winners of the gold and bronze medals, gave 
the black power salute during the playing of the Star Spangled Banner.7 As the 1960s 
ended, the idea of using the spotlight of the preparing for the Olympic Games and the 
actual Games as a political tool was increasing. According to Schiller and Young, the 
Olympics are an opportunity  to express social changes and political discourse: "In 
addition to their long gestation and the epiphany  of the event itself, they  generate 
concrete and emotional legacies, and in time become subject to memorialization of 
another age!s making.!8  
The Munich Games of 1972 were not immune to the sport-politics clash. African 
nations, having succeeded in solidifying South Africa!s removal from the Olympic 
Movement, set their sites on the other racist regime on that continent - Rhodesia. An 
IOC investigation found that Rhodesia did not have separate clubs for whites, no 
special facilities or separate championships, but the SCSA!s main concern was not 
sport but the white minority  government of Ian Smith.9  Members of the SCSA 
threatened to boycott the Games should Rhodesia participate which led to an IOC 
resolution being passed to suspend Rhodesia. To add to the politicisation of Munich, on 
September 5, during the Games, 11 Israeli athletes and coaches were taken hostage 
by  eight Palestinian members of the Black September group. The group were 
demanding the release of Palestinians being held in Israeli jails. The event ended in 
disaster, with a siege resulting in the death of all the Israeli team members and the 
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death of three Palestinians.10 Much like Mexico City, the 1972 Games continued after 
the massacre. It was becoming increasing clear to political groups and nations that the 
Olympic Games were a key  platform to express political discontent. The international 
scope of the Olympics provided a worldwide audience; the importance and celebrity  of 
the Olympics made the movement vulnerable to political machinations.
The Threat of a Boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games
In the wake of the protests surrounding January!s World Softball Championships, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for New Zealand, Brian Talboys, sent a letter to the editor of 
the Globe and Mail. In it he sets out New Zealand!s policy  in regards to apartheid in 
sport:
New Zealand could never approve of, let alone endorse, a system under 
which racial discrimination is supported by  the Government and is 
established as a basic national policy  - a system in which a large part of the 
population is deprived of basic human rights. We believe that such a 
system holds great dangers, not least for those who benefit most from it, 
and that they  would be well advised to reconsider their position before its 
too late. ... We believe that sportsmen and sporting organizations in New 
Zealand should be free to associate with those in other countries if they 
wish to do so, regardless of race, color, creed, or internal politics. 
Sportsmen have the same rights as other New Zealanders and this 
Government intends to uphold them. There will be no more political 
interference in sport.11
Here, Talboys explains, sport had been a significant issue in New Zealand!s 1975 
election campaign, with Robert Muldoon campaigning on a “no government 
interference in sports” (allow the South Africans to compete) playform [sic].!12 
Muldoon!s government felt that it was its mandate to uphold this policy, even in the face 
of diversity  and threats of boycotts. Barry  Gustafson also pointed out that public opinion 
polls also revealed that a majority  of New Zealanders supported rugby contact between 
the All Blacks and the Springboks.13  Sport, especially  All Blacks-Springboks rugby 
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links, were an important part of social life in both New Zealand and South Africa. 
According to David Black and John Nauright, rugby  played a similar role in both 
countries - rugby!s political symbolism is "much more than a matter of simple 
recreation!, each country took pride in and placed great emphasis on its dominance 
and mastery  of the sport.14 New  Zealand-South Africa rugby ties ran deep and neither 
country  was willing to cease play in order to appease the international community. It 
was well within the interests of the South African Springboks to continue playing the 
New Zealand All Blacks; it gave the country a deep sense of pride and helped 
legitimise the apartheid regime.
As early  as April 15, 1976, the Toronto Star reported that New Zealand was receiving 
threats regarding an African boycott of the Olympics due to New Zealand!s continuing 
sporting links with South Africa. President Ordia of the SCSA, had written a threatening 
letter to the New Zealand government. However, "as far as New Zealand is concerned, 
the threats are hardening opinion against giving way  to what is called African blackmail 
and calls are being made for an Olympic showdown and the exclusions of the Africans 
if they  do not abide by  the decisions of international sports bodies.!15  Faced with 
international publicity  surrounding their sporting links with South Africa, New Zealand 
lashed out by  accusing African states of blackmail. Mainly, the SCSA wanted the New 
Zealand government to call off the upcoming All Blacks rugby tour of South Africa, due 
to take place in the summer of 1976. It would be up to the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) to make a decision, through consensus of the African membership, regarding 
the boycott at its meeting in 1976.
In a cable dated March 1976, the British High Commission in Nairobi wrote to the 
Commission in Cape Town and indicated that the SCSA had not yet made a decision in 
regards to sporting relations with New Zealand.16  At a meeting in February, the 
organisation was considering how to proceed in highlighting New Zealand!s support of 
apartheid through its continuing sporting ties with South Africa. The memo indicated 
that a possible boycott, led by  the Kenyan delegation, could happen if New Zealand 
continued its sporting relationship with South Africa.
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According to the Canadian embassy in Nairobi, on April 27 through 29, 1976, the 
SCSA held a series of meetings. Part of the meetings! communiqué included a call to 
action for countries to boycott events in which New Zealand was participating:
With special mention to New Zealand whose government supports and 
encourages relations with racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, a 
decision has been taken that if this country  persists in its attitude, boycott 
sanctions recommended by  Kinshasa will be applied without any  restriction 
to this country as well as its nationals.17
A British memo regarding the SCSA meeting, dated May  5, 1976, indicated that New 
Zealand "came in for heavy  criticism, and African countries were called upon to “expose 
and condemn” the present New Zealand government!s policy.... The Committee 
supported an earlier call by  SCSA President Abraham Ordia, to reserve the right to 
boycott all sporting events in which New Zealand takes part.!18 A memo from Canadian 
External Affairs supported the British memo and concluded "The issue is basically  one 
between the parties concerned, i.e. the Africans represented by  the Council, New 
Zealand and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) which, I understand is 
studying the matter closely. The President of the IOC, Lord Killanin has made clear his 
firm opposition to boycotts or threats of boycott and he, and the IOC, will undoubtedly 
wish to address the matter in that context.!19
The SCSA stopped short of actually  calling for a complete boycott or passing a motion 
on a boycott of the Olympics by African countries. According to Trevor Richards:
At the conclusion of the meeting, a confident Ordia announced: “If the 
Rugby Union sends a team to South Africa in June, then that will be the last 
straw. In that case we have unanimously  decided to call on all African 
countries to boycott sports events in which New Zealanders take part in the 
Olympic Games.! The boycott was on.20
New Zealand!s sporting links with South Africa angered African nations and forced the 
international sport world to take notice. Knowing their boycott threats had succeeded in 
the past, African nations believed the threat would be taken seriously  and New Zealand 
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would acquiesce, calling for a cessation of sporting contact between New Zealand and 
South Africa, with particular emphasis on breaking the rugby ties.
Coinciding with the threat of an Olympic boycott was the decision surrounding the 
Toronto Paralympiad and whether or not South Africa would be allowed to participate in 
the Games. The organising committee had still not definitively  let the Canadian 
government know of its intentions surrounding South African!s invitation to participate in 
the Olympiad. A cable  from External Affairs informed various Canadian embassies; 
Sports Canada; and Paul S. Woodstock, Assistant Deputy Minister of Health and 
Welfare, that on May  7, 1976 Lalonde "informed organizers of Olympiad that in light 
reaffirmation of anti-apartheid stand by SCSA at Nairobi meetings, Canadian 
government would require notification by  May  15 that South Africa disinvited  [sic] from 
Olympiad or federal funding would be withdrawn.!21 The telegram also revealed that the 
organising committee passed two resolutions at a meeting on May  11: one, to accept 
the accreditation papers of the South African team and two, to send the Executive 
Director, Dick Loiselle, to an international meeting in London of the International Sports 
Organization for Disabled to consider ways of bringing international pressure to bear on 
the Canadian government.22  The Canadian government put its foot down and 
demanded a decision from the Paralympiad!s organising committee. In light of the 
African boycott threat of the Olympics in Montréal, Canada had to come down hard on 
severing sporting ties with South Africa and had to follow its own guidelines on ceasing 
moral and financial support for events with South African participants.
On May 7, Jackson and Loiselle informed the government that the Torontolympiad was 
going on as scheduled, "including the participation of the integrated South African 
disabled sport team, in absence of any  evidence that they are not integrated. In order 
to avoid any embarrasment [sic] we urgently  request that you advise us of your re-
assessed position prior to May  12.!23 The committee chose to support the integrated 
South African team and, as such, forfeited the $500,000 grant from the federal 
government.
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Member of Parliament for High Park-Humber Valley, Jelinek, questioned the Minister of 
Health and Welfare, Lalonde about Canada!s stance on the Olympiad on May  11, 
1976. As the event was taking place in Etobicoke, part of Jelinek!s electoral district, he 
forced the issue and pointed out that the government had previously  provided funds to 
two Canadian teams that had participated alongside South Africa!s Disabled Olympic 
Team in Munich in 1972 and in the previous year in England. Jelinek noted that of the 
22 athletes South Africa will be sending, nine are non-white. 24 
Inconsistent, unclear Canadian policy  caused confusion in the House of Commons. As 
much of the policies affecting South African sport were not publicly  announced, the 
government spent much of its time explaining when policies had changed and why new 
policies were now in place. Lalonde made a lengthy response:
The Canadian government policy  denies funding any  Canadian athlete or 
group of athletes who intend to travel to South Africa to participate in an 
athletic competition. While we fully recognize that the decision to participate 
or not rests with the individual and/or sports bodies concerned, we have 
pointed out that competition in South African [sic] under conditions of racial 
discrimination, which are universally  condemned, is a matter of 
considerable concern. Although the government does not financially 
support such visits, neither is it prepared to limit the freedom of Canadians 
to travel abroad where they  wish. ... More recently, events have been 
awarded to Canada in which athletes from South Africa have been invited 
to participate. I wish to confirm the position taken by  the government in July 
1975 of not providing either moral or financial support to any  event in 
Canada in which South African athletes have been invited. ... We do not 
believed that circumstances in this country  have changed materially, even 
though the South African government may  allow modification in a particular 
case. This view has been confirmed in recent days by the reaffirmation by 
the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa of its continued opposition to all 
sports contacts with the regime in South Africa.25
Again, Lalonde and the government were forced to defend their position. By reiterating 
its views in Parliament, the government put on record that these policies had been in 
place since 1975 and the government would not make any  exceptions or provide 
leniency in the application of these policies.
There was no feasible compromise to the Paralympiad situation. The government could 
not face the international repercussions of supporting an integrated South African team 
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at the Paralympiad and the organising committee believed it had a moral duty  to accept 
the integrated South African team. On May 19, 1976 the Toronto Star reported that the 
disabled Games would go ahead with the participation of the South African team. 
According to Jackson: 
"This is the first multiracial team to represent South Africa in international 
sport. ... Their presence was accepted by European press as a significant 
step towards modification of the segregationist policies of the South African 
government. The government of Canada, on the other hand, dismissed this 
by  stating that it is mere “tokenism” employed by  the South African officials 
to gain acceptance.!26
The Globe and Mail reported that the Olympiad committee had to raise the funds 
promised by  the Canadian government and were seeking public support. Jackson told 
Nora McCabe: “"There is an apparent double standard - promoting trade while 
(enforcing) an embargo on humans. ... I really don!t think they!ve taken these games 
seriously. The Government regards our handicapped people as second-class 
citizens.”!27  Strong rhetoric and images were used by  the committee to portray  an 
insensitive government that did not care about disabled athletes. This appealed to 
Canadian public opinion and the Canadian desire for equality  and accommodation for 
all.
The Ontario Medical Association (OMA) came out in support of the Olympiad. The 
board of the OMA passed a resolution "deploring the Canadian Government!s refusal to 
pay its promised $500,000 grant to the Olympiad for the Physically  Disabled because 
an integrated South African team will be competing in the Games.!28 The press and 
Canadian public accepted at face value that the South African team was legitimately 
integrated and that these athletes already  suffered enough by  being disabled and 
should not be punished further by the Canadian government!s policies.
The government continued to deal with the problem behind the scenes. Marc Lalonde 
wrote to Jackson on June 4:
You have now confirmed the participation of South Africa in the Olympiad 
for the Physically  Disabled and have, in so doing, decided not to comply 
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with the policy  of the Government of Canada as it has been enunciated to 
you on repeated occasions. ... I wish to officially  advise you that the 
Olympiad for the Physically  Disabled is no longer eligible for financial 
assistance from the Government of Canada.29
In the letter Lalonde also requested that the Olympiad return the advanced contribution 
of $50,000 which was made by the federal government in January 1975.
In addition, Minister Lalonde wrote a letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail in 
defence of his government!s position. Simply, he stated that since 1974, the 
government had outlined its policy  in regards to apartheid and sport and that all 
sporting bodies were informed of the policy  change in the summer of 1975. He also 
noted that in December 1975 Jackson and the organising committee acknowledged 
that they  had been informed of the policy, as noted above. Most importantly, Lalonde 
explained two things. Firstly, former Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen 
informed Jackson in 1976 "that there was not sufficient evidence to justify a 
modification of the Government policy.! And, secondly, "...the federal Government never 
did apply  in the same way  to competitions hosted by  countries other than Canada or 
South Africa. In such cases Canada follows a policy of discouragement only. Canada!s 
participation in the Olympiad in Britain, although not encouraged, was not in 
contravention of the policy.!30 Lalonde had to backtrack to fully  explain the Canadian 
government!s position. The position is confusing because it was not consistently 
applied nor was it clearly defined until the problem surrounding the Masters event in 
Toronto became public. It was up to Lalonde to appeal to the public via his letter to the 
editor in defence of the government!s position and policies.
Once the committee made the official decision to invite South Africa to the 
Paralympiad, public debate also increased. J. McQuaid of Toronto wrote "It is ironic that 
the International Sports Organization for the Disabled (ISOD) after persuading the 
South African team to select its competitors at fully  integrated trials should now  lose the 
federal Government!s commitment to support the Games to be held in Etobicoke in 
August.!31 Robert McCormack of the History  Department at the University  of Winnipeg 
added: "Canada supports extensive commercial dealing with South Africa. Canada 
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maintains full diplomatic relations with the Union. As well, it would appear that Canada, 
or more specifically  Marc Lalonde and company, is less concerned with principle and 
more concerned to buy  votes or do business.!32 The government!s justification of its 
anti-apartheid sport policy  was hard to understand because of its continuing diplomatic 
and economic ties with South Africa. To the Canadian public the policy  seemed 
hypocritical and, in this case, disrespectful towards disabled athletes. As the summer 
progressed, the Paralympiad dropped out of the press, for the most part, although 
there were some calls for financial support from the Canadian public.
While the Canadian government struggled with domestic pressures surrounding the 
Olympics and the Paralymiad, external, foreign pressure was also increasing. The 
United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid held a conference in Havana, 
Cuba on May  24 through 28. Ordia was invited to attend as an official observer as was 
Dennis Brutus, President of SAN-ROC. Richards writes: "The seminar was pivotal, both 
in the shorter and longer term, to the international campaign against apartheid in sport. 
It gave both Ordia and Dennis Brutus a useful international forum at which to lobby  - 
and to reach some agreement on positions.!33 Each man was given the opportunity  to 
address the conference. In his comments, Brutus called for support of an international 
convention against apartheid sport, as proposed by Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael 
Manley, and called for support for the SCSA!s call for action against New Zealand, 
"...the principal ally  of apartheid in sport.!34 SAN-ROC came out in support of the SCSA 
and its call for a boycott of New Zealand. According to the Globe and Mail, Brutus "told 
newsmen that a showdown could be avoided by  a clear declaration by  the New 
Zealand Government against racial discrimination in sports, and against the rugby 
team!s tour.!35 As a non-white South African in exile, Brutus fought hard for SAN-ROC!s 
ultimate goal of complete South African sport isolation. It was believed by anti-
apartheid groups that complete isolation was the most effective tool in precipitating 
change within South Africa and an end to apartheid.
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Ordia!s message was simple and more direct than Brutus. He wanted the seminar to 
support anti-apartheid movements, especially  in New Zealand; advise the New Zealand 
Government of  the Havana seminar!s opposition to its policies around its sporting 
relations with South Africa; request the government of New Zealand to persuade the 
rugby  union to call off its upcoming tour of South Africa; and try  to raise the matter in 
international forums.36 In regards to the Montréal Olympics he was clear:
I wish to reaffirm the position taken after our recent Executive Committee 
meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. We have made it clear that the Supreme Council 
for Sport in Africa has instructed member nations not to compete in any 
sporting event in which New Zealand participates if the New Zealand 
Rugby Team goes to South Africa from June - August, 1976, as planned. 
This, of course, has serious implications for this Summer Montréal Olympic 
Games.37
Ordia!s message was strong and consistent: New Zealand must cut sporting ties with 
South Africa. A cable from Canadian representatives in Havana to External Affairs in 
Ottawa noted that Ordia and Brutus were seeking the seminar!s endorsement of the 
SCSA!s decision to instruct its members not to compete against New Zealand if the 
rugby  union goes ahead with its tour of South Africa. The cable writer noted this would 
mean possible lack of participation by  the countries in Olympic events which include 
competitors from New Zealand, specifically  noting "They envisage that this policy  would 
first go into operation at Olympics; Ordia and Brutus have evidently  fallen back from 
previous position that Olympics should be boycotted entirely  if NZ participates.!38 At this 
point, Canadian diplomats believed the boycott would be limited to only  those events in 
which New Zealand participated. This course of action would have been less drastic 
and less prohibitive for African nations, if it occurred. It would mean African athletes 
would at least be able to participate in events that did not include any  New Zealand 
athletes.
In regards to the possibility  of a boycott of the Olympics, the seminar!s final 
communiqué noted:
The Seminar commends the activities and actions of Supreme Council for 
Sport in Africa, the South Africa Non-Racial Olympics Committee and other 
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bodies who have tried to isolate South Africa from all sporting competitions 
so long as South Africa practises the policy  apartheid in breach of the 
principles enshrined in the Olympic charter.39
The seminar closed with support for the SCSA and its call for the isolation of South 
Africa in the area of sport.
In addition, the seminar called on the Canadian government to prevent the 
establishment of a South African hospitality  centre. It had been known for months that 
South Africa hoped to establish a Friendship House in Montréal during the Olympics as 
a means of national promotion. In 1975, Jean Claude Ganga, the Secretary  General of 
the SCSA, wrote to the President of the IOC regarding the establishment of the 
Friendship House. A copy  of the letter was cabled from the Canadian embassy  in 
Nairobi to External Affairs in Ottawa:
We want to let you know that the planned Friendship House is but a 
propaganda den the political aim and provocative nature of which is well 
known. ... We felt it urgent to draw your attention to this affair so as to 
enable you take appropriate measures and avoid to throw a sad note on 
the next games the organization of which as we all know, is meeting with 
serious economic difficulties. We sincerely  count upon your respect for 
Olympic rules to intervene in order to avoid further developments of this 
affair and stop all manoeuvres that might create a grave scandal and cause 
a general feeling of indignation.40
This scarcely  veiled threat by the SCSA - rumor of this South African Friendship House 
- was a further obstacle to Canada!s intention to avoid unwanted focus on its ongoing 
contact, outside of sport, with South Africa. International organisations were well aware 
of the planned South African presence in Montréal. A cable from the Canadian office in 
Cape Town to Ottawa notes, a similar project was undertaken during the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games. At the International Seminar on Apartheid in Havana, Québec anti-
apartheid organisations were commended for setting up a Québec Centre Against 
Apartheid and Racism in Sport, in hopes to counteract the effects and propaganda of 
the South African Friendship House. The Chairman of the UN Special Committee 
against Apartheid, Leslie Harriman, also wrote a letter to the President of the Québec 
Peace Council, commending them for the establishment of the Centre and concluding: 
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The Special Committee against apartheid has greatly  appreciated the 
support of the Canadian government and people to the Olympic principle 
and the UN resolutions against apartheid in sport. I am confident that they 
will not fail to rebuff the efforts of the racists to use Canadian soil to spread 
their propaganda.41 
It is important to note that a draft reply  to Harriman!s letter, circulated via telegram 
between Canadian UN officials in New York and External Affairs in Ottawa, observed 
that the government could not prevent the setting up of a centre as long as the 
organisers were not in contravention of any  laws.42  The establishment of a South 
African Friendship  House could not legally  be stopped. It could, however, be 
counteracted by  protests and information from anti-apartheid activists working within 
Québec.
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon responded to the seminar!s support of the African 
nations. According to a cable from Wellington to External Affairs in Ottawa "Calls for 
Olympic boycott of New Zealand made at Havan [sic] UN seminar received prominent 
press attention and prompted Prime Minister Muldoon to issue statement decrying 
political interference in Olympics and reaffirming that New  Zealand would compete at 
Montréal and that if other countries wished to withdraw it was up to them.!43 There were 
also visits to New Zealand from Ordia and the Secretary  General of the 
Commonwealth, Shridath "Sonny!  Ramphal.44  Ramphal warned Muldoon of the 
possibility  of New Zealand!s sporting isolation; Muldoon refused to meet with Ordia 
altogether. Attempts were made to reach a compromise in order to avoid the boycott, 
but the Muldoon government would not budge in its policy  not to mix politics and sport. 
A "Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting! was held at the end of May  1976; the 
summary  of which was excluded and withheld from an Access to Information request 
on an External Affairs file dealing specifically  with the Montréal Games boycott.45 To rub 
salt in the wounds, Muldoon!s National Party, in June 1976, gave an official farewell to 
the All Blacks team before it left for its South African tour, shortly after the Soweto 
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uprisings began.46  "It sought only, it said, to reassure itself that there would be no 
danger to the New Zealand players.!47 The New Zealand government held firm in its 
position that its policies were right, just, and not for international scrutiny.
In a letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail the New Zealand High Commissioner to 
Ottawa, Jack Shepherd, defended the position of his government: "Overseas tours by 
New Zealand sports teams, and visits to New Zealand by  teams and individuals are 
arranged without the permission, sponsorship or assistance of the Government.!48 
Although sticking to its policy  of not mixing politics and sport, the government of New 
Zealand began to actively  defend and justify its policies. It remained firm in its stance, 
allowing the All Blacks rugby team to continue its tour of South Africa throughout the 
continuing riots in Soweto, which were quickly spreading to other parts of South Africa.
A cable to External Affairs in Ottawa indicates that New Zealand!s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Brian Talboys, had reached out to the African foreign ministers meeting in 
Mauritius to explain New Zealand!s position:
“We believe that system is wrong, and we want to see it ended. But we do 
not see how an African boycott of the Olympic Games can help to achieve 
this goal... By  boycotting the Games, African countries would only  further 
undermine the Olympic principle of free competition regardless of race, 
creed or colour. And by  introducing politics in this way  they  might well 
jeopardise the future of the Games themselves.”49
Talboys appealed to the African leaders to reconsider their position and, accuses them, 
in an ironic twist, of contravention of the Olympic charter. Talboys!s appeal was a last 
minute attempt to avoid a boycott of the Montréal Olympics.
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The Olympic Boycott 
By July 10, seven days before the opening ceremonies, Tanzania announced that they 
were boycotting the Games. According to the Globe and Mail the government of 
Tanzania issued a statement:
“Tanzania has always maintained that political, commercial and sporting 
links with the South African apartheid regime strengthen and give 
respectability  to the Fascist state. ... New Zealand!s participation in sporting 
events in South Africa at a time when the whole world was mourning and 
condemning the barbaric incidents in the apartheid state was an open 
approval by  New  Zealand of the murderous acts. ... All progressive people 
the world over will see reason to defend the integrity  of the Olympic Games 
by  excluding New Zealand from the current Games. ... To exclude from the 
Games countries which fraternize with South Africa is the greatest 
contribution mankind can make toward reaching a peaceful solution in 
South Africa.”50
The Ottawa Citizen further explains why Tanzania chose to publicly  announce its 
boycott, indicating that the OAU had passed a resolution in which they  condemned 
New Zealand for allowing the All Blacks to tour South Africa despite the race riots which 
started in Soweto and spread to other townships. The resolution also called on the IOC 
to ban New Zealand from the Games.51 This was a major blow to the Olympics and 
Tanzania, as its star sprinter, Filbert Bayi, was due to compete against New Zealand!s 
star runner John Walker. On July  15, 1976, Yvon Beaulne, Director General, Bureau of 
African and Middle Eastern Affairs in External Affairs, received a letter from the 
Tanzanian High Commissioner in Ottawa, Chief Michael Lukumbuzya indicating:
...I want to reassure the Government of Canada, through you, that the 
withdrawal by  Tanzania from the 1976 Olympics is because New  Zealand is 
participating in the games and not because of anything else. Tanzania!s 
boycott of the 1976 Olympics should not reflect on the good relationship 
which exists between Tanzania and Canada.52 
It was imperative, for most of the African countries that ended up taking part in the 
boycott, that they  reassured Canada that the boycott had nothing to do with the 
Olympic host nation and was not directed at Canadians. They wanted to make clear 
that the boycott was directed at New Zealand. In Tanzania itself, there had been some 
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contention as to whether or not the country  should participate. A cable from Dar es 
Salaam to Ottawa notes that the Minister of Youth and Culture, his officials and 
members of the Tanzanian Olympic Committee had all wanted the country  to 
participate as they thought Bayi would bring glory to Tanzania and Africa. However, the 
decision to withdraw was made directly  by  President Nyerere.53 Even within boycotting 
countries, conflict arose as to whether the boycott was right. The boycotting countries 
and its athletes sacrificed their hard work and dedication in an attempt to send a 
message that New Zealand had to cut sporting ties with apartheid South Africa.
The Nigerian Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, Leslie 
Harriman, issued a statement on behalf of the Special Committee in which he 
applauded Tanzania for its decision to withdraw.  A cable from Geneva to Ottawa 
quotes Harriman as follows:
It is indeed painful to take action against New Zealand, a country  which has 
a tradition of non-racialism in sports and in which many  organizations and 
individuals, including sportsmen, have demonstrated their opposition to 
apartheid and racism. But officials of New Zealand Rugby  Union and other 
sports bodies have been utterly  insensitive to all appeal to desist from 
collusion with South African racists. New Zealand government not only 
failed to exert its influence against such collusion but gave its official 
blessings to visit of rugby team to South Africa.54
The support of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid gave more credence to 
the African call for a boycott; third party  support of the boycott resonated with anti-
apartheid groups and helped fuel the boycott. 
On July  12, 1976, a group of Canadian anti-apartheid activists participated in a protest 
at the Toronto Cricket, Skating and Curling Club where a team of South African 
cricketers were playing a team from Toronto. The South Africans had entered Canada 
as tourists, but were being supported by  Harry  Oppenheimer, owner of Anglo-American 
Corporation.55  The protests, mainly  made up  of members of the CCSA, stormed the 
cricket pitch three times. The Toronto Star reports that there was also a lie down protest 
during the match.56 The traveling team of cricketers also encountered protests in other 
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parts of Canada. Charles Stimac, head of the protesters in Toronto, said they  wanted 
the match stopped as it was "“against the international boycott of South African 
participation in sport.”!57 The riot police were called in and the match was eventually 
allowed to proceed, without any  spectators. The protest was small, yet effective in 
garnering press attention and bringing to light the anti-apartheid sports movement in 
Canada. The CCSA and other protesters took advantage of this small event by 
spreading their message against apartheid sport.
Even though there had been plenty  of advanced warning about the prospect of a 
boycott, it came as a surprise to the public, the IOC and the Canadian government 
when African nations actually  started to walk out. A key  reason for this was that in the 
run up to the Olympics, Canada and the IOC had focused their attention on the Taiwan 
situation. In short:
Under the Trudeau government Canada had sought to distance itself from 
the United States, especially  from its involvement in Vietnam. One way  to 
do this was to support Beijing over the American-backed Taiwan. Canada 
was also selling quantities of wheat to the People!s Republic; consequently, 
our economic interests were more closely linked to Beijing than to Taipei.58
In a show of support of the People!s Republic of China (PRC), Canada refused entry 
visas to Taiwanese athletes unless they  agreed to compete under the designation of 
Taiwan not the Republic of China, the official name the IOC recognised for Taiwan. One 
of the Liberal Party!s political platform in the 1968 election was the intention of 
establishing diplomatic relations with China. The Chinese laid out three conditions to 
the Canada-China relationship: Canada had to break relations with Taiwan, Canada 
had to recognise PRC!s right to occupy  the China seat at the United Nations, and 
"Canada must recognize the sovereignty  of the People!s Republic of China over 
Taiwan.!59  Canada found the last point hardest to accept. In the end, however, 
Secretary  of State Sharp and the External Affairs department came up with a solution: 
"Canada did not accept the assertion by the Chinese government of its sovereignty 
137
57 Ibid.
58 Ann Hall, Trevor Slack, Garry Smit, David Whitson. Sport in Canadian Society (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 98.  
59 Mitchell Sharp. Which Reminds Me: A Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 204.
over Taiwan, neither did we challenge it.!60 This solution allowed Canada to officially 
recognise the PRC and solidified their diplomatic and trade relationships.
Diplomatic relations and official recognition of the PRC meant that Canada could not 
recognise Taiwan as the official China representative at the Olympics as it would have 
had disastrous effects on the Canada-PRC relationship. And, to add to this, in a 
meeting  between Chinese and Canadian representatives on November 1, 1974, the 
Chinese government in Peking, through Kuo Lei, made clear to Canada that it
...will arrange for their participation in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montréal 
and for the expulsion of the ROC [Republic of China aka Taiwan]. It was 
suggested that Canada!s failure to do so would be “regrettable for Sino-
Canadian relations”; the implication of that Sino-Canadian relations would 
be adversely  affected. The Chinese would not believe that either the City  of 
Montréal or the IOC were beyond the effective influence of the Canadian 
Government. Although it was suggested to the Chinese that the proper 
course would be for them to approach the IOC and apply  for admission, it 
appeared that they  were no prepared to apply  but rather preferred the 
matter to be raised  with the IOC by another power, in this case Canada.61
There was tremendous pressure on Canada to protect its burgeoning relationship with 
China; delicate diplomacy  and gentle handling of the communist state was required. 
Yet, the IOC was adamant that the Canadian position contradicted Olympic principles 
as the PRC was not a member of the IOC at the time.62 According to Lord Killanin:
When a city  applied for the Games, the International Olympic Committee 
required, in terms of 1976, the support of and certain undertakings by  both 
the city  and country. In the instance of Canada an undertaking was asked 
for, and given, that all National Olympic Committees recognized by the IOC 
would be allowed to enter Canada to take part in the Games.63
The IOC did not recognise the People!s Republic of China or its Olympic Committee. 
Taiwan, aka the Republic of China, and its NOC in Taipei, was the recognised Chinese 
delegation. According to Ivan Head, "For our part, we had no desire or interest in 
offending the IOC. We had considerable interest, however, in honouring the integrity  of 
our own China policy, which included a refusal to take sides in the intense dispute 
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respecting the extent of Chinese territorial sovereignty.!64  Once Canada officially 
recognised the PRC obligations of that friendship followed, which included not 
challenging China!s claim to Taiwan. Since the Chinese clearly  believed Canada would 
be in contravention of this obligation if Taiwan participated in the 1976 Olympics, the 
Canadian government wanted to avoid even the impression of collusion with and 
acceptance of Taiwan.
To the Chinese "The heart of the problem is the PRC!s traditional insistence that Taiwan 
is an integral part of China and, as such, has no other legal status. There should, 
therefore, be only  one China recognized by  the IOC and the PRC should be recognized 
as its government.!65  The United States weighed in and threatened to withdraw if 
Taiwan did not compete; the US did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC but did 
recognise Taiwan.66  With all of the threats and negotiations, much of the IOC!s time 
was devoted to finding solutions to the Taiwanese problem. According to Head and 
Trudeau:
Beijing opposed the entry  into Canada of the Taiwan team, and encouraged 
the Canadian government to deny the necessary visas, an act that would 
clearly  violate solemn undertaking to the IOC and would, moreover, destroy 
the balance inherent in the 1970 formula. It was a step that Trudeau would 
not consider. Neither, however, was he prepared to permit any government 
to do damage to Canada!s foreign-policy  interests by utilizing Canadian 
territory  to masquerade an entity  it was not. Thus was taken the decision - 
after efforts at persuasion had failed - to insist that Taiwan not hold itself out 
to be China, something it clearly  was not. Taiwan, Trudeau said, could call 
itself anything it wanted, so long as the name was not in flagrant violation of 
international comity.67
Eventually  Trudeau agreed upon a compromise allowing the Taiwanese to enter 
Canada: Taiwan would be allowed to fly  their flag and play  their national anthem, but 
they could not claim to be the representatives of the Republic of China, they  had to 
compete under the name of Taiwan. The compromise satisfied both the United States 
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and IOC.68 In the end, however, this compromise was not acceptable to the Taiwanese 
team and they  chose not to attend the Games. A report entitled "US Leadership 
Challenged: Olympics Out of Control! in the San Diego Union on July 21, 1976 notes: 
It is clear that the International Olympic Committee lost control of the 
games when it yielded to blackmail from Canada. The Canadian 
government also yielded to blackmail from Communist China when it put 
politics and trade ahead of its promises and sportsmanship.69
In the face of increasing international pressure and criticism, Canada protected its 
independent foreign policy  and its relationship with China. This was an imperative step 
and closely followed the foreign policies being developed by  the Trudeau government 
and its Third Option of diversifying and protecting Canadian trade and culture.
While this was happening, African nations were calling on the IOC to ban New Zealand 
from the Games for their continuing sports contact with South Africa. However, the 
Taiwan issue consumed the IOC, the Canadian government, and press headlines up to 
the day  of the opening ceremonies. The issue of New Zealand was pushed to the back 
burner. "After spending many  days discussing the Taiwan issue, the IOC attended to 
the African request for New Zealand!s expulsion from the Games with indecent haste. 
This can only  have strengthened Africa!s resolve to walk out.!70  Donald Macintosh, 
Donna Greenhorn and David Black concur with Richards: "...the international 
controversy about Canada!s stand on Taiwan!s participation in the Montréal Games 
made it impossible for the Black African nations to get world attention focused on its 
cause.!71 African nations and anti-apartheid groups were not taken seriously  in their 
boycott threat. For that matter, many countries and individuals did not think that the 
Africans would be able to coordinate a boycott. According to Richards, there were 
several reasons for this belief:
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The fault lines within Africa were numerous: Anglophone versus 
Francophone; less developed versus more developed. Anti-apartheid 
organisations were divided in terms of goals, tactics, ideological 
allegiances, priorities and the types of pressures to which they  were 
subjected. Geographic separation and poor communications further 
fragmented unity.72
All the African nations and anti-apartheid groups had to work as a collective in order to 
undertake an effective boycott that gained international attention. In his memoirs, Sam 
Ramsamy, who travelled to the 1976 Games as the SAN-ROC representative, "...was 
surprised to arrive and find IOC officials preoccupied! by  the Taiwan issue rather than 
the African one.73  Ramsamy  recalls that he and Ganga met with Lane Cross, IOC 
member and President of the New Zealand National Olympic Committee and Lord 
Porritt, honorary  IOC member. In an attempt to avoid the boycott, Ganga suggested 
that the All Blacks shorten their tour of South Africa. Cross argued that the New 
Zealand NOC had no jurisdiction over rugby  as it was not an Olympic sport. Ganga 
suggested that Cross use the excuse that, according to reports, some All Blacks 
players had gotten too close to a demonstration and suffered the effects of tear gas. 
Porritt embraced this idea, Cross remained skeptical as he left the meeting. Ganga and 
Ramsamy did not hear from Cross or New Zealand again.74
In the furore surrounding the Taiwan situation, the Africans request that New Zealand 
be removed from the Games was not considered until the IOC General Assembly 
meetings in Montréal which immediately preceded the opening of the Olympic 
Games.75  On July  16, the day before the opening ceremonies, Lord Killanin, IOC 
President, sent a letter to Ganga at his hotel in Montréal:
Thank you for your letter regarding Rugby - South Africa/New Zealand.
Rugby is a sport over which the International Olympic Committee has no 
control whatsoever. As you know, as far as the Olympic Games are 
concerned the International Olympic committee took action to withdraw 
recognition from South Africa in 1970.
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Your letter has been discussed by  the full I.O.C. Session who unanimously 
agree this is not a matter within its competence and further confirms that 
the New Zealand National Olympic Committee and Team have in no way 
breached Olympic Principles and Rules.76
Toumany Sangaré, the President of the Guinea Olympic Committee, believed that
The IOC!s evasiveness, purposely  delaying its reply  the Supreme Council 
for Sport in Africa!s legitimate demand, was aimed at presenting the 
Africans with a fait accompli in the foolish hope that, already  installed in the 
Olympic village, they would hesitate in leaving Montréal a few hours away 
from the opening of the Games.77
In the end, the IOC decided they would not take any  action against New Zealand as 
rugby  was not an IOC sport and it was not the place of the IOC to ban New Zealand for 
its rugby links with South Africa. 
By July  16, the day  before the opening ceremonies, a total of 3 countries had 
withdrawn from the Olympics: Tanzania, Mauritius, and Nigeria, and several others had 
threatened to leave. According to the Ottawa Citizen: "A letter purported to be signed by 
representatives of the national Olympic committees of 15 African countries asks that 
the International Olympic Committee bar New Zealand!s participation in the Montréal 
Olympics.!78 According to Richard Cleroux, the African nations did not think the IOC 
would expel New Zealand, but it did hope for some moral support, perhaps in the form 
of a statement "that would have shown the world the IOC didn!t go along with a rugby 
team touring South Africa.!79 Cleroux reiterated this fact in an interview  on CBC radio: 
"the whole thing started up last minute, it snowballed by  accident. These countries 
didn!t come here with the intention of pulling out.!80 The African nations travelled to 
Canada with the intention of participating in the Olympics; most of these countries 
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could not have fathomed the boycott would go ahead, their Olympics ending 
prematurely.
The High Commissioner for Zambia in Canada, W.M Chakulya, wrote to Prime Minister 
Trudeau on July 16. He laid bare Zambia!s decision for boycotting the Games:
As a member of the Organization of African Unity, Zambia will not 
participate in the 1976 Montréal Olympic Games if New Zealand is allowed 
to participate. ... South Africa!s policy has resulted into unnecessary loss of 
life, not only  among the South African non-white population, but also loss of 
life and destruction of property  in the Republic of Zambia. On the 11th July, 
1976 the South African troops killed twenty  two people and injured more 
than forty  others twenty  kilometer [sic] inside the Zambian territory. Zambia 
considered this action flagrant aggression against her independence and 
soverignity  [sic]. Zambia is taking this issue up with the United Nations, and 
has asked the Security  Council to place the matter on the agenda for next 
week. Zambia!s action in withdrawing from the Olympics has in no way 
been linked to the excellent relations that prevail between Zambia and 
Canada.81
Chakulya pointed out to Trudeau that although Zambia valued its friendship with 
Canada it could not support the 1976 Games if New Zealand was allowed to continue 
in its participation.  In hopes to bolster its point of view, Zambia pointed out that South 
Africa!s apartheid policies affect other countries in Southern Africa and that the 
apartheid state did not respect international borders and security. African nations and 
leaders went to great lengths to assure Trudeau and the Canadian government that 
their boycott was directed New Zealand, and should not reflect their relationships with 
Canada. They  acknowledged that Canada was an important ally, especially  in the 
Commonwealth, and that a boycott of the Olympic Games, being held in Canada, could 
have had negative repercussions on Canada-African relations.
The opening ceremony was held on July  17; the ceremony attended by  Queen 
Elizabeth II, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, and Prince Andrew along with Prime 
Minister Trudeau and other dignitaries. Yet by  the time the ceremony  started, more 
countries had dropped out - Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, Mauritius, Somalia, and 
Tanzania decided to boycott the Games. A cable from Lagos to Ottawa shows that 
Nigeria struggled with making the decision to boycott and hoped that the IOC would 
change its mind regarding New Zealand!s participation:
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Nigerian government hopes that International Olympic Committee will, even 
at this late hour, and without any further delay, allow their better judgement 
to prevail, by  calling for New Zealand!s withdrawal from the 1976 Olympic 
games. Nigerian government will make its final position known if, by  Friday 
July 16 New Zealand has not withdrawn from Games.82
Nigeria gave the IOC the benefit of the doubt in the hope they  would reverse its 
decision. Interestingly, despite increased support, a cable from Lagos to Ottawa, part of 
which has been censored and exempted from an Access to Information request, notes 
that the Nigerian public was not happy  with the prospect of a boycott.83 Nigeria decided 
to wait until the very  last minute, the day  before the opening ceremony, to withdraw 
from the Olympics. 
According to the Globe and Mail, as of July 19, more teams had exited Montréal; in 
total 28 teams, 770 athletes, 10%  of participants boycotted the Montréal Olympics.84 
The situation was in constant flux, it would not be clear for days which countries stayed 
and which had left. Even Lord Killanin, President of the IOC, pointed out that during the 
opening ceremonies, as he watched the athletes file into the stadium "...I was trying to 
discover which of the African and other delegations were missing or present.!85  To 
reiterate the point, Linda Cahill of the Montréal Star revealed "Embarrassed Olympic 
officials were still counting heads today  to determine which black and Arab states 
intend to stay.!86 According to John Brehl the boycott "... is certainly  downgrading the 
calibre of many  Olympic competitions, it was touched off last week by Tanzania and 
mushroomed when the International Olympic Committee (IOC) voted down a move to 
expel New Zealand.!87 Almost all the African teams withdrew before competition began, 
except Egypt, who withdrew several days into Olympic competition. 
The Canadian government reaction was frantic, though delayed.  A memo dated July 
21, 1976 from Ivan Head indicated that Trudeau had approved United Nations 
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal to 
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appeal directly  to African nations to return to the Olympics. On July  18th the two men 
made statements after a meeting in New York. Waldheim!s statement reads:
"I appeal to the International Olympic Committee and all parties concerned 
to continue their efforts to resolve the problems affecting the participation of 
athletes from Africa in the 21st Olympiad. In doing so I recognize the deep 
and genuine concerns felt by  African states. At the same time I wish to point 
out that the Olympics Games have become an occasion of special 
significance in mankind!s search for brotherhood and understanding. 
Ensuring the success of the Olympic Games will help to advance these 
objectives while constructive efforts will have to be pursued to come to 
grips with those issues which must be faced and resolved if world 
brotherhood is to be a reality.!88
And Ramphal!s:
"I warmly  welcome and endorse Dr. Waldheim!s timely  initiative. The 
Olympic Games and world sport in general cannot realistically  be divorced 
from issues of contemporary  concern on which they  impinge. Dr. 
Waldheim!s proposal for the pursuit of these questions by  constructive 
effort following the Games is especially welcome. I suggest that these 
efforts should be directed to securing a comprehensive examination at the 
international level, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the games, 
of the several issues that have arisen as a source of legitimate concern to 
African and other states. Meanwhile, I join in Dr. Waldheim!s appeal to the 
IOC and all the world!s nations to ensure the success of the current games 
through maximum participation. I am sure that such a result can contribute 
greatly  to the propitious resolution of the wider questions to which attention 
has now  quite properly  been drawn in the context of the current 
Olympics.!89
These two influential men attempted to convince African nations to return to the 
Games. Head also points out that messages were sent to various African heads of 
governments "asking them to consider whether their goals had not now been reached 
following the recognition by  Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Ramphal of the legitimacy of their 
stand asking them to consider permitting their teams to participate.!90 In a personal 
telegram from Trudeau to President Kenyatta of Kenya, reaching out in what seems 
like desperate pleas:
It strikes me that your appeal to the conscience of the world has now  been 
largely  successful and I would hope that you would agree with me that no 
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further immediate gains can be made by denying to your dedicated young 
athletes the once in a lifetime opportunity  of participating in this Olympic 
brotherhood exercise. As Mr. Ramphal said, maximum participation in the 
Olympics can contribute greatly  to the resolution of the wider questions to 
which attention quote has now quite properly been drawn unquote.91
Trudeau hoped that complimentary tones would convince African nations either to 
return to the Olympics or, to the ones that remained as of July  21, not to leave at all. 
Trudeau did not receive favourable responses. Both President Kaunda of Zambia and 
Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana sent telegrams to Trudeau to let him know that by 
the time they  received his communications their teams had already left and that 
appeals from Trudeau, Waldheim and Ramphal would have made no difference in their 
choice to leave. President Kaunda puts it quite succinctly: "The withdrawal of our team 
from the Games was in compliance with the decision made by the OAUS Assembly  of 
Head of State and Government in Port Louis (Mauritius) during their 813th ordinary 
session in July  this year. That decision bound all African countries to withdraw their 
teams from competing in the Montréal Games if New Zealand was permitted to 
participate.!92 No Olympic team that left the Games returned, despite the outreach from 
the UN, the Commonwealth and Canada. This boycott was the first major boycott of the 
modern-day  Olympics and gave great international exposure to the anti-apartheid 
movement and the sports boycott. 
By July  22, Michel Guay, Vice President Operations - Sports of the Organizing 
Committee for the Games of the XXI Olympiad, Montréal 1976, wrote to Henry R. 
Banks, Technical Director of the IOC to let him know that the Organizing Committee 
had received confirmation of withdrawal from the Games from a total of 20 countries:
# Algeria## # Libya
# Cameroons [sic]# Mali
# Congo# # # Niger
# Egypt# # # Nigeria
# Ethiopia# # Sudan
# Ghana## # Swaziland
# Guyana# # Tchad [sic]
# Haute-Volta# # Togo
# Iraq# # # Uganda
146
91 Ibid.
92 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds. MG26 O7, Volume 579, File 300401, 17-31 July - July 23, 1976.
# Kenya# # # Zambia 93
Countries wrote to Guay  and advised they were withdrawing due to the IOC!s decision 
to allow  New Zealand to participate in the Games. A letter from the National Olympic 
Committee of Ethiopia states that while the South African government murders black 
students in Soweto:
The world has been shocked by  this act of savagery and the entire 
International Community  has condemned it, except the Government and 
the sport authorities of New Zealand which maintained the rugby  team tour 
giving the evidence by  this decision of their unconditional support to 
Apartheid and to the Genocide of the Black people.94
Tsegaw Ayele, head of the Ethiopian delegation notes, like several other African sports 
leaders, that the decision is not meant to harm the Canadian people nor the organisers 
of the Olympic Games. 
By the time the Disabled Olympiad rolled around in August 1976, several countries 
chose to boycott these Games as well due to South Africa!s participation. Boycotting 
countries included: Jamaica, India, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Uganda, and 
Kenya. David Greig writes: "The number of athletes on the eight teams that did not 
participate was far higher than that of the South African athletes that would have had to 
stay  home had they  not been invited.!95 In total, 22 athletes participated from South 
Africa, nine non-white athletes and 13 white.
The boycott of the Olympics was deemed a resounding success by the international 
anti-apartheid movement - it garnered a vast amount of international attention to the 
anti-apartheid movement, it made the worldwide public aware of New Zealand!s 
continuing sporting ties with South Africa, and, most importantly, it proved the power 
and influence of the African nations. 
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CHAPTER 7: The Making of the Gleneagles 
Agreement
The 1976 Olympic Legacy
Domestically, many  Canadians deemed the Olympics a success, despite the financial 
and political difficulties the Games encountered. Even separatist politician René 
Lévesque felt that "Ce n!est pas tout: les Jeux de Montréal se sont bien passés, malgré 
le déficit gigantesque et les grues qui défigurent le stade pendant les épreuves 
sportives.!1 The province filled with pride after the Games, this pride did not last long. 
History  has been unkind to the Montréal Games, long considered one of the worst 
Games in Olympic history. 
In the end there was a deficit of approximately  $1 billion; the budget of $310-million 
was grossly mismanaged. The official report of the IOC notes:
The gap between the financial projections and reality  was the result of a 
long series of body-blows, including technical difficulties that could have 
been foreseen. Other factors contributing to a five-fold increase in 
expenditure over original projections included an underestimation of costs 
in general, the cost of material and manpower in particular, work stoppages 
that were both numerous and costly, and finally the new construction of the 
Olympic Park installations.2 
In addition, there was some loss of revenue due to the boycott and the necessary 
rescheduling and canceling of events, however, the Games on a whole were a major 
monetary loss for Montréal.  An official judicial inquiry, by the Parti Québécois 
government, found that "Drapeau had let costs of constructing the Olympic Park run too 
high but that there were no other problems of real importance.!3 Mismanagement and 
inexperience were the financial downfall of the Games.
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Soon after the end of the Olympics there was a provincial election in Québec. 
Surprisingly, the Olympic debt and mismanagement of the Games was not the most 
important topic of the campaign. In 1973, Bourassa had defeated Parti Québécois 
(PQ) leader Lévesque in a provincial election. With that defeat, the PQ  began to tone 
down its separatist rhetoric. Responding to its defeat, they  indicated "once elected, it 
would hold a referendum on sovereignty, rather than leading the province immediately 
into independence.!4 Clearly, the appetite for separatism which had increased through 
the late 1960s, had faded in the wake of the October Crisis. Lévesque would have to 
reevaluate his tactics in order to have a chance at winning the next provincial election; 
separatism alone would not get him voted into power.
In 1974, Bourassa!s government passed Bill 22 which made French the official 
language of Québec. This alienated English-speaking citizens of the province. Things 
having quieted since the October Crisis and with English-speaking Québecers feeling 
isolated, separatism became a non-issue. The PQ campaigned on the slogan "Ca ne 
peut plus continuer comme ca! (Things can!t go on this way), which appealed to people 
fed-up with the Bourassa government, even non-separatists.5 The PQ was elected with 
a majority  of 41%, versus 24% for the Liberals, 18%  for Union Nationale. Richard 
Cleroux writes: "The election of a PQ majority  Government has far-reaching 
implications for the future of Canada. But it places the PQ Government in a difficult 
position because an overwhelming majority  of Québeckers [sic] have clearly  expressed 
themselves against separation in opinion poles.!6 Lévesque was given a clear mandate 
to lead the province. It was only  a matter of time before separatism would move to the 
forefront of Canadian politics, once again.
Internationally, the boycott of the 1976 Montréal Olympics is considered the first major 
disruptive protest of the modern day Olympic movement. Despite attempts by the IOC 
to separate the politics and the Games, politics had a way of sneaking in. Sam 
Ramsamy  points out that "The United States made the first political protest when its 
team refused to dip their flag to King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra at the opening 
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ceremony  of the 1908 London Olympics.!7 The Games, by  their nature, are political; 
nations coming together to compete on the world stage promotes nationalism like no 
other world event. The Montréal Games were unique; the African teams showed up 
with every  intention to participate but the athletes were forced to leave. The reactions 
and consequential repercussions of the Montréal Games were important to the 
development of the South African sports boycott and the anti-apartheid movement in 
general, international sport, Commonwealth relations, United Nations and the Special 
Committee Against Apartheid, the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, African 
countries!  relations with Western countries, and the development of sport within South 
Africa itself. David R. Black states that "The Montréal boycott significantly  widened the 
sanctions campaign, which henceforth targeted not only South African teams and 
athletes but also representatives from third countries that maintained links with South 
Africa.!8 Simply, the boycott created a massive worldwide domino effect.
As a whole, the Montréal Olympics were highly  politicised. Besides the Taiwan situation 
and the boycott by  African nations, there were other incidents of politics, including the 
burning of a Soviet flag outside the athletes village. N. Kurdjukov, Secretary-General of 
the USSR Olympic Committee, wrote a letter of protest to IOC President, Lord Killanin, 
in which he indicated that the IOC should interfere in these types of protests to protect 
"delegations participating in the Games of the XXI Olympiade [sic] from any kind of 
hostile actions.!9 According to Killanin, these incidents were created by  the "Ukrainian 
émigré population! north of Montréal.10  The participation of the Soviet team in the 
Olympic Movement received a vast amount of attention from the general public. In July 
1976, in the midst of the politicisation of the Games, the Women!s Campaign for Soviet 
Jewry, London, England wrote to Killanin at the IOC noting:
By refusing South Africa or Taiwan the right of participation, the Olympic 
Committee have fallen to political pressure. ... We fail to see how having 
done so, this Committee permits the Soviet Union!s participation and further 
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will grant that Government the honour of hosting such an important 
occasion as the Olympic Games in 1980.11
A similar letter was also received from the Southport Committee for Soviet Jewry, 
Merseyside, England. In the same vein, one Canadian wrote to the IOC in August 1976 
arguing that she finds it
impossible to understand why  the Soviet Union and the satellite countries 
are permitted to compete in the games while South Africa and Rhodesia 
are forbidden entry  to any  events. The western democracies refuse to 
compete with South Africa because of its repression of blacks and yet these 
same pillars of democracy will not only compete with countries that repress 
entire populations but salute one of these countries by allowing them to 
host the 1980 summer games. Surely  we realize that the Soviet Union 
ignores the inalienable rights to “liberté, egalité, et fraternité” just as much if 
not more than Rhodesia and South Africa.12
The participation of the Soviet team at the 1976 Games created modest protests, but 
were overshadowed by  the situation with Taiwan and the boycotting African nations. 
Cold War politics would lead to larger, more prominent boycotts at the next two Olympic 
Games - Moscow, 1980 and Los Angeles, 1984 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.
A letter of protest was also received from a group called the Kansas City Businessmen, 
who vehemently  disagreed with the IOC decisions to not allow  sprinter James Gilkes of 
Guyana to participate in the Games independently.13 After Guyana withdrew  from the 
Games, in solidarity  with the African boycott, Gilkes had made a request to the IOC, 
asking to participate as an individual under the Olympic flag. The IOC insisted 
"...athletes could compete in the Games only  when they  had been certified by  the 
appropriate NOCs. If the NOCs did not participate in the Games, no athletes from that 
country  could compete.!14 At Montréal, athletes of the boycotting countries were victims 
of politics. They  had trained most of their lives for their Olympic moment, only  to have 
their opportunities dashed at the behest of their individual NOC or government.
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Montréal was a catalyst - the boycott marked the Olympics profoundly. According to 
Alan Tomlinson, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympics "was 
always aware that international sport could create tensions between nations quite as 
easily  as harmony. Yet he persisted in his belief that an international athleticism could 
tip  the balance towards peace.!15 This belief was naive, especially when viewed from 
the post World War II, Cold War years. During this time every cultural, sporting or, 
generally, international event had the opportunity to become politicised. In Canada, the 
Cold War drama played out on the ice, in hockey  championships and tournaments with 
the USSR, most notably  the 1972 Summit Series which Canada won four games to 
three, with one tie. The huge pride and intense nationalism this generated in the 
country  is still felt today. After the African led boycott of the 1976 Games, the floodgates 
opened; countries saw boycotts could be effectual and followed suit. President Jimmy 
Carter of the United States called for an American boycott of the 1980 Winter Olympics 
in Moscow; many  countries followed their lead and boycotted Moscow. In turn, the 
USSR boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. Sport boycotts provided 
an opportunity  for nations and groups to exert power in non-violent ways. Boycotts 
were also beneficial due to the dialogue they  created and the press and media they 
generated. To this day the boycott threat still looms large as a force for change. At the 
2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Aboriginal groups in Canada called for a boycott 
and cancellation of the Games due to Native land claims. The African nations in 1976 
showed the world how an effective boycott could work; the success of this action 
influenced other nations to follow suit. Nationalism and politics remain tightly  linked with 
the Olympic Movement. 
Reaction to the Olympic Boycott
Printed press reaction to the boycott was slow to develop, mainly  because the 
preoccupation with Taiwan and the IOC took up much of the newspaper space at the 
time. However, once the Taiwan situation was resolved, and with the increasing 
number of African nations leaving Montréal, there was increased press coverage of the 
boycott. Often the coverage was straightforward narrative of events, with very  little 
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analysis of why  the boycott occurred, but the Ottawa Citizen’s William Frye offered a 
hefty article which delves into the reasons for the boycott:
To many  in the West, that boycott seems to reflect a distorted perspective. 
Denying talented athletes an opportunity  to take part at the summit of world 
sport simply  to protest New Zealand!s willingness to send a rugby  team to 
South Africa seems close to unbelievable. ... The sending of athletic teams 
to South Africa makes a significant difference. South Africans are great 
fans, especially  of rugby, and when opportunities to watch top performers 
are lost because of South Africa!s discriminatory  practices there is pressure 
on the government to ease the discrimination. ... Continued desegregation 
of sport could be a major encouragement for reform of abhorrent racial 
practices in other areas of South African life. It could help produce the 
national change of heart which many moderates, both inside and outside 
South Africa, have long hoped for.16
Frye offers telling analysis at a time when other press outlets focused on the sequence 
of events and the operational aftermath for the Games. Frye tries to explain to Citizen 
readers why  the boycott was so important to African nations. It was not taken lightly; 
the boycotting nations hoped to create discussion internationally and effect change.
Newspapers also focused on the immediate aftermath and ripple effects of the boycott 
- the story  became front page news at all the major Canadian dailies. The detrimental 
operational effects on planned matches, especially those of soccer and boxing, and the 
automatic drop in revenue due to cancelled events were noted by  both the Ottawa 
Citizen and Montréal Star.17 The already  debt-laden Montréal Olympics suffered due to 
additional losses of revenue.
Newspapers also reported on the workings of SAN-ROC during the Games. Many 
sports federations were holding meetings in Montréal during the Olympics. SAN-ROC 
jumped on these gatherings, using the opportunity  to make their case for the expulsion 
of South Africa from international sporting federations. Douglas Booth explains that 
SAN-ROC built its credibility  by "adopting specific sports objectives! and using 
strategies like diplomatic persuasion and petitioning to effect change.18 SAN-ROC!s 
worked tirelessly  to disseminate its message and took every  opportunity to attain the 
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goal of complete isolation of South African sport. On July  20, 1976, Richard Cleroux 
reported that the week before "...working through the Supreme Sports Council, SAN-
ROC  was able to get South Africa expelled from the international body  of governing 
soccer, the Federation Internationale du Football Association [FIFA], by  a convincing 
78-9 vote.!19 In preparation for the meetings in Montréal FIFA sent a committee of three 
to South Africa to observe the country!s sports policies. They  met with senior officials 
from the non-racial South Africa Soccer Federation, led by  Norman Middleton, who 
submitted a memorandum urging FIFA to expel the all-white Football Association of 
South Africa (FASA) from international soccer.20 In line with the pattern of the boycott 
and anti-apartheid movement, non-white South African athletes and administrators 
urged the international organisation of FIFA to exclude South Africa as a member. FIFA 
had previously  suspended the all-white FASA in 1962 to 1963. They  were reinstated 
when FASA "assured FIFA that it was doing its best for Non-White soccer - within the 
limits of the law.!21 The suspension, however, was reinstated in 1964. In 1976, FIFA 
completely  expelled the South African delegation. Although football was not a popular 
white sport in South Africa (it was mostly  played by  black South Africans), this was a 
key  expulsion for SAN-ROC, the strategy  of lobbying behind the scenes of the 
Olympics to isolate South Africa was given a boost. 
Also during the Olympics, the Federation Internationale de Natation (FINA) conference 
in Montréal, ratified its 1973 decision to expel South Africa from the governing body  of 
swimming.22  After South Africa!s official expulsions from international football and 
swimming, the country  faced another major expulsion. On July  23 when the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), "which governs non-professional track 
and field, expelled the Amateur Athletic Union of South Africa by  a vote of 227 to 145. 
The action makes permanent a year-to-year suspension imposed on South Africa by 
the federation six years ago.!23  This was a major event; the IAAF was a huge 
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organisation with many  yearly meets and competitions. Although many of the African 
delegates had arrived with their official teams, these teams had since left Montréal due 
to the boycott. Behind the scenes, Sam Ramsamy worked to find accommodation for 
the African IAAF delegates. Their votes were crucial and were needed to ensure that 
the IAAF expelled South Africa. Their expulsion was crushing. "For years, South African 
Athletics had been stopped from competing in international matches (as 
representatives of South Africa) but could only compete as individuals. This expulsion 
brought the above concession to an end.!24 The Ottawa Citizen reported that Jean-
Claude Ganga was pleased with the results of the vote and would continue to press on 
in the fight to have South Africa excluded from more international federations under 
which they  were still allowed representation.25  South Africa!s banning from major 
international sport federations solidified their isolation, creating an inhospitable 
atmosphere for South African sport teams and athletes. Their isolation from 
international sport continued to grow through the late 1970s and well into the 1980s.
Another SAN-ROC success was that, through lobbying, they were able to have a South 
African hospitality  suite closed before the end of the Olympics. As indicated previously, 
the South Africans had hoped to set-up a Friendship House during the Olympics. As an 
alternative to the Friendship House, a discreet headquarters in the basement bar of the 
Laurentian Hotel, called the Kittie Lounge, was set up "to counter the virulent anti-South 
African lobby by Black African nations and organizations at this year!s Olympics.!26 It 
appeared that the lobby was set-up by the Association of African Travel Bureaus, 
however, "...the white South African who operate the headquarters, using it as a 
hospitality suite for journalists, athletes and Olympic sports officials say  the costs are 
paid for by a group of anonymous South African philanthropic sportsmen.!27 Although 
the lounge was rented for the duration of the Olympics, it was forced to close down 
early because of lobbying from SAN-ROC and other protesters.  
In terms of press coverage, there were two final important notes. First, growing fear 
that an African boycott would affect the 1978 Commonwealth Games, due to be held in 
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Edmonton; Ganga said that African nations would boycott the Commonwealth Games 
"“... if competing countries do not break sports contact with South Africa.”!28 This fear 
was also held by  the Canadian government and other Commonwealth nations. Second, 
on July  21, the Toronto Star reported that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
feared a new  row would be touched off as the United States gymnastic team, 
reportedly, planned on leaving the Olympics early  to participate in a gymnastics 
competition in South Africa. The IOC feared more walkouts if the US team left.29 As the 
boycott movement gained momentum, coverage and popularity, South Africa was 
quickly  becoming a sporting pariah. Going forward, fewer and fewer countries would 
choose to participate in sporting events which included representatives of the apartheid 
state.
In August 1976, the Anglican Church of Canada made a statement on the situation in 
South Africa, it focused on the continuing dissent in South Africa sparked by  Soweto 
and did not touch upon the boycott of the Olympics. The statement called on 
"Canadians through our churches, governments, banks, corporations and media must 
now more than ever demonstrate that they  support the legitimate struggle of the Blacks 
in South Africa for freedom and oppose the racist Vorster regime.!30  The Anglican 
Church continued to focus on demonstrating their abhorrence of apartheid through the 
boycott of goods and calling on the Canadian government and companies to cease 
trade and investment with South Africa. The Anglican Church of Canada never took up 
the cause of the anti-apartheid movement in sport, they focused on humanitarian aid, 
working conditions, and the cessation of investment and trade. Other organisations 
requested that the Trudeau government make changes to Canadian foreign policy, 
including the termination of diplomatic and trading ties with South Africa. With the 
increase in violence in South Africa, letters and telegrams were sent to Trudeau from 
trade unions, student associations, anti-apartheid groups and churches, including: 
Conseil Québecois De La Paix; Graduate Students Union University  of Toronto; 
National Association of South Africans in Canada; United Electrical Radio and Machine 
Workers of America (Toronto); Ontario Voice of Women (Ottawa); Community  Party  of 
Canada; Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto; Canadians Concerned About 
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Southern Africa.31 The groups were calling for the cessation of ties between Canada 
and South Africa, the hope being that Trudeau!s government would take the necessary 
steps to impose strict, progressive sanctions on South Africa. This included ending 
Canada!s diplomatic relationship with South Africa, imposing trade and economic 
sanctions, and ceasing every form of sport and culture contact.
In terms of IOC reaction, immediately following the Games, Lord Killanin felt that, 
although politics had affected in the Olympic Games, in a variety of ways since 1896, 
nothing compared to the scale of political interference at Montréal.32  He sent a 
message to international federations to see how they  were handling the boycott of the 
Games. Killanin indicated that he 
...would be most grateful if you could reply  to me at Chateau de Vidy  before 
September 15th on how the withdrawal of certain countries in view of the 
South Africa/New Zealand situation affected your competitions, whether 
you have or are taking any  action in regard to sanctions and whether your 
rules permit special sanctions.
I would be grateful also for any  information on how the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) situation affected your competitions and whether you can confirm 
the latest position regarding recognition of either the Peoples!  Republic of 
China or the Republic of China (Taiwan). Further, perhaps you could also 
confirm your situation in regard to South Africa and Rhodesia.33
By surveying the policies of other international federations, Killanin!s aim was to 
establish whether or not sanctions of the Taiwanese, Guyanese and African NOCs 
would be useful and deemed acceptable. The question of the withdrawals were 
discussed at the IOC meeting in Barcelona; in a press release dated October 17, 1976, 
the Executive Board placed the following blame:
The unfortunate situation which arose in Montréal was predominantly 
caused by:
The failure of the Canadian Government to fulfill [sic] the conditions under 
which the Games were given to the City  of Montréal by its refusal to admit a 
recognised National Olympic Committee;
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The obligation of certain NOC delegations to withdraw from the Games in 
Montréal due to pressures exerted by outside authorities.34
The IOC Executive Board squarely  places responsibility  on the Canadian government 
for the Taiwan situation at the 1976 Games and the African nations!, including their 
NOCs, for the boycott. In both cases, outside political forces interfered in the running of 
the Olympic Games. The IOC did not take a strong stand against boycotting countries 
as it felt suspensions of NOCS would only  truly  effect the athletes who were, for the 
most part, innocent bystanders in the boycott saga. 
In the wake of the boycott, the IOC attempted to decipher exactly  which countries 
boycotted the Montréal Games. By late 1976 it was clear that 22 countries actually 
withdrew from the Games and eight made entries but did not arrive for no identified 
reason.35  After the boycott, at the behest of Killanin, NOCs provided the IOC with 
explanations for their actions. Toumany Sangaré, President of the Guinea Olympic 
Committee explained that the decision to leave Montréal:
...was received with enthusiasm and relief by  our people who consider it 
one of the greatest sports victories that their athletes have won throughout 
the history of international competitions.
Through its significance and scope this victory  by  African sportsmen goes 
beyond the simple framework of sport. It enters the line of great victories 
which Africa continues to win in its worldwide and many-sided struggle 
against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism and all 
forms of injustice.
The African countries!  firm and courageous attitude at Montréal was the 
brilliant demonstration of Africa!s resolute wish henceforth to impose the 
respect for its personality upon other countries and peoples.36
Sangaré notes that Guineans fully  supported the boycott and embraced it with much 
enthusiasm. He believed that the boycott was good for all of Africa - it was a show of 
the continent!s strength. However, information from the IOC member for Tunisia, 
Mohamed Mzali, provided a contrasting point of view, he did not agree with the boycott 
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at all and felt that Ordia has "...organized the whole affair in a very  high-handed 
manner.! Mzali notes that he would like the IOC to discover exactly  what happened and 
how decisions were made and, more importantly, why  sport authorities received no 
instructions prior to landing in Montréal.37
A review of IOC archival files found a significant amount of responses to Lord Killanin!s 
request for additional information, the highlights of which are found here. In January 
1977, W.P. Nyirènda, Chairman of the Zambia Olympic, Commonwealth and All Africa 
Games Association, let the IOC know that "As faithful members of the Organisation of 
African Unity  and the United Nations, we could not adopt an ostrich-like attitude in 
relation to the actions of countries like New Zealand which give aid and encouragement 
to the perpetrators of the abominable system of apartheid.! Abraham Ordia, acting in 
his role as Secretary-General of the Nigeria Olympic Committee, wrote to the IOC in 
September 1976 "We strongly  object to the principle of New Zealand maintaining 
sporting relationship [sic] with racist South Africa in spite of the fact that the IOC. has 
withdrawn recognition from the National Olympic Committee of that country  and that 
nine-tenths of International Sports Federations have either suspended or expelled 
South Africa, all for the latter!s apartheid policies in sport.! Uganda!s and Kenya!s 
Olympic Committees supported the OAU resolution and let the IOC know that is why 
they did not participate. Other countries that provided explanatory  letters to the IOC 
included: Algeria and Swaziland, who both noted that their respective governments had 
requested that they  withdraw. The Algerian Olympic Committee supported this 
decision; Swaziland!s Olympic Committee did not and claimed that its government!s 
action was a "blatant case of political interference in sport!.38 It is clear that each NOC, 
and thereby  each African boycott participant, had differing points of view on how  the 
boycott came about and whether or not it was successful. However, the reasons for 
boycotting fell, generally, into two main camps - one, the NOCs who were instructed to 
boycott at the direction of their country!s central government and two, some NOCS felt 
the OAU call for a boycott of Montréal was just and withdrew from the Games in 
support of the boycott.
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The IOC had neglected to take the boycott threat seriously. They  were too focused on 
ensuring the viability  of the Montréal Games and, once they  were secure the Games 
would go ahead, they  were then too preoccupied with the Taiwan situation. They 
deserve part of the blame for the failure of the Games and the success of the boycott, 
they were too short-sighted and preoccupied to take the African threat seriously. 
Although the IOC did not punish or sanction those countries involved with the 1976 
boycott, they  adopted a resolution that attempted to eliminate the interference of 
politics at Olympic Games. Lord Killanin recalls:
There was a feeling that those countries who withdrew for political reasons 
should be sanctioned, but it was a measure which would not affect the 
responsible politicians. A new rule was passed so that an NOC which had 
entered athletes for competitions could not withdraw them except on 
grounds of health, and this was designed to dissuade countries carrying 
their demonstrations into the Olympic arena where, for instance, an African 
runner might refuse to appear in the same heat as a New Zealander. The 
IOC was weak not to sanction those who withdrew for political reasons.39
By imposing this new rule, the IOC hoped to avoid future boycotts; they  hope this rule 
would be a sufficient deterrent in countries contemplating a boycott of the Games. 
Killanin and the IOC did not want the Olympics to be used to advance political 
agendas. Notably, Killanin reiterated that sanctions would have punished African 
athletes, not the actual individuals responsible for following the boycott.
As IOC  President, Killanin tried to avoid bringing politics into the Olympics. In a letter 
dated January  1977 to a Mr. A. Hebert of New Zealand, Monique Berlioux, Director of 
the IOC writes:
I would comment that whilst the IOC deplores, even forbids, racial 
discrimination in Olympic sport, it has absolutely  no authority  at the present 
time to boycott countries which permit and aid sports contact with those 
exercising apartheid, and would only  be able to make a recommendation in 
this respect. Its field of power is restricted to the Olympic Games and 
recognised Olympic sports (of which rugby  - the sport in question - is not 
one), and therefore the African countries! demand that New Zealand be 
excluded from the Montréal Olympic Games could not be considered.
On the contrary, within its scope the IOC now has the authority  to suspend 
or withdraw  recognition of an NOC  which infringes the Olympic Rules. As 
pointed bout by  Lord Killanin in his letter, by  withdrawing in protest against 
New Zealand!s participation in the Games (thus using the Games as a 
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political platform), the African countries have caused severe disruption to 
the planned events! programme and indeed contravened the Rules, 
although it was decided not to apply sanctions in this particular instance.40
In terms of historiography, the Olympic boycott of 1976 has been hailed as a major 
blow to apartheid sport and an important turning point in the anti-apartheid sports 
boycott. According to Bruce Kidd: "Although sharply  criticized by  the Western media, 
which interpreted the obvious shock and disappointment of departing athletes and 
coaches as opposition to the decision, the boycott achieved both immediate and long-
term results.!41 Kidd notes that within days, FIFA and the IAAF had expelled South 
African and "...before the year was up, the IOC had agreed to use its "moral suasion! 
against South African sporting contacts, even in non-Olympic sports.!42 The boycott 
gave credence to the call for South African sport isolation, it did not go unnoticed by 
major sports leaders at the time.
Most importantly, Kidd, and other historians, point out that Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau feared a boycott of the Edmonton Commonwealth Games - he did not want to 
host "a conspicuously  white-only  games!.43 This boycott fear was an important catalyst 
in the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement. Trudeau and other Commonwealth 
countries began preparations for the upcoming 1977 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting (CHOGM), being held in London, England. This preparation 
included lobbying support for a declaration against apartheid in sport and an easing of 
hostility  towards New Zealand from non-white Commonwealth countries. On July  30, 
1976, Prime Minister Trudeau met with Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal. 
The memorandum regarding their discussion has been removed from its External 
Affairs file. This file was originally  closed, and, when it was opened through an Access 
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to Information request, this document was withheld from the public.44 This leaves the 
reader wondering what Trudeau and Ramphal discussed. Why  is it still important for 
the record of this conversation to remain closed, more than 30 years after the fact?
Abraham Ordia issued a press statement in November 1976 noting that the SCSA!s 
concern was now focused on the upcoming All-African Games and the Commonwealth 
Games in Edmonton. In regards to the Commonwealth Games Ordia questioned: "Will 
New Zealand be taking part in the Games while maintaining sporting relations with 
Apartheid South Africa?!45  And, he notes, that Bill Young, a vice-president of the 
Commonwealth Games Federation, was quoted as saying "“Africans were not missed 
in Montréal and would not be missed in Edmonton. If the Africans wish to withdraw, it!s 
entirely  their business, the Games will go on. Eleven White nations founded the Games 
45 years ago and they  will compete in Edmonton.”!46 By  quoting Young!s statement, 
Ordia preyed on the fears of Trudeau and other Commonwealth political figures. An all-
white Games would have disastrous repercussions on the Commonwealth as a whole; 
the boycott threat was real and had plagued other host cities throughout the 1970s. 
Finally, Ordia points out:
In Canada, Australia and Great Britain, although a few sports associations 
and clubs still continue to compete with South Africa, the Governments of 
these countries are publicly  opposed to such exchanges and make their 
views well known to the associations and clubs involved. The New Zealand 
Government, in contrast, defiantly  and openly  aid and support such 
sporting exchanges. This is why we make a clear difference between New 
Zealand and other countries. That is why  we shall continue to boycott all 
competitions, Championships or Games in which New Zealand, individually 
or collectively, are also to feature.47
The SCSA took exception to the Muldoon government!s policy. Canada, Australia and 
Great Britain, by this time, had all adopted the policy  of discouraging sports contact 
with South Africa. Canada also refused financial assistance and funding for events 
taking place in South Africa and events taking place in Canada in which South African 
athletes were invited. Although the African nations would have preferred a complete 
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boycott of South Africa, they  accepted the public admonishment of South African 
sporting contact by the governments of Canada, Australia and Great Britain.
South Africa itself reacted to the boycott in a most unexpected way. In 1976, after the 
Olympics, the government announced further changes in its sport policy that enhanced 
existing multinational sport policies. The Canadian daily, the Globe and Mail, reported 
that integrated teams would be able to represent South Africa abroad and compete 
against each other within South Africa.48 Sam Ramsamy  indicates that "the eight-point 
plan defined the parameters within which mixed sport would henceforth be permissible. 
It provided for mixed race events or leagues to be arranged by “umbrella” sports bodies 
at national or provincial level, but only under certain specified circumstances.!49 
With this change in policy, Vincent Tshabalala, a black golfer, became the first black 
athlete to receive the Springbok colours and an Indian from Rhodesia, I. Ramabhai, 
was allowed to play  squash in the South African Open championships.50 According to 
Booth, multinational sport!s extension to the club level "...marked an ideological turning 
point. Rather than portraying mixed sport as synonymous with racial conflict, the state 
claimed that it would ease racial conflict.!51 Again, like the initial change to multinational 
sport, the government of South Africa hoped that these amendments would make 
apartheid in sport more palatable to international sports organisations. The 
government!s main concern was that integration should occur through white sporting 
federations, not through existing multiracial federations with links to SACOS.52 Guelke 
notes that SACOS was an unequivocal supporter of the international sports boycott of 
South Africa and "its policy  was that even SACOS affiliates achieving international 
recognition should not participate in international sport until apartheid itself was 
dismantled.!53 Booth explains that for SACOS "...there was a greater appreciation that 
sport did not transcend politics and that black people would continue to experience 
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discrimination in sport while they  suffered mass unemployment and poor living 
conditions, inadequate health services and transport, housing shortages, inferior 
education and subsistence wages.!54 However, most countries saw these moves as 
tokenism and blatant attempts to seek reinstatement into international sporting 
organisations; there were no real changes in the policy  - apartheid was still vigorously 
applied to sport.
The final legacy  to be addressed is that of the Toronto Paralympiad. As noted, the 
Olympiad for the Disabled went ahead, as planned with South African participation, in 
August 1976. Although Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was an official patron of the 
Paralympiad, it does not appear that he withdrew his patronage after the funding 
debacle, but he did not attend any  of the Games. Minister for Health and Welfare, 
Lalonde, tried to recoup the $50,000 advance the federal government gave to the 
Olympiad!s organising committee. The committee refused to return the money, so Paul 
Woodstock, Assistant Deputy  Minister, Fitness and Amateur Sport, requested a legal 
opinion from the Legal Services department of the federal government on recovery  of 
the $50,000 advance. As the money  was approved and the contract signed between 
the federal government and the Olympiad, prior to July  1975, there was little hope of 
recouping the money. According to Robert F. Lee, Director of Legal Services, the only 
hope of making a case was the facet that Jackson had sent a letter to the Minister, 
Lalonde, indicating that he 
...had accepted the Government!s posture regarding South African 
participation and would proceed to inform the South African organizers that 
they would be unable to participate. ... It may be that the subsequent 
breach of this undertaking would disqualify the 1976 Olympiad from 
receiving the $450,000 which they might have otherwise obtained. It may 
also well be that the 1976 Olympiad may be entitled to keep the $50,000 
already  forwarded to them since the Minister in his letter of June 4, 1976, 
officially advises Dr. Jackson that the Olympiad is no longer eligible for 
financial assistance from the Government of Canada.55
It remained possible that if the government tried to sue the Committee for the $50,000 
they wanted returned, the Committee would counter-sue for the remaining $450,000 
that had been promised to them in the contract. In September 1976, after further 
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investigations, Legal Services lets Woodstock know  that, based on an opinion from  the 
government!s Justice Regional Director of Toronto, "there was no legal condition upon 
which the $50,000 was made ... the breach of which the Crown could recover upon.!56 
Due to the unclear policies and the lack of publicity  and appropriate dissemination of 
information surrounding Canada!s decision to withhold funds from events with South 
African participants, the federal government could not force the Committee to refund 
the $50,000 advance. The government ended up allocating the $450,000 that would 
have gone to the Olympiad to "extending additional support to sport for the 
handicapped! in Canada.57 This was a key  move as the government had been accused 
of discrimination against disabled athletes; the donation would go a long way  in 
repairing the government!s reputation in the eyes of disabled athletes and 
organisations.
Preparing for London and Gleneagles
Canada had a long, tactical road ahead; it was the nation!s goal to prevent another 
boycott. According to Macintosh, Greenhorn and Black, by December 1976, 
government officials had prepared recommendations for Prime Minister Trudeau, which 
included: "urging the New Zealand High Commissioner to impress upon his government 
the necessity  of meeting with SCSA President Ordia; requesting the personal 
assistance of leaders of key  Commonwealth countries; and sending a special emissary 
to appropriate countries to seek a solution to the problem.!58  The government of 
Canada took on the major responsibility  of tackling this issue. As the host of the 
Olympic Games which fell victim to an African boycott and as the upcoming host of the 
1978 Commonwealth Games, Canada was in a unique and important leadership 
position. According to  Baka and Hoy "Canada!s involvement in this controversial matter 
has been to attempt to discourage a planned boycott of the 1978 Games by many of 
the disgruntled black member nations. As host of the upcoming festival, Canada does 
not want a repeat of the African boycott which plagued the 1976 Olympic Games.'59 
Finding a solution to the boycott threat became a key foreign policy  task for the 
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government over the next two years. Mihir Bose explains that Canada was held in high 
esteem by  black Commonwealth members and felt that "something must be done to 
prevent the Games from being disrupted.!60 Canada had a sense of moral responsibility 
to ensure the Games were a success for all Commonwealth members and, more 
importantly, the Canadians did not want to fall victim to a second major sport boycott in 
two years.
Sir Keith Holyoake, Minister of State for New  Zealand, in September 1976, travelled to 
New York City to explain New Zealand!s position regarding sports contact with South 
Africa to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. He was there in an effort to repair 
the damage caused by  the Olympic boycott and made a "scathing! attack against 
apartheid, informing the General Assembly  that his government would remind New 
Zealand sports bodies of relevant UN resolutions on apartheid.61  The New Zealand 
government was in damage control; it had quickly  become a pariah in international 
sport. New Zealand had established a reputation for being a racially  tolerant country; its 
treatment of its native population, the Maoris, was progressive. Yet, now they  were 
closely  associated with South Africa!s apartheid regime and showed, despite their 
protests to the contrary, implicit support of apartheid through its sporting contacts. 
Despite Holyoake!s trip, Professor Cecil Abrahams, the Canadian representative of 
SAN-ROC, said that "pressure will be intensified to keep New Zealand out of the 1978 
Games! and pointed out that South Africa!s changes in its apartheid sport policy  were a 
hoax and attempt to fool the world into thinking changes had occurred.62 
In a letter dated December 15, 1976, Prime Minister Muldoon, in response to Jean-
Claude Ganga, lays out his country!s current policy  in regards to apartheid South Africa 
and sport. In conciliatory tones he writes:
The New Zealand Government deplores the selection of any  sports team, 
from South Africa or anywhere else, on a basis of racial discrimination. We 
have therefore said publicly  that we do not welcome, encourage, or give 
recognition to exchanges with teams selected on the basis of apartheid. ... 
Sporting bodies in New Zealand have traditionally  be autonomous 
organisations wholly  free from Government control. ... During the last few 
months there has been a significant change in attitudes of New Zealanders 
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towards sporting contacts with South Africa. This has been reflected in a 
series of decisions taken by sporting bodies themselves. On 29 November 
the New Zealand Lawn Tennis Association announced that it was 
withdrawing the invitation it has previously  issued for the 1978 Federation 
Cup competition for international women!s tennis to be held in New Zealand 
if it could not be held in Australia. On 3 December, the New Zealand Rugby 
Football Union, the largest sporting organisation in this country, announced 
that it had declined an invitation to send a representative Maori team to 
South Africa in 1978. Other sporting bodies in this country have cancelled 
planned exchanges with South Africa. Public opinion in this country  has in 
fact moved to the point where I believe there will be no more significant 
contacts with racially selected teams from South Africa.63
Muldoon explicitly  states that his government does not support sporting exchanges with 
teams selected on the basis of apartheid. In an attempt to calm things down and 
appease the OAU and the SCSA, Muldoon reaffirmed that sports organisations are 
autonomous in New Zealand, but, at the same time, highlights that although they  are 
autonomous and free to associate with any  country they  choose, his government does 
not support racial discrimination in sport. It was hoped that such a statement from New 
Zealand would prevent a Commonwealth Games boycott.
In January  1977, Allan MacEachen, in a memorandum to Trudeau, laid out Canada!s 
current sport policy with South Africa versus New Zealand!s:
Canada will not give financial or moral support to Canadian teams who 
wish to travel to South Africa, or to Canadian sport bodies who wish to 
invite South African teams to compete in Canada. ... The New Zealand 
Government has no sport funding policy; therefore, no means of denying 
financial support. ... The difference between our policies is therefore that 
while we explicitly  deny financial support, New Zealand has none to deny. 
Also, we are willing to criticize contacts, while the New Zealand 
Government is only willing to advise against them if their opinion is asked 
by  sport bodies. ... Canadian policies have not been summed up in a public 
statement since this controversy  began. As several Canadian sports 
federations are known to be contemplating contacts with South Africa within 
the next two years, I believe that the Government should publicly voice its 
opposition to all such contacts as soon as possible.64
In his analysis from External Affairs, MacEachen points out that it is important for the 
Government to clearly  state what its policies are and how they  differ from New 
Zealand. This remark was twofold in its importance. Firstly, Canada began a two-year 
term of the UN Security  Council "at a time when international pressure for stronger 
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action against apartheid was becoming increasingly  irresistible.!65 And, secondly, in the 
run up to the Commonwealth Games Canada needed to distance itself from New 
Zealand and anything the two countries had in common in terms of their policies 
regarding apartheid sport.
In January  1977, the Cultural Affairs Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth  (FCO) 
Office undertook a similar comparison of Britain!s sport policies with South Africa. An 
FCO memorandum states:
New Zealand!s policies on sporting contacts with South Africa are not, in 
fact, much different from our own. In the last resort we cannot prohibit 
sporting bodies from making their own decision but we are careful not to 
highlight this. We also take every  opportunity  of publicly  deploring racialism 
in sport and discourage, at Ministerial level, sporting contacts with those 
who practice it. The New Zealand Prime Minister on the other hand, has 
chosen to emphasise the independence of New Zealand!s sporting bodies 
rather than these aspects of his Government!s policies which would be 
more acceptable to African Governments.66
The memo also points out that Canada sees the boycott threat as not only  a threat to 
the Commonwealth Games, but a threat to the Commonwealth itself; a concern shared 
by  Britain. The importance of a successful boycott-free Commonwealth Games was 
also important to British foreign policy.67 Another boycott by  non-white Commonwealth 
countries would have caused irreparable damage to the Commonwealth as a viable, 
multiracial institution. 
Also in January, a cable was sent to External Affairs in Ottawa reporting on a meeting 
of the Organization for African Unity  (OAU). According to the cable, the President of the 
SCSA, Abraham Ordia, called on delegates to find a solution to apartheid in sport 
through unity, not recrimination. To the cable writer, Ordia inferred that the boycott 
decision in Montréal had been taken in haste and he wanted to avoid future similar 
situations.68  The writer of the telegram is confident that Ordia and Ganga are 
sympathetic to Canada!s views and that Ordia is determined to see the Commonwealth 
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Games succeed.69 Along these same lines, Ivan Head, wrote in a memo to Trudeau in 
preparation for an upcoming press conference, in early  February  1977, that in regards 
to the Commonwealth Games:
The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa has recommended to the OAU that 
the boycott against competitions with New Zealand athletic teams be 
suspended for the time being while a continuing close watch be made of 
New Zealand activities and attitudes with respect to apartheid. We are not 
yet out of the woods with respect to the Commonwealth Games but this is 
certainly a forward step, though not as complete as we should have liked. If 
asked, you could welcome the decision taken by  the SCSA and express 
your confidence that the Games will proceed, on the basis of 
correspondence which you understand has passed between Prime Minister 
Muldoon and the African body.70
Head was confident that the boycott could be prevented. News that he felt the Prime 
Minister could surely  report to the media in a press conference. Encouraging words 
from Muldoon and pressure from within made the SCSA reconsider its positions in 
regards to the boycott. Ironically, by  trying to isolate South Africa from international 
sport, African nations were also isolating themselves.
In response to his letter from late 1976, New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
was asked by  Ordia to make clear his country!s policy  on visas to sporting groups from 
South Africa. In a press statement which included quotes from his letter of response, 
Muldoon reiterated and elaborated on his previous letter to the SCSA - sport 
organisations in New Zealand were multiracial and that they  were "...autonomous 
organisations wholly  free from Government control and do not depend on Government 
for financial support. It is the Government!s policy not to interfere in their affairs. The 
Government does not therefore seek to dictate to New Zealand sports bodies what 
teams they should or should not play against. It does, however, deplore the selection of 
any team in any  country  on a basis other than merit.!71 Muldoon clarified that his 
government would not change its stance - non-interference in sport was an important 
aspect of his election campaign and the government was unwilling to bend to appease 
political forces outside of New Zealand. Non-interference in sport had been a standard 
policy  of most New Zealand governments, starting in 1960 when Prime Minister Walter 
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Nash indicated that, although the government was opposed to racial discrimination, it 
would not prevent or interfere with the Rugby  Union!s right to proceed with an All 
Blacks tour of South Africa.72 Muldoon!s government continued along the same lines by 
refusing to interfere with the Rugby  Union!s actions. His government would also not 
prevent its athletes from traveling abroad nor would they  put visa restrictions on South 
African athletes traveling to New Zealand.
By March 1977, the OAU was, again, calling for a boycott of the Commonwealth 
Games. The Star reported "The African boycott of sports events involving New Zealand 
will be widened to include any  country  maintaining sports links with South Africa...!73 
Canada, responsible for hosting the upcoming Commonwealth Games, was obviously 
concerned. In a cable to External Affairs in Ottawa a press release from the OAU 
Secretariat noted with concern continuing sports contact with apartheid South Africa by 
countries and international sport organisations and, building on the successful boycott 
of 1976, passed a resolution calling on OAU members, throughout 1977 and 1978, to 
refrain from participating in any  sporting events which include athletes from New 
Zealand or any other country  maintaining sporting ties with New Zealand.74 The calls 
for a boycott were back on. According to the OAU, there had been no discernible 
change in New Zealand!s policy; the country  still maintained sporting contacts with 
South Africa. 
In a further conversation with Ordia, according to a cable to Ottawa, the "cause of the 
strong OAU resolution was continuing erosion of New Zealand!s credibility.!75 Ordia 
also told the telegram writer:
that if New Zealand were to take demonstrable steps to terminate all 
sporting links with Republic of South Africa then he and OAU Secretary 
General would be in position to set in motion lifting of boycott. This he 
considered could be achieved by  obtaining clearance of OAU chairman and 
without need for further OAU deliberation. However, when it came to what 
would constitute demonstrable action on New Zealand!s part he would go 
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no/no further than say it would have to be unequivocable [sic] statement in 
public which he doubted Muldoon would give.76
Although Ordia felt that steps had been taken by  New Zealand to ease the situation, 
the OAU had taken a hard line in response to Muldoon!s February  letter and New 
Zealand!s continually providing of visas to South African athletes. 
Trudeau, the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, and Commonwealth Secretariat, 
Shridath Ramphal, went about finding a solution that would appease the OAU and 
Muldoon. A memo from M.F. Daly in the Cultural Relations Department of the FCO, 
dated March 1977, states:
John Noble of the Canadian High Commission came to meet me at his 
request yesterday. His main purpose was to emphasise the importance the 
Canadians attach to seeing that the Commonwealth Games went off 
smoothly; they  would coincide with Federal elections and the government 
were particularly anxious not to have any  trouble in Alberta. I said we 
shared the Canadians concern.77
Along with trying to prevent a poor showing at the Commonwealth Games, it appears 
that the Canadian government was also concerned with the upcoming elections. 
Alberta, noted in the memo, is historically  not a strong supporter of the Liberal Party  of 
Canada. Ensuring that the Edmonton Commonwealth Games went off without a hitch 
would be important to Alberta voters. The memo also touches upon both Canada!s and 
Britain!s policies towards apartheid sport:
We agreed that our own policies were very  similar and that although it was 
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the attendance of South Africans and 
other possible undesirables at sporting contests, our policies of reiterating 
our advice to sporting bodies not to give encouragement to contacts with 
teams selected on a basis of racial discrimination was acceptable to the 
Africans. We agreed that it was singularly unfortunate that Mr Muldoon did 
not seem prepared to use a similar form of words.78
Both Daly  and Noble agreed that the situation surrounding the upcoming CHOGM and 
the Commonwealth Games boycott was worsening. The governments began to 
redouble their efforts to ensure the cancellation of a boycott and a satisfactory  solution 
for all parties involved.
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According to Macintosh, Greenhorn and Black, the government of Canada supported 
the suggestion of the British Sport Minister, Dennis Howell, to create a statement of 
principles that would be strong enough to placate African nations but would allow  New 
Zealand to feel comfortable signing the document. Commonwealth Secretariat 
Ramphal would draft the statement; he would also be responsible for selling the idea to 
other Commonwealth nations.79
Within Canada itself, Trudeau was feeling pressure to ensure that the Edmonton 
Commonwealth Games would not face a boycott. On March 10, 1977, Member of 
Parliament for Edmonton-Strathcona, Douglas Roche, asked Secretary  of State for 
External Affairs Jamieson what steps the government was taking to ensure that African 
Commonwealth countries would not boycott the Games. Despite having formulated a 
plan to help avoid a boycott, the Canadian government evaded answering Roche!s 
question. Jamieson noted that he did not want to be too specific; simply  indicating that 
there were a number of efforts taking place to ensure maximum support from 
Commonwealth nations.80
In reply  to the letter, in July  1977, the President the Sports Federation of Canada, 
Maureen O!Bryan, wrote an opinion piece in the organisation!s newsletter Coast to 
Coast Sport. O!Bryan complained that the government  should not dictate who can play 
with whom and under what conditions:
...I believe this approach to be an extremely  dangerous intrusion of 
government in the right of sports governing bodies to order and develop 
their national and international affairs. ... The policy  on sports isolation with 
South Africa is discriminatory  in that it uses the highly  visible, human 
contact of sport as the striking weapon when the much more pervasive and 
infinitely  more profitable questions of trade relations are left untouched. ... 
Most sports have little contact with South Africa - largely  because their 
federations have insisted that it desegregate its teams. Canadian sports 
that do continue to play  and interact must be allowed to do so, even if we 
have to suffer sanctions from those nations who would use the 
Commonwealth Games as a forum for their own political beliefs.81
172
79 Macintosh, Greenhorn, Black, "Canadian Diplomacy!, p. 39.
80 March 10, 1977. House of Commons Debates Official Report, 2nd Session, 30th Parliament, Volume IV, 
1977 (Ottawa: Queen!s Printer for Canada), p. 3842.
81 YMCA Fonds. MG28 I95, Volume 322, File 11; International Development South Africa 1976-1983 - July 
6, 1977.
It is O!Bryan!s opinion that the federal government should not be interfering in the 
policies of Canada!s sports bodies and agencies. In a rebuttal letter, former Olympian 
Bruce Kidd pointed out that due to pressure from individuals and lobby groups the 
government:
...is now asking that in situations where athletes are heavily  subsidized and 
are universally  considered as national representatives - i.e. in international 
competition - the athletes conduct themselves in accordance with national 
policy. If a sports federation is opposed to government policy, it has the 
option of declining the conditional grants and going it alone.82
In response to O!Bryan!s assertion that sanctions do not work, Kidd pointedly  asked 
"Why  have the only  attempts at liberalization of apartheid sport in South Africa closely 
followed significant steps in the spread of the boycott?!83 Kidd made strong arguments 
against O!Bryan!s opinion. O!Bryan was advocating a the complete separation of 
politics and sport; Kidd an anti-apartheid activist and supporter of SAN-ROC in 
Canada, often wrote letters to explain the situation and brought individuals to task on 
the continuation of sporting links with South Africa.
In late March 1977, Jamieson, supported by  Iona Campagnolo, Minister for Sport, 
outlined in a memo to Trudeau three ways in which to strengthen Canada!s apartheid 
sport policies. The options were: refuse visas to South African teams; withdrawal of 
federal support, not just for a specific event, but from activities of the offending 
federation or sports body; public criticism, in the form of press releases, government 
statements, for every  instance of sport contact with South Africa which the policy  fails 
to prevent.84 Jamieson and Campagnolo supported option number three. A response 
from Trudeau!s secretary, Mary  Macdonald, noted that Trudeau supports option three 
with the possibility  of looking at option two sometime in the future, if necessary.85 In 
their memo, the two ministers also include a draft of a strongly  worded letter that they 
propose be sent to national sport governing bodies; Trudeau also agreed with the draft 
and the letter was sent May  11, 1977.86 The Toronto Star, on April 1, 1977, concludes 
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that Ottawa is faced with three options "To go ahead with the Games in the face of a 
boycott by  black Commonwealth governments; to refuse to let New Zealand take part; 
or to call off the Games.!87 It was important to the federal government that they take a 
hard line against apartheid and sport and that they  make these policies very visible to 
the public.
The CHOGM was taking place in early June 1977 in London. On May  25, 1977 
Trudeau received a memo from the High Commissioner of Britain, J.B. Johnston. The 
memo included a personal message from Prime Minister James Callaghan. He invited 
Trudeau and his wife to join him and his wife at Gleneagles, Scotland: "We shall have 
the whole of Gleneagles at our disposal, and the intention is that Heads of Delegation, 
Secretary  General and our wives should spend two days together without our 
colleagues or official advisors.!88 Callaghan goes on to state that the weekend will 
provide the heads of government some privacy  to discuss items on the official agenda 
in an informal atmosphere. This is reiterated in a memo from High Commissioner 
Johnston to Ivan Head on May 26, 1977:
Lord Thomson!s impression from his discussion with African and Caribbean 
Governments was that although they  feel strongly  on this issues, and are 
determined to press for some movement from New Zealand, they  are not 
seeking a noisy confrontation at the meeting, and would be glad to see the 
matter disposed of before or in the margins of the formal sessions and the 
result recorded in the communiqué. ... Mr Callaghan feels that a 
compromise in respect of sporting contacts will be difficult to achieve if 
Heads of Government tackle the subject in a high key in the formal 
sessions. For this reason, although he accepts that there will be strong 
statements, he would like to achieve general agreement in advance that the 
way  should be left clear for negotiation outside the formal sessions, 
preferably at Gleneagles.89
By offering an informal session to discuss apartheid sporting contacts, Britain, Canada 
and the Commonwealth Secretariat hoped to find a solution to the potential boycott of 
sporting events by  African nations, most specifically  the imminent Commonwealth 
Games. This was conveyed by  Fernand E. LeBlanc, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs on June 6, 1977. Roche addressed the House of 
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Commons to voice his opinion that Canada had not "exerted enough muscle!  to prevent 
a boycott; he felt the country  had been too timid and should have acted sooner to stop 
the boycott threat. Roche felt particularly  strongly  that Canada should have 
admonished Muldoon of New Zealand when Muldoon noted that the Commonwealth 
Games were not sufficiently  important to stop New Zealand teams from touring South 
Africa.90 LeBlanc assured Roche and Parliament that the government was concerned 
about the current situation and wanted to ensure that there were representatives from 
all members of the Commonwealth in attendance at the Games. In terms of a solution, 
LeBlanc did reveal:
What we envisage is a statement by  all heads of government reaffirming 
their opposition to the practice of apartheid in sport and to contacts with 
South Africa by  Commonwealth sports bodies and individuals. The 
Secretary  General has been charged with finding a suitable formula for 
discussion, and the exact content of the statement will no doubt be a matter 
for debate among heads of government.91
Private deliberations and discussions would allow countries to make concessions 
without feeling like they  were in the spotlight or that they  appeared to have folded 
under pressure. However, LeBlanc did not share this information with the Canadian 
House of Commons. The negotiations would be tenuous and the Canadian government 
wanted to tread lightly  to appease African nations and to ensure that New  Zealand did 
not feel pressured. This was most important in the case of Prime Minister Muldoon 
who, in the run up to the CHOGM, felt backed into a corner and put on the defensive.
The 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
In the run up to the meeting, several senior Commonwealth nations began to make 
provisions to adopt an agreement regarding Commonwealth principles about apartheid 
in sport. It was hoped that such an agreement would avoid further boycotts by  African 
and Asian countries; most specifically, an imminent boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth 
Games. During the conference, Canada had more at stake than its stated foreign policy 
as an honest broker in the Commonwealth, the 1978 Games were being held in 
Edmonton and Canada had a vested interest in preventing another boycott of a major 
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sporting event held within its borders. A repeat of the boycott at the 1976 Olympics 
inspired Canada to push for a Commonwealth compromise. 
The main goal was to appease New Zealand!s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. 
According to Anthony  Payne, Secretary-General Shridath "Sonny! Ramphal felt there 
were two problems facing the Commonwealth: the human rights situation in Uganda 
under General Idi Amin and New Zealand!s sporting contacts with South Africa. Payne 
writes: 
Muldoon was, in effect, brought before his fellow  heads of government at 
the July  1977 summit in the most demeaning fashion. ... The association 
[sporting contact with South Africa] was highly  embarrassing to New 
Zealand and served to underline the seriousness with which Ramphal 
intended to force the Commonwealth to find a practical way of translating 
its rhetorical opposition to apartheid into a common policy  on the matter of 
sporting contacts with South Africa.92
Senior white Commonwealth nations, Canada, Britain and Australia, along with 
Ramphal obtained consensus among non-white Commonwealth nations to discuss the 
proposed statement outside of the formal meetings being held in London. Malcolm 
Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister at the meeting, notes that when the leaders 
arrived at Gleneagles, Muldoon and the African states could not have been further 
apart on the issue of sporting contacts with South Africa.93  Having the meetings in 
private provided for a non-confrontational, informal atmosphere in which to hash out 
the important points that needed to be included in the statement to settle tensions.  In a 
speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society  in Toronto in 1974, as Secretary  of State 
for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, touched upon the importance of the 
Commonwealth, politics and candor:
...when political questions arise, they are approached in a manner that 
enables members to accept different positions, to identify  the common 
elements in them, to determine whether they are amenable to 
Commonwealth treatment, and then to move forward from this agreed basis 
to a solution or an amelioration of the problem. The stress increasingly  is on 
practical collaboration and co-operation, and the avoidance of futile political 
altercations. ... The association provides, through its evolution, a unique 
forum where members discuss and exchange views in complete candour 
and informality, on a basis of full equality. The practice of understanding 
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differences and resolving problems, of seeking constructive solutions by 
agreement rather than by  voting, brings members together, rather than 
dividing them; this cohesion reinforces Commonwealth endeavour and 
makes co-operation easier.94
The Trudeau government!s rhetoric in the 1970s called upon the Commonwealth to 
reach consensus to solve problems. This feeling is echoed by  Fraser, who in his 
memoirs explains that one of the strengths of the Commonwealth summits was that 
much of the business was conducted during retreats where heads of government got to 
know each other. They  "left behind their staff, their public relations operators and their 
advisers, and met face to face for long discussions.!95 This openness and camaraderie 
was unique to the Commonwealth and allowed the association to make decisions via 
consensus while trying to avoid acrimony. Canada was pro-active in finding solutions 
and working behind the scenes to gain consensus for solutions that were beneficial to 
Canada and the Commonwealth as a whole. Although not a great supporter of the 
Commonwealth when he became Prime Minister, Trudeau realised its inherent value 
and worked hard to ensure it continued as a progressive organisation, making 
decisions that benefited all member countries.
According to a memorandum, June 7, 1977, from Ivan Head:
Chona [Personal Assistant to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia] and 
Gordon Wells (Permanent Secretary, PMO, Jamaica) both accept without 
qualification our strategy  that the sporting issue not be raised in any fashion 
by  anyone until the weekend. In order to guarantee this result and to 
strengthen the Chairman!s hand, Mr. Manley  tomorrow will move that the 
issue be entered on the agenda but under an item that will not be reached 
until Tuesday. If any  speaker attempts during the Southern African debate 
to allude to sporting contacts the Chairman will then be able to call him to 
order. I have spoken to each of the Secretary-General and to Sir John Hunt 
(Cabinet Secretary, Britain) and they support this ploy. Additionally, Mr. 
Anyaoku (Assistant Secretary-General) has confirmed to me that Nigeria 
will accept this strategy.96
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his team actively  pursued consensus and collusion 
from Commonwealth nations in the days preceding the start of the conference. 
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Therefore, several people were privy  to the plan, yet it was kept tightly  under wraps. On 
June 9, Trudeau and Head met with Prime Minister Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese Tufuga 
Efi and Attorney-General N. Slade of Western Samoa to discuss the conference.97 The 
transcript of the conversation reveals a frank, candid interaction:
Efi: I came to question you on sporting ties - to pick your brains.
Trudeau: That!s what the Commonwealth is all about. Our tactics [sic] to 
wait for the weekend. Muldoon feels he!s a target. It!s important he feel 
we!re well disposed. There!s not a great deal of difference between New 
Zealand and Canadian policies. I intend to speak to the Nigerians. It seems 
the problem is Muldoon!s manner. Canadian policy  is not to interfere or 
prevent Canadians from going to South Africa. Neither is it to prevent South 
Africa!s entry  to Canada. However, no financial support for such or for 
events, or to have government presence at such events. New Zealand 
instituted visas to control sport. Yet now the issuance of visas appears to be 
a positive acceptance of apartheid athletes.
Efi: I told Muldoon we won!t support him; it!s not a question of fashion, but 
of conviction. Muldoon!s language is not helpful to a settlement of the issue.
Trudeau: Yes, perhaps more style than substance. Is there any  chance to 
change, either of policy or his expression of it?
Efi: Our impression is that Muldoon is gearing for a scrap. He!s very 
provocative; but does he want to go down fighting, or is he looking for an 
out? Perhaps he could leave victoriously?98
In the absence of Muldoon, Commonwealth leaders felt free to talk about him and 
about why they  were protesting New Zealand!s sporting contact with South Africa. 
Canada, as a well-established ally of non-white Commonwealth members, was an 
important confidant for these countries. Trudeau often provided both insight and advice 
to these nations, thus increasing the bond. Although New Zealand!s policies were very 
similar to both Canada!s and Britain!s apartheid sports policies, African nations took 
exception to Muldoon and the way he defended New Zealand!s national policies. He 
very  rarely  spoke out against sporting contacts with South Africa and often defended 
New Zealand!s point of view by indicating he was voted into office on a policy  of non-
interference in sport.
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It was a tough battle for Commonwealth members. Trevor Richards reports that as 
Muldoon "stepped off the plane in London he announced: “I certainly  am not going to 
compromise the Government!s standards on the freedom of the individual to get a 
black athlete to Edmonton.”99  Tough talk, but the rest of the Commonwealth had 
prepared itself well for what was required.!100 Muldoon!s hostile rhetoric would come 
face-to-face with the rest of the Commonwealth; an association which had been 
working for weeks, behind Muldoon!s back, on a statement that would, hopefully, ease 
hostilities between New Zealand and non-white members. 
It fell to Jamaica!s Prime Minister, Michael Manley, to pass along the message to 
Muldoon that the Commonwealth needed a declaration on apartheid in sport. Richards 
points out that Muldoon was not pleased with what he was told.101  However, the 
Commonwealth nations had out-maneouvered the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
everything was in place and everyone was on side with the plan to adopt a declaration 
during the weekend!s hiatus from the official conference in London. Anthony Payne 
notes that "Muldoon!s isolation was obvious, but discussions were not acrimonious. 
There was an understanding that Muldoon had to be helped out of the predicament in 
which he found himself and that the best way  forward was to draw a curtain as much 
as possible over the events of the past, notably  the controversial All Blacks tour of a 
year earlier.!102
As previously  stated, the weekend at Gleneagles was touted as an opportunity for 
heads of delegations to discuss topics in an informal atmosphere, therefore, there are 
no official minutes of any  of the meetings which took place at Gleneagles. According to 
a memo from the Cultural Relations Department in Britain, the text of the agreement 
was drafted by  "Canada, New Zealand and certain African and Caribbean countries and 
the UK was not closely  involved in its drafting.!103 In remarks to the press on June 13, 
1977, Trudeau answered questions about the agreement:
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Q: Prime Minister, could you tell us the details of the agreement reached 
among the Commonwealth Leaders to head off a threatened African 
boycott of the Games?
A: I couldn!t give you any  details: we worked rather extensively  in little 
groups both Saturday and Sunday  to arrive at a text which so far as I know 
is acceptable to Canada and so far as I know is acceptable to the main 
players. But it still has to be shown to various people for modifications put 
in so that all Heads of Government are given a chance to see if they agree 
on it and if they  do which I hope they  will, well, we will see it in the final 
communiqué. But the details I would rather just ask you to wait until you 
see the communiqué.
Q: Can you tell us essentially  if it amounts to a condemnation of sporting 
links with apartheid countries?
A: Well it depends on what you mean by  links. It!s something you could 
best describe I suppose as something not very  different from what Canada 
is actually  doing. So from that you could assume what!s (inaudible). It is 
linked to specific condemnation of apartheid in general and it applies to 
sports the general kind of principles that Canada has.104
Trudeau did not reveal any information regarding the agreement in advance of its 
publication. Importantly, he was also hesitant to state that the agreement was an 
outright condemnation of apartheid in sport. But, according to Bruce Kidd, "...the 
Canadian Government, which had committed some $18 million to the capital and 
operating costs of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and did not wish to 
play  host to a white-only  Games, took the lead in persuading the other dominions to 
accept this new obligation.!105 The delicate foreign policy  taking place at the Heads of 
Government Meeting would continue long after the Gleneagles Agreement was signed 
and published. Gustafson elucidates: "After discussion and agreement on the main 
points to be included in the agreement, Ramphal, with the help of officials in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, prepared a draft which was then amended to meet the 
views of Pierre Trudeau of Canada, Michael Manley  of Jamaica, and Muldoon.!106 It 
was key  to the success of the agreement that the wording of the document pleased 
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both the African Commonwealth nations and New Zealand. Also, it was necessary  that 
Muldoon and New Zealand did not come out of the agreement looking guilty  of racism 
and that African nations did not appear to be soft on New Zealand!s sports contact with 
South Africa. 
There was some limited mention of the agreement in the final communiqué of the 
conference, otherwise, the only  official acknowledgment of the statement was its 
release on June 15, 1977.107 The agreement was a form of soft diplomacy; Mihir Bose 
points out that "Strictly  speaking Gleneagles was neither an agreement nor a 
declaration, and nobody signed anything. It was a press statement endorsed by  the 
Commonwealth leaders.!108 The Globe and Mail reported that, with the adoption of the 
agreement, the curtain of isolation was drawn more tightly around South Africa.109 The 
Gleneagles Agreement was purposely  vague and did not force any  Commonwealth 
nation to cease sporting contact with racist regimes. It was the "urgent duty! of every 
Commonwealth nation to combat apartheid in sport, but how they  chose to fight it, was 
up to the individual country.
Canada and other senior Commonwealth nations were able to produce a statement 
that satisfied both non-white Commonwealth members and New Zealand. According to 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal "...it was a conference which I believe got 
down to business in greater detail and substance than many  that went before it.!110 Like 
many of the Commonwealth Conferences which preceded it, the 1977 conference was 
successful in that group was able to avoid the threat of its break-up. Although the 
Commonwealth was touted as an association of independent nations able to come 
together to make thoughtful decisions and build consensus, it often faced the threat of 
break-up, mainly  due to the differences between white, established nations and newer, 
non-white nations.
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CHAPTER 8: The Edmonton Commonwealth 
Games
Reaction to the Agreement & the Agreement in Action
In regards to the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977, Adrian Guelke states: "In practice, the 
effectiveness of the Gleneagles Agreement depended on the willingness of government 
to override the autonomy  of sporting bodies. This was to vary, but the Agreement was, 
nonetheless, a serious blow  to South African participation in international sport.!1 It was 
up to every  Commonwealth nation to ensure that the Gleneagles Agreement was being 
respected within its borders and by  its citizens. As Booth points out, "...the interpretation 
of the agreement and the machinery available to governments to control their sports 
people varied from country  to country.!2 Secretary-General Shridath took responsibility 
for monitoring the Agreement in action over the year that preceded the Commonwealth 
Games in Edmonton.
In a memo from the Department of External Affairs to Prime Minister Trudeau it is 
revealed that Trudeau had sent telegrams to Francophone African colleagues after the 
Gleneagles Agreement was signed and before the OAU meeting in Libreville in July 
1977. According to the memo:
The OAU decided to amend the resolution passed in Lomé in February 
which made the boycott against New Zealand definite and comprehensive. 
It appears that they considered in retrospect that the far-ranging boycott 
provisions then enacted would, if applied, have little use in achieving their 
purpose of isolating South Africa -- rather it would isolate Africa from most 
significant competition. The Liberville [sic] resolution calls for a boycott of 
any individual national sports federation which maintains sporting links with 
South Africa, instead of a boycott of whole nations. As explained to us by 
Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, this 
could mean that some events in the Commonwealth Games might be 
boycotted, without implying a boycott of the entire Games. Ordia stressed 
that New Zealand still has to prove her good intentions by being seen to 
reduce contacts with South Africa. We are still assessing African reactions, 
but general indications are that the danger of a general boycott of the 
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Games has been lifted unless a very blatant example of contact between 
New Zealand and South Africa takes place hereafter.!3
It appeared that the Gleneagles Agreement was a successful tool in avoiding an African 
boycott of the Commonwealth Games. Interestingly, the OAU decided that a complete 
boycott would have negative effects on African sporting relations as a whole and would 
be detrimental as Africa was itself in danger of becoming isolated from international 
sport. 
Also in July, "...the New Zealand parliament gave its approval to a resolution supporting 
the Gleneagles Declaration and Prime Minister Muldoon issued a statement defining 
government sport policy, calling on all national sport bodies to adhere to the 
Declaration.!4 He also reiterated, however, that the final decision on whether or not to 
have sporting contact with South Africa would lie with individual sport bodies. "In 
making such a statement, Muldoon was giving a clear message that he did not truly 
support boycotting sporting contacts with South Africa, despite his signing of the 
Gleneagles Agreement.!5 As such, in August 1977, seven New Zealand rugby players 
accepted invitations to play  rugby  in South Africa.6  According to a memo from 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs to Trudeau, Muldoon expressed disappointment 
that the New Zealand Rugby Union passed on the invitation to the players who then 
accepted the opportunity, but there was nothing the government of New Zealand could 
do to prevent the players from travelling.7  At a time when all African nations and 
members of the Commonwealth were closely  watching New Zealand!s sporting 
contacts, rugby players flouted the Gleneagles Agreement and travelled to South Africa 
to participate in the rugby tour. Interestingly, the memo notes that, British players also 
participated in this tour. And, Richards points out, one Australian player also 
participated, despite protests from the Australian government.8 There was other contact 
between South Africa and New Zealand - Canadian External Affairs also noted that four 
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South African fishermen competed in the Bay of Island International Billfish Contest, 
taking place in New Zealand,  in March 1978.9
In an attempt to defuse the situation, in August 1977 the New Zealand High 
Commissioner to Ottawa, Dean J. Eyre, forwarded a cable from Muldoon to Trudeau!s 
office. The memo reiterated New Zealand!s commitment to the Gleneagles Agreement 
and quoted from Muldoon!s July  press conference. During the conference, Muldoon 
talked about his Government!s obligations under the Agreement and the steps they 
were taking to ensure the Agreement was followed:
In discharging its commitments under the Gleneagles Agreement and to 
assist national sporting bodies in making their decisions in this area, the 
Government proposes:
To make available to national sporting bodies through Minister of 
Recreation and Sport the official text of the Gleneagles Agreement
To offer guidance and counsel of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to any 
sporting organisation faced with a decision on whether to have sporting 
contact with a country  where sports are organised on the basis of race, 
colour or ethnic origin.
To make known the Government!s views and those of the Commonwealth 
Head of Government whenever it appears that such contacts are in 
contemplation by a New Zealand sporting organisation.10
In October 1977, when asked to evaluate the Gleneagles statement, with specific 
reference to individual New Zealand rugby  players travelling to South Africa for the 
rugby  tournament and the possibility  of other athletes following suit, Commonwealth 
Secretary-General Shridath stated:
It was always recognized, indeed it is implicit in the agreement itself, that 
there could be situations in which despite the best efforts of Commonwealth 
governments there would be contacts of one kind or another at the level of 
individuals. It was always understood that not all Commonwealth 
governments could exercise a measure of constraint, for example, through 
withholding passports. In a large measure, sportsmen who persist in 
individual contacts with South Africa are more misguided than evil. ... I 
believe that the Government of New  Zealand, like all other Commonwealth 
governments, has done what it undertook to do in relation to the cessation 
of sporting contacts. The fact that, despite those efforts, some players from 
New Zealand, and indeed other from some other Commonwealth countries, 
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over the heads and advice of their governments, have accepted invitations 
in their individual capacity  to go to South Africa, is to be deplored. But this 
does not represent an erosion of the Gleneagles agreement, and it does 
not in my view represent a threat to Commonwealth sport.11
Shridath implies that athletes who continue to play sport with South Africa have not 
truly  considered the ramifications of this contact. This is a surprisingly  patronising 
statement by  Shridath. By  stating that these athletes are misguided he implies that they 
are simply  ill-informed and that if they  had the correct information they  would choose 
not to participate in such sporting events. He also acknowledges that each 
Commonwealth government would support the agreement by means which were 
acceptable to each individual government. Many  Commonwealth governments, like 
Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia, were unwilling to deny  passports to their 
citizens and, therefore, restrict their freedom to travel. As such, the agreement could 
easily  be broken. However, Shridath did not think it undermined the agreement, as he 
felt, at that point, the signatories were living up to their obligations. 
In October 1977, Iona Campagnolo, Minister of State (Fitness and Amateur Sport) 
made a general statement in the House of Commons regarding sport in Canada. She 
made a point of reiterating Canada!s stance on South Africa: the government would not 
provide funds or moral support for the participation of Canadians in sporting events 
involving South Africa, either in Canada or the apartheid state:
The Gleneagles compromise, largely  spearheaded by  our Prime Minister 
(Mr. Trudeau), put Commonwealth leaders on record as being opposed to 
sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries 
and South Africa. This is a consistent policy  of this government, and not just 
something conjured up to keep next year!s Commonwealth!s [sic] Games at 
Edmonton on track.12
The Canadian government needed to ensure that every  individual athlete and sports 
body understood Canada!s current policy  on apartheid in sport. Unlike in the early 
1970s, when policy  was not as publicly  enunciated, the government undertook efforts 
to make clear its policy  regarding apartheid in sport. It wanted there to be no confusion 
regarding the policy  and no contravention of the policy  in the run-up to the 1978 
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Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Any  links with apartheid sport could have sparked 
another call for a boycott.
Also in October, Baka and David note, the President of the XI Commonwealth Games 
(Canada 1978) Foundation, Dr. Maury  Van Vliet, travelled to Africa on a five nation tour 
to discuss "...air charter travel arrangements for African athletes and to talk with African 
leaders.!13 This goodwill tour showed that Canada was an ally  for African nations, 
willing to help out wherever necessary. The Canadians wanted to ensure a successful 
Games and provided assistance to African participants, which would go a long way 
towards mending fences and helping prevent another boycott of a major sporting event 
hosted by Canada.
Interestingly, Bruce Kidd wrote to Campagnolo to protest about the inclusion of 
Canadian golfers in an event in the Philippines. Kidd questioned the government!s 
application of the Gleneagles Agreement explaining Canadian pro golfers competed in 
the World Golf Championship in Manila, which also included South African pro golfers 
as participants. Kidd believed this was a violation of UN resolutions against apartheid in 
sport. Also, he pointed out, that according to the Gleneagles Agreement, the Canadian 
government was obligated to use moral suasion to discourage Canadian participation 
in events involving South Africa.14 Kidd brought the government to task; he questioned 
why  the government did not speak out against Canada!s participation in the event. At 
the time of Kidd!s letter, however, policies regarding Canadian-South African sports 
contact in third party nations had not been clearly addressed. 
Another event which stirred the Canadian press occurred in November 1977, Canadian 
swimming coach, Deryk Snelling, was suspended for contravening FINA!s instruction 
that forbade members from "having anything to do with aquatic programs! in South 
Africa. Snelling conducted swimming clinics during his holiday  in South Africa over the 
summer and, due to this contact, the Canadian Amateur Swimming Association banned 
him for three months and he was dropped from the coaching staff of the 
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Commonwealth Games.15  This rigorous application of the Gleneagles Agreement 
provides an excellent example of how seriously  Canadian sports federations were 
viewing contact with South African sport in 1977. A seemingly  innocuous event proved 
disastrous for Snelling, and set an example for other sports federations in Canada.
The Gleneagles Agreement came at a key point in Commonwealth history; at a time 
when unity  within the Commonwealth was imperative, otherwise, there existed the real 
possibility  that the association would have disintegrated. James Callaghan, the British 
Prime Minister, felt that the Agreement "...prevented a serious rupture of the 
Commonwealth Games.!16  In 1978, Secretary  of State for External Affairs, Don 
Jamieson noted, that:
The Commonwealth is basically  a consultative rather than a negotiating 
forum, and works by  consensus; unlike the United Nations, there are no 
votes or vetoes, no ideological or geographical blocs. ... There is freedom 
to disagree; but, in a forum of long-standing friends and associates, 
disagreement can be without hostility, with tolerance and, above all, with a 
better understanding of the other point of view.17
It was imperative that the African Commonwealth nations and New Zealand felt that 
their voices were heard with regard to the boycott situation. This was able to happen 
through the frank, candid conversations which took place at Gleneagles and it also 
happened through understanding and a desire to ensure that the Commonwealth 
continued to succeed as an association.
Changes to Canadian Policies
In the year that preceded the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Canada made 
several changes to its South African foreign policies as international political pressure 
against apartheid increased. In 1977, the Trudeau government received letters and 
telexes of protest regarding the trial of the Pretoria 12, the death of Steve Biko, and the 
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banning of almost 20 organisations in South Africa.18  The communications were 
unique and individually  written by  each organisation, mostly  from trade unions, church 
groups and anti-apartheid organisations across the country, including: Manitoba Peace 
Council; Campbell River, Courtenay and District Labour Council; CCSA; Hamilton and 
District Labour Council; Canada United Autoworkers Union; United Electrical Radio and 
Machine Workers of America and the Central Canada Synod Lutheran Church of 
America.19  There was consistent pressure on the Trudeau government to make 
changes to its policies governing it relationship with South Africa. Canadian anti-
apartheid groups, trade unions, student unions, and churches increased their letter 
writing campaigns; a broader cross-section of Canadian society  was becoming 
engaged and involved in anti-apartheid groups and campaigns. As the 1970s 
progressed, the anti-apartheid movement in Canada was gaining strength and the 
government received increased correspondence, mostly  written protests, against South 
African apartheid policies and Canada!s South African foreign policy. 
Donald Jamieson, Secretary  of State for External Affairs, made a lengthy speech in the 
House of Commons on December 19, 1977 regarding Canada!s foreign policy. In his 
speech he revealed that Canada was phasing out all government-sponsored, 
commercial-support activities in South Africa. But, what did that mean exactly? 
According to Jamieson:
For example, we will as quickly  as possible withdraw our commercial 
counsellors from Johannesburg and close the office of the consulate 
general in that city. We will also withdraw our commercial officers from 
Cape Town. We will, of course, maintain our offices in Pretoria for normal 
business, because we do not feel that the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations at this time is advisable. We will wish to have an opportunity  to do 
what we can in order to impress upon the government of South Africa the 
necessity  for change. We also want to have an opportunity  to talk to 
respected leaders who are opposed to apartheid in South Africa.20
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In addition, Jamieson also announced the phasing out of commercial activities, the 
withdrawal of all Export Development Corporation (EDC) government support from 
transactions relating to South Africa, the requirement of non-immigrant visas from all 
residents of South Africa traveling to Canada, and the publication of a code of conduct 
and ethics for Canadian corporations doing business within South Africa.21  In 1974 
Britain introduced a similar Code of Practice, with the hope "...that economic contacts 
could be used to promote reform, first in the workplace and then leading to broader 
social and political change.!22  Extensive analysis of Canada!s new trade and 
investment policy  ensued and was revealed to be mostly  cosmetic in nature. For 
example, the announcement was "...at first interpreted as meaning that all commercial 
support facilities would be  discontinued....!23 Yet, a locally  appointed commissioner to 
the Canadian embassy  in Pretoria was available to answer trade questions, which 
meant that Canada-South Africa trade was still being promoted.24  Only  loans to 
importers ceased, therefore, ceasing commercial-support to activities from within in 
South Africa; insurance to exporters continued, therefore, continuing commercial-
support from within Canada.25 In an interview with the CBC, Pik Botha, South Africa!s 
Foreign Minister in 1977, told Barbara Frum that South Africa would not make changes, 
despite Canada!s own changes to its trading relationship with the republic. He also 
noted that Canada should stay out of South Africa!s internal politics, and that South 
Africa does not "hammer! Canada on topics like "Québec and the Red Indians.!26 Again, 
Canada!s comparison to South Africa in terms of the treatment of native populations is 
used to highlight similarities in policies of the respective governments of each country. 
By comparing Canada to South Africa, Botha attempts to legitimise his government!s 
apartheid policies. Botha!s interview was flippant and he left the impression that South 
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Africa would not be phased by  the changes, despite Canadian hopes that these 
changes would be a catalyst for change.
Basically, trade with South Africa changed very  little; the government simply  closed up 
shop on projects that were failing, losing money  or not being utilised. According to an 
assessment by  the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, "For 
reasons of political expediency  (Commonwealth games, larger potential markets in the 
rest of Africa, Canada!s participation in Namibia negotiations, etc.) the Cabinet decided 
that Jamieson should take a public stand on South Africa without effectively 
jeopordizing [sic] the interests of those with a stake in the status quo.!27 The Taskforce 
made an important connection between changes in Canada!s trade and economic 
policies and the upcoming Commonwealth Games. It shows how seriously  Canada 
was taking the threat of a boycott. Perceived changes in Canada!s South African 
foreign policy were key to maintaining its stance of being hard on apartheid.
Macintosh and Hawes reveals that Campagnolo played a part in pushing for changes 
in Canada!s South African economic policy. Concerned that Canada!s anti-apartheid 
policies were too focused on sport she lobbied the cabinet "...for parallel 
“compensatory” action against South Africa on the economic side. In particular, she 
called for the closing of all trade offices in South Africa to balance the contribution 
being made by  sport in opposing apartheid.! 28  Trudeau, importantly, "...supported 
Campagnolo!s argument in cabinet for fairness in distributing more broadly  sectoral 
responsibility  for opposing apartheid.!29 Spreading out Canada!s anti-apartheid actions 
gave more validity  to the Government!s stance and supported their rhetoric of 
abhorrence for apartheid. Economic changes, even cosmetic ones, were long overdue. 
These changes came at a key  time in Canadian history, during the country!s tenure on 
the UN Security  Council and preceding the Commonwealth Games. After Jamieson!s 
announcement regarding changes in Canada!s trade and investment policies with 
South Africa, the government received correspondence from around the world. The 
Jewish Labour Committee applauded the Trudeau government, as did Joe Saloo Jee, 
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the Canadian Representative of the ANC and Joan Bhabha of the CCSA.  The CCSA 
and the ANC hoped that Canada would expand these measures. For Bhabha, Canada 
should withdraw the Commonwealth Trade Preferences and
Canada must immediately  support the calls of the anti-apartheid people!s 
organizations, trade unions and all the national liberation movements of 
South Africa, the African National Congress, and halt all economic, 
diplomatic, cultural and sporting contacts with the apartheid regime. ... 
Canada must also support the General Assembly!s call for a mandatory 
economic embargo of the illegitimate racist regime.30
Canada also received praise from Trudeau!s long-time political ally, President Kaunda 
from Zambia. Kaunda received with joy  Canada!s decision to institute action on trade 
sanctions against South Africa; it was "...congrete [sic] testimony to your personal 
commitment and that of your government to the principles of human dignity  freedom 
and justice. I therefore want you to know how profoundly  we value this decision os [sic] 
historic significance and which is a good example to other nations.!31
For the most part, feedback received by  the government was positive; anti-apartheid 
organisations and NGOs approved of the changes in Canada!s economic and trade 
policy  for South Africa and even asked the government to make more changes. The 
Canadian Export Association, however, did not agree with the Trudeau government!s 
new policies.  K.C. Hendrick, Chairman of the Association, wrote in January  1978: 
"Canada should be in a position to trade openly  and freely  with all countries in the 
world. Such a policy  recognises the importance of trade to the Canadian economy  and 
the contribution which trade makes to international understanding and cooperation.!32
Iona Campagnolo announced to the House of Commons in April 1978 that Canadians 
were contributing $40 million to the Edmonton Commonwealth Games and she was 
very  pleased to see "...the very  great pleasure that Canadians from every  part of 
Canada take in sharing in those games.!33 Interestingly, for the Commonwealth Games, 
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the federal government lauded both their moral support and funding. Unlike the 
Montréal Olympic Games, which remained solely  the responsibility  of the governments 
of the City  of Montréal and the Province of Québec, the federal government was 
pleased to be associated with the Commonwealth Games. Even though there was 
more potential for international prestige in an association with the Olympic Games, the 
Canadian government, especially Trudeau, distanced themselves from those Games. It 
was important to Trudeau that he did not appear to be pandering to Québec. And, it 
was equally  important to publicly  support the Commonwealth Games for two reasons: 
first, to ensure the Games were a success and not faced with a potential boycott and 
second, to help  quell regional factionalism. Trudeau wanted to show that he and his 
government supported all regions of Canada, not just Québec and Central Canada.
In mid-July  1978, less than one month before the beginning of the Commonwealth 
Games in Edmonton, Campagnolo announced that "Visas will be withheld from South 
African citizens coming to participate in sports competitions or associated congresses 
as representatives of that country. ... Visas will also be withheld from representatives of 
South African national sport federations or any  member organization of a federation 
and from South African executive members of an international sport governing body.!34 
The Globe and Mail noted that, according to Campagnolo, this new policy  met requests 
by  sports people that the Government take responsibility  for the administration of its 
South African sport policy.35 The previous policy, in which associations and federations 
had to monitor invitations and ensure no participation from South African athletes at 
events in Canada, was difficult to monitor and apply. The new policy, however, would 
be policed by the government as all South African citizens would have to apply  for 
visas to enter Canada and the government could, therefore, refuse visas to athletes 
applying for entry in order to attend sporting events.
After the change in Canada!s sport policy  was announced, Sharon Capeling, Director 
of Public Affairs of CUSO wrote to Campagnolo praising the government!s decision:
We would like to express our support of your decision to bar South African 
athletes and sports organization representatives from participating in 
competitions and congresses in Canada. We feel this toughening of 
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government policy  against South Africa!s iniquitous apartheid laws will add 
appreciably  to the ostracism that country  is facing in the world of nations. 
The high calibre of many  of its athletes is well-known, and if enough 
countries ban their participation in sports, the South Africans and their 
government may begin to question seriously their unjust policies.36
In October 1977, Canadian Concerned about Southern Africa (CCSA) organised a 
conference for anti-apartheid groups in Canada. This was the first coordinated, mass 
anti-apartheid event within Canada. The CCSA invited members of the ANC, South 
African Congress of Trade Unions, Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, South West Africa!s 
People Organisation (SWAPO) and Canadian anti-apartheid organisation in an effort 
to:
...mobilize public opinion, on the South Africa question to the fullest extent. 
It is also important and urgent that the effort of the various support groups 
concerned with the Southern Africa question be co-ordinated so as to 
streamline the educational, informational, and aid programs in support of 
the liberation struggles. CCSA is therefore calling a national conference of 
all support groups and organisations active on the Southern Africa 
question.37
The Anglican Church refused the invitation to observe the conference, indicating that 
the format of the meeting did not match the Church!s own anti-apartheid aims. Despite 
the negative response from the Church, the event was successful, according to one of 
its organisers, Lynda Lemberg.38 Some of the recommendations out of the conference 
included increased media outreach; a campaign to raise money for the liberation 
movements; continuation of the boycott of South African goods; and the initiation of a 
series of campaigns which focused on violations of the mandatory  arms embargo, 
sporting events with South African and Canadian participation, investments in South 
African multinationals and Canadian banks providing loans to South Africa.39 The first 
coordinated anti-apartheid event within Canada was, for the most part, successful. The 
conference was able to come up with concrete plans on how to progress the 
movement!s mission in Canada. Yet, it would prove difficult for these groups to continue 
working on a national level. Throughout the 1970s they  faced the same problems: 
expenses associated with communication i.e. long distance calls, travel; lack of 
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leadership  on a national level to provide consistency in messaging; regional groups 
with different aims and goals. It would not be until the mid-1980s that the Canadian 
anti-apartheid movement really  picked up steam under the leadership of large 
Canadian trade unions, the student movement, and stricter anti-apartheid policies 
instituted by the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney.
In May, 1979, the Anglican Church provided the Canadian government and cabinet with 
additional recommendations concerning South Africa, including publicly  discouraging 
new and expanding investments, removing the Commonwealth preferential tax 
agreement, and revisions to the Canadian Code of Conduct for companies operating in 
South Africa that would make companies more responsible for championing the right of 
workers.40  For the most part, these recommendations fell on deaf ears. But, the 
preferential tax agreement was revoked by the minority  government of Prime Minister 
Joe Clark in 1979. According to Tennyson:
The announcement was made totally  without fanfare, however, and the 
government emphasized that the decision reflected the size of the 
imbalance in preferential trade in South Africa!s favour, which meant that 
there was little economic justification from Canada!s point of view for 
continuing to exchange preferential tariff treatment. Thus, the decision was 
motivated more by  financial than political considerations and, indeed, the 
impetus came from the Department of Finance rather than the Department 
of External affairs.41
Again, Canada acted in the best interests of its economy; only  when the preferential 
agreement was no longer beneficial to Canada did the government revoke the tariff.
The 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games
Commonwealth Secretariat Shridath Ramphal "took on the self-appointed role of 
custodian of the [Gleneagles] Agreement! and visited New Zealand in November 1977 
"and made clear that the document was intended to be comprehensive, embracing 
individuals as well as teams, amateurs as well as professionals.!42 Through the end of 
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1977 and the first half of 1978, Ramphal monitored New Zealand and its adherence to 
Gleneagles. By June he  reported that all Commonwealth governments had adhered to 
their obligations under the agreement. In his letter he explains:
The real measure of the success of the Gleneagles Agreement is the fact 
that, since its adoption, there have indeed been no sporting contacts of any 
significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South 
Africa. This was the belief unanimously expressed by  Heads of 
Governments at Gleneagles; this was the promise of the Agreement. It is a 
promise that has been fulfilled. And, of course, its fulfilment has materially 
strengthened the collective international campaign against apartheid.43
Along with Ramphal!s analysis, the Trudeau government noted that the SCSA had 
decided at a meeting in Rabat, that African countries should attend the Commonwealth 
Games, if they  felt that New Zealand had sufficiently  adhered to the Gleneagles 
Agreement; the decision to participate was left up to each individual country.44
Despite assurances from Ramphal that the agreement was successful and being 
applied appropriately, Nigeria chose to boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games. On 
July  26, 1978, Léonard Legault, Canadian High Commissioner to Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, explained that he was summoned to meet with Nigerian Permanent Secretary 
Ukegbu who let Legault know that Nigeria would not be participating in the 1978 
Commonwealth Games. Ukegbu stressed that the decision was difficult to make, 
especially  due to Nigeria!s high esteem for Canada and its leadership in the 
Commonwealth under Trudeau. Legault, using strong language in response to this 
news, let Ukegbu know that Canada deserved better and noted that the decision would 
"surely  damage Nigerian/Canadian relations! but hoped both sides would do what they 
could to limit the damage.45 In a press release issued by  Nigeria!s Federal Ministry  of 
Information on July 26, the government of Nigeria explained that it:
...maintains that the philosophy  that sports and politics should not mix is a 
specious and hipocritical [sic] one. Sporting achievements today  are used 
as a country!s greatness. Sporting links foster development and 
understanding between countries. Therefore, a country  which enjoys 
maintaining sports relations with South Africa stand guilty  of giving indirect 
encouragement to the inhuman policies perpetrated by South Africa. 
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Nigeria stand opposed to any such encouragement and will fight apartheid 
in all its ramifications.46
Having learned an invaluable lesson during the 1976 Olympics, the Canadian 
government reacted immediately  in an attempt to avoid a mass African boycott of the 
Commonwealth Games. In a telegram from New York, a British official informed his 
government that he had spoken to Jamieson and that either Jamieson or Trudeau 
would be speaking to Nyerere and Kaunda to help  secure their support for the 
Commonwealth Games. The British official had spoken to Ramphal who had already 
spoken to Nyerere and Kaunda and both leaders stated that their respective countries 
would be attending the Games.47 Acting Prime Minister Jean Chrétien sent a message 
to all African, Asian and Caribbean embassies. The message was drafted with input 
from Ramphal, who also advised Canada not to panic. Canadian embassy  officials 
were to hand the message over in interviews with individuals in the host country!s 
government, at the highest possible level. The message read:
The government of Nigeria informed us yesterday  in Lagos that Nigeria will 
not participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games and this decision was 
released to the press at the same time. The reason given by  the 
Government of Nigeria is that New Zealand has not, in its view, lived up  to 
the commitments accepted by  all Commonwealth countries at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting last year (the Gleneagles 
Agreement) to take all practical measure to discourage sporting contacts 
with South Africa.
On behalf of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau, I have informed the Government of Nigeria of Canada!s 
profound disappointment and dismay  at the decision it has taken. The 
action of the Nigerian Government is inconsistent with the judgement of the 
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Mr Shridath Ramphal, recently 
conveyed to you, that all members of the Commonwealth have adhered to 
their obligations under the Gleneagles Agreement. The judgement accords 
with the information available to the Government of Canada.
The Nigerian Government!s action is difficult to reconcile with the decision 
of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, taken on July  20, formally  to 
recommend to its members that they  participate in the Commonwealth 
Games in Edmonton. Thus I am confident that Nigeria!s decision will not 
affect the participation of your country!s team and I am happy, on behalf of 
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the Prime Minister, to reiterate that Canada looks forward with pleasure to 
welcoming your team to Edmonton.48
Canada moved quickly  to prevent another boycott on Canadian soil. It did so by 
leveraging its close relationship with non-white Commonwealth nations; they  reiterated 
its policies and the findings of the Secretary-General in regards to the Gleneagles 
Agreement and its application and efficacy since its adoption. Unlike in 1976, Canada 
took very  seriously  any  talk of a boycott of the Commonwealth Games and moved 
swiftly to avoid another boycott.
In August 1978, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, Head of the Federal Military 
Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Arms Forces for the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria wrote to Trudeau noting that Nigeria!s government was quite grieved "that by 
accident of the venue of the Commonwealth Games being Edmonton our decision not 
to participate has to touch directly  or indirectly  our very  good Canadian friends.!49 
Nigeria could not afford to alienate Canada, a strong Commonwealth ally. Much like the 
African nations! response to the Olympic boycott, Nigeria reached out to Canada and 
reiterated to the government that their boycott was due to New Zealand!s continuing 
sport contact with South Africa, more specifically, in this case,  the tour of South Africa 
by a small number of New Zealand rugby players. 
According to Jim Kernaghan of the Toronto Star, Games officials crossed their fingers 
that Nigeria!s withdrawal was an isolated event and not a repetition of the Montréal 
boycott.50  In the end, Nigeria was the only  country  that boycotted the 1978 
Commonwealth Games. Payne writes that despite Nigeria!s withdrawal, "the rest of the 
Commonwealth had no desire to pursue the matter further at this stage.!51 African 
athletes had paid the ultimate price at the 1976 Olympics by not participating in the 
Games. It would have been another blow to African athletes and the prestige of African 
sport had they gone through with a boycott of the Commonwealth Games. In effect, 
they would have further isolated themselves from international competition; this would 
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not have been good for their international relationships nor for their sense of 
nationalism. After the Games ended, Ramphal wrote to Trudeau:
Apartheid of course is still very  much with us, and as long as this is so 
Gleneagles cannot be consigned to the archives. On the contrary, it must 
remain a vital expression of the Commonwealth!s opposition to a social evil 
that remains to be rooted out. No one can be more aware than yourself that 
the question of apartheid not only  endangered the Games, but threatened 
to envelop the entire Commonwealth in acrimony. That it did not do so is a 
tribute to the goodwill and good sense of our members, and not least to 
your impressive statesmanship.52
After the Montréal Olympics, Canada moved into a leadership role in regards to the 
anti-apartheid sport movement in the Commonwealth. According to Macintosh and 
Hawes, this was easy  for them to do because "...Canada had no significant sporting 
ties with South Africa in that country!s most important sports: rugby  and cricket. .... One 
can only  conclude, then, that sport was a convenient vehicle with which Canada could 
show its resolve against apartheid without either doing harm to the economy  or running 
into any  significant opposition from special-interest groups.!53 As mentioned earlier, 
anti-apartheid groups in Canada never used the sports boycott to its full capacity, 
mainly  because Canada did not have the same links to colonial sport that Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa shared. The sports boycotts were successful 
in these countries because it affected everyday  people, not just a small group of 
athletes supporting obscure sports. Canada became pro-active in publicly  speaking out 
against apartheid sport only  in the mid-1970s when two major international events, 
hosted by  Canada were threatened. At this point, it was the government who acted, to 
maintain its international reputation, by  tightening its stance on contact with South 
African sport. 
Continuing Sports Contact with South Africa up to the 1980s
The British government had drawn up a document that could be used, if needed, in a 
defensive situation at the Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 
November 1978. Should Britain!s application of Gleneagles be questioned, the 
government planned on reiterating its sports policy in regards to contact with South 
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Africa: "We maintain a policy  of active discouragement including the withholding of 
grants in cases where contacts with South African sports teams are involved. This 
policy  extends to such contacts in all countries. Given the independence of our sporting 
bodies, our efforts may not always be successful but they  are an honest method of 
reconciling our opposition to Apartheid with the expression in our laws of the freedom 
of the individual.!54 The document also shows that there was limited sporting contact at 
the 1977 and 1978 International Paraplegic Games in Stoke Mandeville and at the 
1977 International Tug of War Championships in Jersey.55
Anthony  Payne explains that although the number of sporting contacts with South 
Africa decreased after the signing of the Gleneagles Agreement, contact was not 
eliminated and continued to cause embarrassment:
For example, in September 1979 Commonwealth High Commissioners in 
London publicly expressed their disquiet about an impending visit to Britain 
by  a South African Barbarians rugby  team; in July  1980 a meeting of the 
Commonwealth Games Federation turned bitter when African and 
Caribbean representatives insisted on discussing a recent British Lions 
rugby  tour of South Africa, pointing out that the British prime minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, had spent noticeably  less energy seeking to prevent the 
tour than she had in promoting a boycott by  British athletes of the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games; and in March 1981 the government of Guyana in 
the Caribbean refused an entry  permit to an English test cricketer, Robin 
Jackman, on the grounds that he had longstanding [sic] sporting links with 
South Africa.56
In regard to the Barbarians tour of Britain, which would involve a mixed race team from 
South Africa, the Minister of Sport, Hector Monro, requested that the Home Rugby 
Unions reconsider their invitation to the Barbarians team.57 Monro also wrote to Peter 
Hain, Chairman of Stop All Racist Tours, to let him know that the British government did 
not have the power to prevent the tour.58 The tour went ahead. Abraham Ordia wrote to 
Monro in October 1979, admonishing the British government for not taking every 
practical step to stop the tour and accusing the British government of contravention of 
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the Gleneagles Agreement.59  The subjectivity  of the agreement allowed for 
philosophical disagreements of this kind - the British government felt that it did all it 
could do to prevent the Barbarians tour, but the African nations felt that Britain fell short 
of its obligations. Ordia went on to threaten a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
should sporting contact with South Africa continue.60
Canada!s new visa policy  "...disallowed visas for all South African athletes and sports 
representatives wishing to enter Canada to participate in sports competitions or 
associated congresses.!61 However, this policy  only  applied to individuals that were 
entering Canada as official representatives of South Africa; it did not apply  to 
professional athletes who were not formally  representing the apartheid state. According 
to a memo from Eric Morse, Sports Liaison Officer, "It appears that the consensus at 
the official level is that visas should be withheld, at least from nationally-representative 
teams and individuals. The question of professionals is a difficult one; again consensus 
favours not interfering with their entry  as this could represent legal problems.!62 The 
Secretary  of State for External Affairs, Jamieson, wrote to the Minister of State for 
Fitness and Amateur Sport, Campagnolo, in May 1978 to reiterate the new policy: 
I therefore propose that we deny  entry  to nationally  representative South 
African teams or individuals wishing to visit Canada for purposes of 
competition, until South Africa wholly  abandons the policy of apartheid in 
sport. The term “nationally  representative” would include any  team or 
individual participating in an event, either multilateral or bilateral, in which 
competitors represent their country, or a national sport federation, or any 
component of such federation. On the basis of my Department!s 
consultations with the Employment and Immigration Commission I 
understand that this is the most feasible policy  to adopt. While it would 
exclude neither professionals, unless they  were participating in an event 
organized on the basis of national representation, nor groups of tourists 
with sporting interests, it would effectively  prevent all significant sporting 
contact between Canadians and South Africans within Canada. I believe 
that we can reasonably  maintain that professionals normally ought not to be 
excluded since they  usually  represent only  themselves, and that the 
proposed policy represents the most that it is practical for us to do.63
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Therefore, visas continued to be issued for "professionals! entering Canada to compete 
in sporting competitions. Professionals included tennis players, golfers, jockeys, 
squash players, and a reporter who was affiliated to an athletic association in South 
Africa but was entering as a reporter, not an athlete. The process of obtaining visas for 
these individuals was as follows: a professional athlete would apply for a visa to the 
Canadian consulate in South Africa, the consulate would contact External Affairs in 
Ottawa with the following information: name, date of birth, occupation - e.g. 
professional tennis player, and the name of the event that the individual was 
participating in; External Affairs in Ottawa would approve the request and a visa would 
be issued.64 Even after the announcement of the change in Canada!s policy  regarding 
visas for South African athletes there were numerous applications approved by 
External Affairs for professional South African athletes.
Visas applications were also requested for the President of the South African Amateur 
Athletic Union, Charles Nieuwoudt, and a Director of the Union, Gert le Roux, both 
attending the World Cup of Athletics in Montréal in 1979. The President of the Union 
claimed to be entering as a private tourist and, as such, he would not undertake any 
official contact with sport federations and organisations nor would he have any  official 
public activities while in Canada. Le Roux noted that he wanted to maintain informal 
sport contacts in hopes that South Africa would be able to rejoin the IAAF.65 The visa 
requests were denied by  External Affairs, with the explanation "For your info 
parameters of policy  would appear to permit decision either way in this case, however 
given general objective of policy, and fact that Republic of South Africa sport is long 
way  from achieving genuine integration, we see no reason to be forthcoming at this 
time, nor do we wish to provide precedent for opening door beyond present limit of 
unaffiliated amateurs and professionals.!66 The Ottawa Citizen ran an article on the 
denial of the visas, noting that both men had applied for tourist visas only; Nieuwoudt 
explained that he had told the Canadian Embassy that he was not attending any  IAAF 
meetings and was travelling to Canada to watch the World Cup.67 The article noted that 
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the reasons given for the refusal was Canada!s obligations under the Gleneagles 
Agreement which discouraged contact with South African sport and then pointed out 
that other South African athletes had been allowed entry  into Canada in recent months, 
like golfer Gary  Player. This reiterates the confusion surrounding the government 
policy: Nieuwodt and le Roux were associated with the Amateur Athletic Union in South 
Africa and, as such, the government felt that they  would have entered Canada as 
representatives of South Africa. Professional athletes, who were not in Canada officially 
representing the Republic, were issued visas because the government chose not to 
prevent this type of sport contact, as professional athletes were not, in most cases, 
representatives of a specific country.
The Canadian government continued to provide funds that allowed teams to take part 
in events that included South African teams in third party  countries. The government!s 
new policies, implemented in the late 1970s, did not prevent this type of sport contact 
with South Africa. In a letter to the President of the Soaring Association of Canada, 
A.O. Schreiter, André Levasseur of Sport Canada, informed Schreiter that Sport 
Canada had been informed that a South African team would be participating in the 
1978 World Soaring Championships in Chateaureaux, France in July-August 1978 and:
In accordance with the federal government!s policy on sport participating 
with South Africa, I wish to advise you that although the Canadian team is 
free to participate, each individual member must be advised of Canada!s 
policy  relative to sporting contacts with South Africa. Would you, therefore, 
notify  all members of the Canadian team that South Africa competitors may 
be participating in the competition.68
A handwritten note at the top of this letter reveals that the information provided by Sport 
Canada to the Soaring Association was "the normal position taken with respect to 
events outside Canada.!69 
Internationally, Canada continued to be involved in anti-apartheid sport activities. In the 
wake of the Montréal Olympics, in November 1976, the UN passed a resolution that 
urged states "...to refuse any official sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to 
sport contacts with South Africa; to refuse visas to South African sportspersons [sic]; 
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and to deny  facilities to teams or sportspersons for visits to South Africa.70  The UN 
Security  Council, of which Canada was a member from 1977 to 1978, passed 
resolution 418 which imposed a mandatory  arms embargo against South Africa in 
1977. And, by  December 1977, the United Nations General Assembly  approved a 
resolution  which included a lengthy  international declaration against apartheid sport. 
Resolution A/RES/32/105 was the most comprehensive UN resolution against 
apartheid in sport. One of its main recommendations was the refusal of financial and 
other assistance to teams and individuals participating in sport against South Africa, 
something which Canada had already  implemented. Other recommendations included: 
denying visas and/or entry  to individuals and teams from countries practicing apartheid 
and requested that states provide public education on the principle of non-
discrimination in sport.71 Given the political upheaval caused by sports boycotts and 
protests during the 1970s and the obvious success of the boycotts, strictly  in terms of 
the boycott!s popularity  and success thus far, the UN moved to solidify  its process of 
isolating South African sport. 
Once the declaration was approved, the UN started drafting an international convention 
against apartheid in sport. Although Canada had been influential in helping draft the UN 
declaration, it refused to take part in the drafting of the convention:
Canada has demonstrated in New York its support for campaign against 
sporting contacts with South Africa by participating actively  in elaboration of 
drafting declaration on subject and in promoting western support for that 
declaration. Its role has been appreciated. Drafting committee must now 
devote itself to elaboration of convention on basis of principles enshrined in 
declaration. Since Canada does not anticipate being able to become a 
party  to any  such convention and since all western countries consulted by 
us during UNGA indicated similar inability  of disinclination, consider there is 
no point in Canada participating in drafting convention. It will be time-
consuming exercise and believe comments on Canadian preoccupations 
would only  be counterproductive in view of inability to adhere to convention 
itself. Recommend therefore that Canada decide not to seek reappointment 
to drafting committee in 1978 but remain member of ad hoc committee as 
demonstration of interest.72
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External Affairs agreed with the suggestion from the office at UN headquarters that 
Canada continue as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, but not as a member of the 
drafting group for the convention. The government chose not to be party  to a 
convention as it was not in the best interest of Canadians, however, it was, 
nonetheless, interested in observing the process as it allowed them to continue 
displaying Canada!s abhorrence of apartheid.
Along with the declaration against apartheid in sport, the UN declared an International 
Anti-Apartheid year, running from March 21, 1978 to March 21, 1979. According to a 
British government telegram: "Its aim is to increase understanding world-wide of the 
nature and practice of apartheid and to mobilise support at all levels to oppose it. UN 
member states are required to report on activities undertaken during the year.!73
To end the decade, in the wake of continuing crises throughout Africa, a declaration 
was drafted during the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, Zambia in 1979. The 
declaration built on previous Commonwealth documents dealing with racism: 
Singapore Declaration and the Gleneagles Agreement. According to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat:
Lusaka expanded upon principles first outlined in the Singapore Declaration 
of 1971, which set out how member states of the Commonwealth must 
embrace equal rights for all regardless of race, colour, creed or political 
belief.
Crucially, it explained in greater detail the obligations that member countries 
face in eliminating discrimination in their own societies, including in the right 
to vote, in civil rights and access to citizenship, or in economic, social or 
cultural fields such as education, health, employment, occupation, housing, 
and social security.74
The formal declaration solidified the Commonwealth!s position on discrimination - the 
association would not tolerate it and promised to fight it.
By the late 1970s, the Trudeau government was in trouble. Canada was struggling with 
high unemployment and inflation. And, by 1979 Lévesque and Trudeau were in a fight 
for the hearts and minds of Canadians. Samuel LaSelva summarises: "Trudeau!s 
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implicit appeal is to the Canadian community  and the universalism its represents; 
Lévesque!s appeal is to the Québécois community  and the particularism implicit in it. At 
their deepest level, such appeals represent not a political impasse so much as a moral 
challenge. The challenge is to imagine a form of federalism that accommodates 
adequately  both the universal and particular, and re-imagines Confederation.!75 As the 
separatist movement gained momentum in the late 1970s, the country was at a cross-
roads again. According to Pierre Trudeau, in 1976 the PQ had come to power:
...on the promise of good government, but no sooner were they  in office 
than they  began talking about the referendum they  were going to hold to 
have Québecers decide between Canada and independence. And, of 
course, their line was that Canada was so far gone that it couldn!t be fixed. 
Canada, they said would never accommodate Québec!s legitimate 
aspirations, so it was no longer a matter of special status; Québecers would 
be asked to vote for independence. Naturally, under the circumstances, I 
had no choice but to reopen the constitutional can of worms once again.76 
Trudeau was a nationalist Prime Minister; he knew that he had to appease each of the 
different loyalties which made up the identities of individual Canadians. By  the end of 
the decade, Trudeau hoped the patriation of the constitution would formalise and 
centralise national feeling within the country. In a Globe and Mail article in 1978, 
Trudeau pleaded "The regions and groups that make up Canada must be united. Their 
unity  requires a political framework. This framework is the federation and these 
institutions the ones which make up the federal authority. The Constitution must define 
this framework and these institutions. The unity  of Canada must transcend the 
identification Canadians have with provinces, regions and linguistic or other 
differences.!77 Trudeau!s plea was heartfelt; he wanted to save Confederation. Trudeau 
went on to explain how the Government plans on making changes in six key  areas: 
improving the federal-provincial relationship; make consultation processes more time-
efficient and less demanding on resources; ensure freedom of action for each 
government to "fulfill its constitutional responsibilities!; better understanding of 
intergovernmental process for taxpayers and citizens; eliminate duplication of 
legislation, policies, programs or services. And, he promised a new constitution and a 
205
75 Samuel V. LaSelva. "Re-imagining Confederation: Moving Beyond the Trudeau-Lévesque Debate!, 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXVI:4, December 1993, p. 700.
76 Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993), pp. 242-3.
77 "Trudeau: Ottawa would accept less power!, Globe and Mail, June 13, 1978, p. 7.
charter of rights and freedoms for Canada by 1981.78  Trudeau hoped these steps 
would help save Canada and stop the separatist agenda. Patriation of the constitution 
would need the support of the provinces, previous governments had already failed in 
garnering this support. So dedicated was Trudeau to the patriation of the constitution 
from Britain he was willing to undertake unilateral patriation should the provinces not 
support the federal government.79 
Pushing forward with the separatist agenda, in 1979, the PQ published the White 
Paper: The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership  Between Equals: 
Sovereignty-Association. The paper called for Québec to be its own independent 
nation, but still use the Canadian dollar and tariffs. Lévesque believed that the 
patriation of the constitution would have negative effects on Québec. He found the 
proposals regarding the constitution insufficient: 
These are old questions that many  federal-provincial conferences have not 
succeeded in resolving ... because the provinces fear they  will lose those 
guarantees of autonomy assured them by  the British North America Act, but 
gnawed at by Ottawa. The constant failure of these periodic endeavors is 
related in particular to a fundamental contradiction which has existed since 
the beginning: between the French people in Québec who need autonomy, 
more and more self-government, and the anglo-Canadian people who 
would easily  be able to accommodate a more and more centralized regime 
because they are the ones who would control it.80
This decade saw great shifts in the power struggle in Canada; Trudeau wanted to limit 
regional-provincial-federal power struggles and make a strong, cohesive federal 
government while Lévesque wanted Québecers to form their own separate nation. The 
two French-Canadians were in a very public struggle over Canadian confederation. On 
June 4, 1979, the Progressive Conservative party  won a minority  election and Joe 
Clark became Prime Minister. The Trudeau government fell due to Canada!s economic 
situation and Trudeau!s preoccupation with constitutional matters. His constitutional 
aspirations would be put on hold for the 200 days that made up Clark!s minority 
government. Conveniently, with Trudeau out of the picture, in December 1979, 
Lévesque published the question which would be put to Québecers during the 
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referendum, to be held in May 1980. The push to save Canada was on. Despite no 
longer being Prime Minister, 1980 began with Lévesque and Trudeau struggling over 
the future of Canada.
Internationally, picking up where the Trudeau government had left off, Flora 
MacDonald, the New Secretary  of State for External Affairs, informed an organisation 
competing in a world championship  in Berlin about Canada!s policy  of discouraging 
contact with South Africa and:
With respect to competitions in third countries, it is more difficult to arrive at 
a policy  which will fulfil our commitment to the campaign against apartheid 
in sport and still be practical to enforce and fair to Canadian sport bodies. 
We consider that in most cases participation in a sport event is the 
responsibility  of the host country, and that it would be unfair to demand that 
Canadian sportsmen withdraw  from such an event when it is often 
impossible to know in advance whether South Africans will actually  be 
present. Therefore when a Canadian team goes abroad to compete in an 
event in which South Africans may  also be participating, the government 
advises the team that officially  it discourages sporting contacts between 
Canada and South Africa, and if any member of the Canadian team refuses 
to compete against the South African team, the government will not provide 
any funds to replace that player, whether or not the original team had 
federal financial support.81
Previously, the Trudeau government had informed the United Nations Special 
Committee on Apartheid that in third party  instances "...the possibility  of South African 
participation in an athletic event in which Canadians may also be participating is not a 
factor which can be influenced by  the application of the financial restraints utilized 
under present Canadian Government policies. The only Government which can apply 
any such influence is the Government of the country  where this event is being held.!82 
By the end of the 1970s, Canada still had not addressed Canadian-South African 
sporting contact in third party countries.
The anti-apartheid sports boycott was weak in comparison to the focus on the economy 
and humanitarian affairs emphasised by  the grassroots movement in Canada and in 
comparison with other Commonwealth nations. Bruce Kidd stands out as the main 
activist working to abolish Canada!s sporting links with South Africa. Few NGOs, 
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church groups or grassroots organisations focused on the sports boycott; mainly 
because Canada had only limited contact with South African sport, unlike Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand. For the most part, the international sports boycott affected 
Canadian policy  due to Canada hosting two major international sporting events in the 
1970s. Canada!s policy  in regards to South African sport evolved over many  years and 
through great turmoil. However, by  the end of the 1970s, the policies were well-
established and would remain unchanged until Conservative Brian Mulroney  became 
Prime Minister in 1984. Although the international sport boycott was the most 
successful campaign in isolating South Africa, in terms of popularity, by  1977 only  "...
99.9956 per cent of sport was still played according to the segregated sports policy! 
and "there were only  56 cases of people joining clubs of other racial groups.!83 Sport 
was important to South Africans and the government was willing to bend apartheid laws 
in order to continue playing international sport. But, by  the end of the 1970s, South 
Africa was virtually isolated from international sport. 
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CHAPTER 9  Conclusion
 
For most of the last century  competitive athletes and sports organisations tried to keep 
politics out of sport. But as sport became a mass phenomenon and increasingly  subject 
to the forces of popular nationalism and ideological manipulation, the state was drawn 
in. This was most obvious in the case of totalitarian regimes of left and right, but it also 
could apply to the liberal constitutional middle ground of politics. In public liberal 
democratic governments have tried to be - or to appear to be - removed from decisions 
involving international sporting relations. Politics, however, proved impossible to keep 
out. The XXI Olympiad in Montréal is a striking example. This Olympics saw  the first 
mass boycott by  IOC member countries in the history  of the modern Olympic Games. 
This boycott, undertaken by  a multitude of African nations, Guyana and Iraq, took place 
just at the point at which Canada established a strong, coherent policy against 
apartheid sport. The two were necessarily  connected. It was the threat of concerted 
diplomatic pressure from the new African states which had concentrated the mind of 
Canadian policy  makers in the years immediately  before the Montréal Olympics. It was 
also the fact of the boycott which drove forward policy  making afterwards and 
concluded in the Gleneagles Agreement. 
For all the many  factors involved in the creation of an anti-apartheid sports policy, close 
analysis of the historical evidence shows the critical importance of a small number of 
policy-makers, and crucially  of Trudeau himself from the time he took office in 1968 to 
when he left office in 1979. By  the time he was reelected in 1980, it was clear that 
Trudeau was an important international figure, well respected for his work in increasing 
Canada!s influence and prestige, especially  in the area of international relations and 
diplomacy. 
When Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, there were two particular issues which 
commanded his personal attention: the rise of the separatist movement in Québec and 
his foreign policy  goal to move Canada forward and have it play  a more progressive 
role on the Commonwealth and, to a larger degree, world stage. Both, however, proved 
to be relevant to his future handling of the anti-apartheid movement. At that point he 
had no idea he would have to deal with the political ramifications of hosting two mega 
sporting events in quick succession. That the most important of the two - the Montréal 
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Olympics - was to be staged in the city  at the heart of the separatist debate clearly 
meant the government had to tread warily  and avoid being seen to undermine the 
event by a diplomatic failure. The Olympics also became mired in Commonwealth high 
politics. This in turn raised the profile of anti-apartheid sport diplomacy. The sudden 
decision to walk out after the Games had actually  started caught the Trudeau 
government by  surprise and was embarrassing for them in relation to the IOC and the 
Games organising committee. This, in turn, motivated the government to ensure the 
success of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games by  taking decisive diplomatic 
initiative in conjunction with the British. This move succeeded and led to the 
Gleneagles Agreement which headed off the risk of mass boycott of Edmonton and 
governed Commonwealth relations to South Africa in the 1980s. 
During these 11 years the Canadian government, under Trudeau!s leadership, made 
extensive changes to its policies dealing with sporting contacts with South Africa. 
Increased activity  and diplomacy  on the part of Trudeau, the Secretaries of State for 
External Affairs and their Department brought Canada!s point of view to the forefront of 
the politics of international sport. In doing so policy  makers at first were motivated by 
both internal and external forces with the balance swinging in favour of external 
diplomatic pressure as time passed.
Several key questions were posed at the beginning of this thesis, it is appropriate to 
address them now. What was the role of moral pressure exerted by  Churches, trade 
unions and other progressive bodies and individuals in the formulation of an anti-
apartheid sports policy? And, did Canadian economic and trading interests effect this? 
Simply, grassroots anti-apartheid groups, Churches, trade unions and other 
progressive organisations had limited influence on Canadian politics and Canadian 
public opinion during the period under investigation. The movement was fractious - 
several small groups worked in isolation in cities and towns across Canada. But the 
Canadian public at first took little notice. During the 1970s, the Canadian groups found 
moderate success in boycotting South African goods; with activists in British Columbia 
striking the largest victory  when the province!s liquor stores removed South African 
wine from their shelves. But, in terms of ongoing trade relations and cultural and sport 
relations, Canadians took very little interest during the time period covered in this 
thesis. As shown above, Canada actually  had limited economic and trade contact with 
South Africa. But, as part of the Trudeau government!s Third Option policy, the 
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government maintained this limited contact in order to diversify  its economic and trade 
ties throughout the 1970s. The government and corporations paid very  little attention to 
calls for cessation of trade with South Africa, voiced by  trade unions, churches and 
anti-apartheid groups. The main reason the government undertook cosmetic changes 
to its trade and economic policies in 1977 was not due to pressure from these sectors, 
but due to the international relations and diplomacy  fiasco surrounding the boycott of 
the 1976 Montréal Olympics and Canada wanting to avoid the same predicament 
during the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. 
The main reason for the lack of interest in the sports boycott was that Canada and 
South Africa did not compete with each other in popular Commonwealth team sports 
like cricket and rugby. Therefore, Canadians were not initially  or directly  affected by  the 
sports boycott. This was one of the main reasons that it was easy  for the government 
of Canada to take the lead in urging the isolation of South African apartheid sport. It is 
not difficult to imagine the outraged reaction from sections of the Canadian public to a 
boycott if there had been a long-standing ice hockey rivalry between Canada and 
South Africa as there was in rugby  between the Springboks and All Blacks. In other 
white Commonwealth countries with cricket and rugby links to South Africa, the anti-
apartheid movement gained momentum from the stubborn opposition of the relevant 
sporting bodies to ending South African touring teams and tours of South Africa. In 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand, anti-apartheid groups, trade unions and churches 
actively  promoted and participated in actions that isolated South Africa sport. By 
encouraging the cessation of sporting contact, these countries were able to effectively 
support and expand anti-apartheid activity within their respective countries - for 
example, trade unions refused to transport South African athletes on commercial 
Australian airlines and churches participated in the Stop the Seventy  Tour movement. 
In the 1970s, Canadian anti-apartheid activists lacked the focus for public activism 
present in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which may  explain the relatively  limited 
role of voluntary associations in the formation of policy. 
What role did Canadian regionalism, notably  the growing "problem! of Québec 
separatism, play? Or was it rather external factors - Canada!s desire to increase its 
"middle-power! status or the relations with emergent African nations, for example - 
which were the crucial catalysts for changes to Canada!s sports policy  in relation to 
South Africa? Widespread regionalism is a striking Canadian characteristic; the main 
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regional division plaguing the Trudeau government during this time period was Anglo-
Canada!s relationship with Québec. Québec!s majority  was French-speaking and the 
Parti Québecois was making serious progress as a nationalist and separatist force in 
the 1970s. In other circumstances, this would not have influenced sports policy  but the 
fact of Montréal, the largest city  in Québec, hosting the Olympic Games, made it 
imperative that the Canadian government should be seen to be alert to the growing 
threat to the Games from the African Commonwealth states. The central government 
could have greatly  assisted the Games by making sure the voices of the African 
nations were heard and by  dealing with the sensitive question of New Zealand!s 
sporting links with South Africa. Yet, the federal government did not publicly  stand up 
and support the African nations. The Canadian government did adopt strict foreign 
policies dealing with apartheid sport, but this was not enough to prevent a boycott of 
the Montréal Olympics. In the immediate run-up  to the Games, Canada!s attention was 
focused on the Taiwan situation and ensuring its delicate relationship  with China was 
not ruined. The IOC and Canada reacted too late to the boycott threat; once the wheels 
were in motion and nations began to depart Montréal there was nothing that could be 
done to bring them back or stop the boycott. 
Whilst such internal pressures need to be borne in mind, the prime reason Canada 
became a key  player in the movement to isolate South African sport was their 
vulnerability  to external pressure as hosts of the Montréal Olympic Games and the 
Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Canada!s policies against participation and 
collusion with apartheid sport became stronger as the threat to these two major 
sporting events increased, culminating in the withdrawal of funding for a disabled event 
at which a mixed-race South African team had been invited. In the run-up to the 1976 
Games, Trudeau approved changes to Canada!s policies dealing with South African 
sport. These included refusing funds to events held in Canada where South African 
athletes would be participating and withdrawing moral support for any  events held in 
Canada which included South African athletes. Although Canada appeared tough on 
apartheid sport, a boycott of the Montréal Games went ahead because of New 
Zealand!s ongoing rugby  relationship  with the apartheid state. After the failure to 
prevent a boycott of the Montréal Games, Trudeau and External Affairs increased and 
accelerated efforts to isolate South Africa from contact with Commonwealth sport, 
leading not only  to the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977 but also to limited economic and 
trade sanctions and the refusal of visas to South African athletes by 1978. Canadian 
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regionalism, although rife, played a minor role in pressurising the federal government to 
change its anti-apartheid sport policies. The main pressure to change its policies came 
from non-white Commonwealth nations; they  proved to hold the power. African nations, 
especially, proved to be the main external catalyst for change; once they walked away 
from the 1976 Olympics, Canada increased its role in isolating South African sport in 
order to ensure the success of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. As 
noted above, the Canadian government worked at amending its own South African 
trade policies, changed its visa requirements, and proactively  and aggressively 
pursued the adoption of the Gleneagles Agreement in order to avoid the 
embarrassment of a second boycott on Canadian soil.
Canadian historiography  surrounding the development of Canada!s anti-apartheid sport 
policy  and its role in the isolation of South African sport is limited. Linda Freeman, a 
former anti-apartheid activist, analyses the Trudeau government!s relationship with 
South Africa in The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau 
and Mulroney  Years.84  Although Freeman does discuss the role of anti-apartheid 
groups during the Trudeau era, there is only  limited mention of the sports and cultural 
boycotts. She emphasises the groups! work on the boycott of goods and their work in 
advocating with corporations. Freeman!s book provides little support for the role 
Trudeau!s government played in isolating South African sport and focuses largely  on 
Brian Mulroney!s Conservative government in the 1980s and its desire to change 
Canada!s anti-apartheid policies to completely cut all ties with South Africa. 
In Sport and Canadian Diplomacy, Donald Macintosh and Michael Hawes over-simplifiy 
the role Canada played during the 1976 Olympics and 1978 Commonwealth Games; 
access to additional resources from External Affairs, focusing specifically  on South 
African sport contact, and access to Pierre Elliott Trudeau!s archives, available since 
his death in 2000, provided in-depth detail regarding the development of Canadian 
policy  through a variety  of documents. Macintosh and Hawes note that Trudeau was 
too preoccupied with the Taiwan situation to adequately  prevent the boycott of the 
Montréal Games. However, this thesis has shown that, beginning in the early  1970s, 
Trudeau, his government ministers and External Affairs worked diligently and 
consistently  to isolate South African sport in an effort to prevent a boycott on Canadian 
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soil. This thesis has expanded its strong argument surrounding the active, participatory 
role that Canada played in isolating South African sport from 1968 to 1980. Additionally, 
regarding the Edmonton Commonwealth Games, Macintosh and Hawes provide an 
overarching history  of Canada!s foreign policies targeting South African sport. They 
note that "sport carried the lion!s share of Canada!s more aggressive stance towards 
apartheid in South Africa!, mainly  due to the fact that the Canadian public would not be 
inconvenienced by  the lack of sporting contact with South Africa.85  This statement is 
accurate for the 1970s; yet it limits the active, participatory  role that Canada played 
throughout the decade. Macintosh, David Black and Donna Greenhorn come to the 
same conclusion in "Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Commonwealth Games.!86 To 
expand on this argument, it is clear that Canada aggressively  pursued the isolation of 
South African sport, mainly  due to the fact that it was host to two global sporting 
events, in 1976 and 1978. It was in Canada!s interest to take a leading role in isolating 
South Africa; when Trudeau and other government leaders realised that the foreign 
policies that had been implemented in the early  1970s were insufficient in preventing 
the 1976 Olympic boycott, they  ramped up their efforts and moved to promote change 
on the international stage through a Commonwealth agreement focused on eliminating 
contact with apartheid sport. This thesis has shown that, more than being an easy 
target, the isolation of South African sport was a major foreign policy  and diplomatic 
development from 1968 to 1980. Canada moved to isolate South Africa in an effort to 
increase its middle power status, prevent a boycott of the 1976 Olympics and 1978 
Commonwealth Games, and secure the stability of the Commonwealth.
The sports boycott and sporting isolation of South Africa was the most successful 
aspect of the broad anti-apartheid movement. White South Africans placed a very high 
value on sport and believed that sport was an important way  to express national pride 
and identity. Their inability  to participate in international sport was a major blow to the 
country, revealing the extent of international condemnation of apartheid, and in 
consequence, apartheid laws and policies governing sport began to be loosened 
before the liberalising of other aspects of South African society. Within the 
Commonwealth, Canada took a leading role in ensuring that the association remained 
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strong in its stance against apartheid sport. Trudeau played a key  role in this process, 
attempting to increase Canada!s importance and value within the Commonwealth while 
navigating the difficult relationship between sport and politics, Ottawa and Québec, and 
Canada!s move away  from American influence to take a distinctive, independent place 
on the world stage.
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Appendix A 
Timeline of Key Events
! 1948 - apartheid becomes the official policy  of the National Party  under Daniel 
Francois Malan. 
! 1958 - South African Sports Association (SASA) established.
! 1958 - Campaign Against Race Discrimination (CARD) created in Wales.
! 1958 - June 22, 1960 - Jean Lesage of the Québec Liberal Party  elected provincial 
Premier - kicking off the Quiet Revolution.
! March 21, 1960 - Sharpeville Massacre where students protesting South African 
pass book laws are shot upon by the police, 69 people are killed.
! March 15, 1961 - South Africa withdraws from the Commonwealth.
! May 31, 1961 - South Africa declared a republic.
! 1962 - South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) established.
! October 30, 1964 to June 12, 1964 - The Rivonia Trial of Nelson Mandela and nine 
other leading ANC figures for sabotage and treason. Eight of the defendants, 
including Mandela, were sentenced to life imprison, one was found not guilty  and 
one was discharged at the end of the case.
! April 1968 - South Africa!s invitation to the Mexico Olympics revoked.
! April 20, 1968 - Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Liberal Party win the federal election.
! 1968 - IOC Killanin fact-finding group tours South Africa.
! October 1968 - Parti Québecois is formed.
! 1969 - Stop the Seventy  Tour (STST) causes mass unrest during South Africa!s 
rugby  tour of Britain in protest to the upcoming South African cricket tour of England, 
due to take place in 1970.
! 1970 - Liberal Party White Paper Foreign Policy for Canadians published.
! April 20, 1970 - Robert Bourassa!s Liberal Party  wins the Québec provincial 
election.
! May 12, 1970 - Montréal is awarded the 1976 Olympic Games at the IOC Meeting in 
Amsterdam. May 1970 - IOC expels South Africa from the Olympic Movement.
! May 22, 1970 - The Cricket Council cancels South Africa!s planned tour of Britain.
! October 1970 - On October 5 British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, is 
kidnapped by  members of the Liberation Cell of the Front de libération du Québec 
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(FLQ). October 8, the FLQ Manifesto was broadcast to the media, as per the 
kidnappers request. October 10, Québec Minister of Labour is kidnapped by  the 
Chenier Cell of the FLQ. October 16, Pierre Trudeau enacts the War Measures Act 
for the first time during peace, as per the request of the governments of the City  of 
Montréal and the Province of Québec. October 17, Pierre Laporte is killed. James 
Cross is found alive on December 3. Members of each cell are arrested in 
November and December.
! 1971 - United Nations General Assembly passes Resolution 2775D XXVI, dealing 
with apartheid sport.
! January  1971 - Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting resulting in the 
Singapore Declaration.
! 1972 - The Liberal Party develops the Third Option policy.
! October 30, 1972 - Trudeau!s Liberals win the election, form a minority government.
! Late 1972 - Louis E. Lefaive, Director of Sport Canada, advised amateur sports 
institutions that no federal assistance will be provided to Canadian athletes who 
intend to participate in events hosted in South Africa.
! 1973 - YWCA publishes Investment in Oppression.
! March 1973 - South African Council on Sport (SACOS) established.
! July  8, 1974 - Trudeau!s Liberals form a majority election, after a non-confidence 
vote which brought down the previous minority Liberal government.
! 1975 - federal government formally  announces that it will not provide funding and 
would withhold moral support for athletes participating in sporting events in South 
Africa and for events in Canada where South African athletes have been invited.
! December 1975 - Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility 
established.
! May 7, 1976 - Marc Lalonde, Minister of Health and Welfare, reiterated to the 
Toronto Paralympiad Committee that the government would not be providing funding 
should the Committee allow South Africa to participate.
! May 24 - 28, 1976 - International Seminar on the Eradication of Apartheid and in 
Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa held in Havana, Cuba.
! June 16, 1976 - Soweto Massacre where South African police shot upon students 
protesting the replacement of English with Afrikaans as the main language of 
instruction in schools.
! July  1, 1976 - The Organization of African Unity  meet in Mauritius and pass a 
resolution encouraging its members to boycott the 1976 Olympics. 
! July 10, 1976 - Tanzania announces that it will be boycotting the Olympic Games.
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! July 17 - August 1, 1976 - Montréal Olympics.  
! November 15, 1976 - Parti Québecois wins the provincial election, René Lévesque 
becomes the Premier.
! March 1977 - The Organization of African Unity  (OAU) calls for a boycott of the 1978 
Commonwealth Games due to New Zealand!s continuing ties with South Africa 
sport.
! June 15, 1977 - Gleneagles Agreement passed.
! December 19, 1977 - Secretary  of State for External Affairs, Donald Jamieson 
announces changes to Canada!s South African trade and economic policy.
! July  1978 - Iona Campagnolo, Secretary  of State (Sport) announces that visas 
would be withheld from representatives of South Africa!s national sport federations.
! June 4, 1979 - Trudeau!s Liberal Party  is defeated, Joe Clark and the Conservatives 
form a minority government
! February  18, 1980 - Trudeau and his Liberal Party  are reelected and form a majority 
government.
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Appendix B
OAU Resolution on Sporting Links with South Africa1
The Tv!enty-Seventh Orc!in 2. ry Session of the Council of                 of the 
Organization of African Unity meeting in Fort Louis, filauritius, beivleen 
24th and       June 1976. 
               that one of the manifesta ti ons of the abomi nab1 e Aparthe i d 
system is the separation of the population of South Africa by race and 
the colour of their skin, 
Reminding., all the States especially those peace-loving states that have 
an  interest in the freedom and dignity of all mankind that the South 
African fascist regime is using sports for political and publicity 
purposes aimed at gaining international acceptability, 
                    that vlhile South Africa is committing V-Ianton massacre 
of our brothers and sisters in Soweto, Johannesburg, Pretoria and elsewhere 
in South Africa, New Zealand condones these atrocities by entertaining 
South African fascists in sports, 
1.  STRONGLY CONDEMNS New Zealand and all countries and International 
Organizations that cooperate with and participate in any sporting 
activity with the Racist Regime of South Africa. 
2.  APPEALS to the International Olympic Committee to bar New Zealand 
from participating in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada. 
3.  CALLS UPON all Member States of the OAU to reconsider their participation 
in this yearls Olympic Games in Canada if New Zealand participates. 
4.  CALLS UPON the International Community to demonstrate once more        
solidarity with Africa in this struggle against Apartheid. 
Ll 
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Appendix C
African Nations! reasons for boycotting the 1976 Olympics, 
as provided by individual countries to the IOC1
[ r)/G ,L\P,/OCT 1976 
ALGERIA 
           
CHAD 
CONGO 
EGYPT 
ETH I or I [", 
GHANA 
GUYANA 
UPPER VOLTA 
IRAK 
KENYA 
LYBIA 
       I 
         
NIGER 
NIGERIA 
SUDAN 
S\·IAZ I LAND 
TOGO 
TUNISIA 
UGA,NDA 
ZAMBIA 
2. Those who did not arrive for any particular reason but made entries: 
GABON CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
             THE GM·1BIA 
SRI LANKA t,1ALAWI 
TANZANIA ZAIRE 
3. Sports affected by               and numbers of competitors involved (see also [\r.re: 
ATHLETICS 
BASKETBALL 
BOXING 
CYCLING 
FENCING 
FOOTBALL 
HANDBALL 
HOCKEY 
JUDO 
           
S\,1 It'i1·1 ING 
SHOOTING 
VOLLEYBALL 
    IGHTL I FTI riG 
173 
14  
90  
31 
1 
51 9 matches cancelled 
15 
16 5 matches cancelled 
11 
13 
2  
5  
13  
6  
   1 
KENYA Government instructions to withdraw. 
NIGEFdA 
T             I /'\ I      C.O;-fii',1 i .:;                \'/1 -r:!""l 
reso·'ut (;!'j          th 
Games ..           0(; 
th(:;           r; :           ; (>:1                         ;', ljn ': Ly ( 
Jun c: 'I9/6 cal!-ing on a'll O/\U nl:?iilbers 
                                   2) 
; } " 
tv                
             
- 2 -
ZAIRE 
TUNISIA 
ALGERIA 
UGANDA 
SRI LANKA 
SvJAZI LAND 
GUYANA 
IRAK 
EL S,ll,L VADOR 
Not due to political considerations, but to national priority  
needs re finance.  
Have requested CSSA for information concerning withdrawals.  
Government interventions to withdraw.  
Not a result of political pressure but a fight against apartheid  
in sport.  
Athletes did not reach minimum standards.  
Withdrawal done without reference to NOC.  
Not motivated by political pressure. Decision taken by Noe re  
participation of New Zealand.  
vJithdrai'/al by NOe as act of protest on sports relations - New Zealar 
South Africa. 
Non-participation due to purely technical aspects and for lack of 
necessary funds. 
LETTERS OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE MAYOR OF THE OLYMPIC VILLAGE  
CAMEROON 
CONGO 
LIBYA 
MALI 
NIGER 
TOGO 
EGYPT 
ETHIOPIA 
GHANA 
UPPER VOLTA 
SUDAN 
CHAD 
ZAMB 1ft. 
Reason - racial segregation 
No reason given 
II II " 
II II II 
II II II 
II II II 
"For private reasons" 
Protest re sports relations New Zealand/South Africa 
Protest at New Zealand1s participation in the Games 
Due to refusal of IOe to exclude New Zealand from the Games 
Due to participation of New Zealand in the Games 
Government intervention 
Government instructions to withdraw 
220
1 Historical Archives of the International Olympic Committee. CIO JO-1976S-BOYCO, 1971-1988, 204879 
- October 1976.
Appendix D
The Sports Policy Announcement of 23 September 1976
The Federal Information Council of the National Party accepts that, taking into account 
the applicable legislation and regulations, the interests of South Africa and all its 
peoples in respect of sport can be served in terms of the following policy:
1. White, Coloured, Indian and black sportsmen and women should all belong to their 
own clubs. Each should control, arrange, and manage its own sporting fixtures.
2. Wherever possible, practical and desirable the committees or councils of the 
different race groups should consult together or have such contact as would 
advance the interests of the sport concerned.
3. Inter-group competition in respect of individual types of sport (will) be allowed at all 
levels, should the controlling bodies so decide.
4. In respect of teams sports, the councils or committees of each racial group should 
arrange their own leagues or programmes within the racial group.
5. Where mutually agreed councils or committees may, in consultation with the 
Minister, arrange leagues or matches enabling teams from different racial groups to 
compete. 
6. Each racial group should arrange its own sporting relationships with other countries 
or sporting bodies in accordance with its own wishes, and each should award its 
own badges and colours.
7. If and when invited or agreed, teams comprising of players from all racial groups 
can represent South Africa, and can be awarded colours which, if so desired, can 
incorporate the national flag or its colours.
8. Attendance at sporting fixtures can be arranged by the controlling bodies.1
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Appendix E
Iona Campagnolo to Canadian sport bodies1
    .       
." 'I 
'i _q 
...... 'i ., 
     1 1 i977 
As you are aware, the question of sporting 
contacts with the Republic of South Africa is an issue 
that has caused increasing concern to the international 
athletic communi ty over' the last several years. In 1970, 
the International Olympic Committee decided to expel the 
South African National Olympic Committee because that 
country's racist sports policies and practices were 
            to be in violation of the IOC regulations. 
Similarly, ,Canada and the international community, 
including a growing number of international sport 
governing bodies, have implemented policies designed 
to express to South Africa firm opposition to the appli-
cation to sports of the policies of apartheid and racial 
discrimination and to impress upon the South African 
Government and                         federations the 
need to make significant changes in these discriminatory 
practices. Some countries and sports federations have 
imposed a total ban on all sporting contacts with South 
African athletes. Other countries have sought to restrict 
and discourage such contacts by other means. Canada, for 
example, has maintained since 1974 a firm policy of not 
giving either financial or moral support to Canadian 
sports bodies for the purpose of travelling to South 
Africa for competition, or of hosting events in Canada in 
which South African teams or athletes are allowed to 
participate. 
000517 
2 
222
1 External Affairs, RG25, Volume 15285, File Part 6 - May 11, 1977.
- 2 -
The Government does not consider itself to be in 
a position to place restrictions on the right of Canadian 
citizens to travel abroad. Nonetheless, the Government 
firmly disapproves of all sport contact with South Africa, 
and within the limits of the policy described above, has 
done all that it can to discourage : such contacts since 
that policy was adopted in 1974. . 
As part. of the international effort to eliminate 
racially discriminatory practices from sports, the united 
Nations         Assembly                 series of resolu-
t ions: -( in 1971 j '-19 75: and - 1976) -:           6n - all member ,.: 
states to (among- other              · refuse · any spons9rship-, 
assistarice or encouragement. ta                 with Soutfi 
Africa, including official receptions for teams; refuse· 
payments of grants to sports bodies or teams or sportsmen; 
and encourage national sports bodies to support the 
exclusion of South Africa from all international sports 
bodies, competitions or tournaments. 
The Canadian Government has supported these 
resolutions and has declared its intention to implement 
their provisions. The Government considers that such 
measures as these are necessary to strengthen the inter-
national effort to. bring about substantial change in 
South African sports policies and practices. While the 
Government recognizes that certain limited steps have 
been taken in South Africa in this 'direction, we consider 
that until now these modifications have been largely 
           are designed solely to give the appearance of 
change, and are not indicative of any real and substantial 
alterations jn the present racially discriminatory 
policies and practices. in ; Soubh African sports. Sport 
activities constitute a very important element in South 
African society, and it is clear that that society's 
self-esteem has been markedly affected by the growing 
isolation of South Africa in international sport. It is 
equally clear that the modifications undertaken to date 
have come about partly as a result of this isolation. 
3 
"-,..
• 
000518 
223
·.. '.            
.' -.. J' 
'-, 
- 3 -
It is with the above considerations in mind that 
I wish to discuss the questiori of future Canadian 
attitudes towards continued sporting contacts with South 
Africa. You will recall that African and other states 
boycotted the Montreal Olympics as a means of expressing 
their              over the policies of New         
regarding sporting relations with South Africa. The 
possibility of some such action was raised in Mr. Lalonde's 
letter of May 3, 1974, to all sport governing bodies, as 
was the possibility of a similar boycott against the 
1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. While some progress 
appears to have been made in recent months in reconciling 
the differing views of the countries concerned, the         
ment believes that there remains a possibility that the 
success of the Edmonton Games may be undermined by a boy-
cott along the lines of the Montreal example. The 
Government is anxious to minimize this possibility and 
is particularly concerned that such a boycott should not 
come about as a result of continuing sporting relations 
between Canada and South Africa. 
In order to avoid such a development, the 
Government is concerned that Canadian sports federations 
and individuals should not undertake actions which might 
cause adverse international attention to be focused 
on Canada or on Canadian sports federations. I therefore 
strongly urge you and other Canadian sports federations to 
do your utmost to discourage sports contacts with South 
Africa at all levels within your sport,         national, 
provincial or local. For its part, the Government will 
continue to enforce the policies expressed above. Further-
more, as a reflection of the seriousness with which we 
regard this matter, the Government will in the future 
strongly discourage and,'if             take a very 
critical attitUde in public towards any proposed sporting 
contact between Canadians and South Africans, whether 
federal funding is involved or not. This concern would 
necessarily include proposals by Canadian sport bodies to 
'host world-class events at their own expense in those 
sports where South Africa is a member of the International 
Federation and, as such, would be eligible to participate. 
• •• 4 
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With your assistance and cooperation, the Government 
is hopeful that these actions will convince South Africa 
of the need to abandon apartheid policies and racially 
discriminatory practices in sport once and for all. 
very truly, 
IonaCampagnolo 
,'. 
000520 
225
Appendix F
Gleneagles Agreement on Sporting Contacts with South Africa, 19771 
The Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport, better known as the Gleneagles 
Agreement, was issued by  Heads of Government from the Retreat held at Gleneagles 
in Scotland during their London meeting in June 1977. 
The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, 
colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination 
as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts 
to foster human dignity  everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government 
reaffirmed that apartheid in sport, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly 
counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they  made at Singapore 
on 22 January 1971. 
They  were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering 
understanding between the people, and especially  between the young people, of all 
countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting 
contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in 
sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they  are prepared to 
condone this abhorrent policy  or are less than totally  committed to the Principles 
embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and 
difficulties and recognising that these were partly  the result of inadequate 
intergovernmental consultations, they  agreed that they would seek to remedy  this 
situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved. 
They  reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and 
welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally  accepted approaches 
to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign. 
Mindful of these and other considerations, they  accepted it as the urgent duty  of each 
of their Governments vigorously  to combat the evil of apartheid by  withholding any  form 
of support for, and by taking every  practical step to discourage contact or competition 
by  their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or 
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from any other country  where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or 
ethnic origin. 
They  fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance 
with its law the methods by  which it might best discharge these commitments. But they 
recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the 
harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter. 
They  acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the 
understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of 
their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the 
past, they  issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with 
a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Governments of the 
Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world. 
Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously  expressed at their 
Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord, there were unlikely  to be 
future sporting contacts of any  significance between Commonwealth countries or their 
nationals and South Africa while that country  continues to pursue the detestable policy 
of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked 
forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and 
to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.
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Press Statement: Canada Defines Policy for South African Sportspeople1" ... ,J ..';; _ •• •• •'.          .'. 
Minn;lre d 'Etat 
Sanle et Sport amaleur 
1978 - 101 
July 14, 1978 
CANADA DEFINES POLICY     
SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTSPEOPLE 
OTTAWA - The federal government has established specific criteria 
for the granting of Canadian visas to South African sportspeople, 
it was announced today by the Honourable lona Campagnolo, Minister 
of State, Fitness tlnc1Amateur Sport, 
Criteria were established following the December 1977 
announcement by External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson which stated 
that non-immigrant visas would be required for all South Africans 
visiting Canada. l'his policy went into effect with implementation 
of the new Canada llwnigration Act on April 10, 1978. 
Crj,teri<l relc'ased. tOllay d1sa110\1I visas for SOllth African 
citizens who wish to come to Canada to participate in sports competi-. 
tions 01' associated congresses ;.IS represcntatLves of thejr country. 
They also apply 'to represent:Jt ives of South 1\frlcan national sport 
federations, to                  of a cOllst"it,ucnt body of South 
Afrh'an national sporl.' federatiolls, and to Sooth 1\frican executive 
members of an international sport governing hody, 
     restrictions are in accordance with the Agreement 
reached by Common'weal th Heads of Government at Gleneagles, 
Scotland           1977. The               sL.lted that Commonwealth 
Governments would take every pructicahle step to discourage 
sporting       with South Africa, because of that country's 
official policy of apartbe .i.J. 
000481 
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Policies           to Canada's hDve been adopted by other 
. . 
Commonwealth countries, inclUliing .il.ustralia. 
The new criteria, announced tod.1Y, are designeu to 
clarify the goverl1lilent '5 previous pol il.:Y on sporting contacts with 
South Africa. 
Under this policy, the federal government refuses to 
provide funding or other assistance to Canadian teams travelling to 
South Africa, or to sporting events or congresses in Canada at which 
South Africans are           to participate. The Canadian policy 
is based on discouragement of Canadian sporting contact with 
South Africa in third countries. 
The Minister felt the policy pl:JecJ .111 unfair Iwrucn on 
inuividual sport and recreation govcrlling houics in Canada. Today's 
announcemcnt wi 11 lIlee t requcs t s 0 r lila ny C;I /1au ian sport speople 
that the government take full responsibility for administration of 
the South Africa        Policy. 
- ..    -
Ref.: N.-Ren6 Mercier 
Tel.: (613) 99S-R1J6S 
.. 
.-
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